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THE MYRIAD REASONS TO HIT “RESET” ON
PATENT-ELIGIBILITY JURISPRUDENCE
Alan J. Heinrich & Christopher T. Abernethy∗
This Article explores the Supreme Court’s recent decision in
Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. in the
historical context of the Court’s jurisprudence regarding the scope of
patent-eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101, including the
broad, judicially created “exceptions” to the statute which exclude
“laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas” from patent
eligibility. The authors posit that the Myriad decision was a significant
departure from the Court’s prior jurisprudence regarding patenteligible subject matter. The authors welcome this departure and
contend that Myriad more accurately adhered to the letter and the spirit
of § 101 than did many of the Court’s prior rulings. The authors further
propose that Myriad’s bright-line test for patent eligibility can provide
a foundation for a clear and workable framework, grounded firmly in
statute, that would at last bring order and consistency to an area of
patent law that has long been riddled with confusion and uncertainty.

∗ Alan J. Heinrich and Christopher T. Abernethy are litigators at Irell & Manella LLP. The
views expressed in this Article are solely those of the authors and do not reflect the views of Irell
& Manella LLP or its clients.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On June 13, 2013, the Supreme Court decided Association for
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.,1 its latest decision on
the scope of patent-eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. In
Myriad, the Court considered the patent eligibility of claims directed
to human DNA sequences. The patentee had discovered the sequence
and precise location on chromosomes 13 and 17 of two genes
(BRCA1 and BRCA2) that, when mutated, are associated with a
substantial increase in an individual’s risk of developing breast and
ovarian cancer.2 The Court decided the case by applying a bright-line
rule. The Court held that naturally occurring DNA sequences are not
patent eligible, but that non-naturally occurring DNA sequences
(known as complementary DNA, or “cDNA”), which are synthesized
using well-known laboratory techniques, are patent eligible.3
The thesis of this Article is twofold. First, we posit that
Myriad’s bright-line rule on patent eligibility sharply conflicts with
much of the Court’s modern § 101 jurisprudence—including, in
particular, with the Supreme Court’s immediately preceding foray
into patent eligibility in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus
Laboratories, Inc.4 Second, we posit that Myriad was “correctly
decided”—that is, decided in accordance with the letter and spirit of
§ 101 itself.
In ruling that cDNA is patent eligible, the Myriad Court
abandoned two primary judicial glosses on § 101 from prior Supreme
Court case law—the “inventive concept” and “preemption” analyses.
The Myriad Court did not ask whether the patentee’s claims to
cDNA included an “inventive concept” beyond the discovery of the
patent-ineligible isolated genes and the use of conventional
laboratory techniques to synthesize cDNA from those genes. Nor did
the Myriad Court consider whether, and to what extent, allowing
claims directed to cDNA would “preempt” further exploitation and
1. 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013).
2. Id. at 2112–13.
3. Id. at 2111 (“[W]e hold that a naturally occurring DNA segment is a product of nature
and not patent eligible merely because it has been isolated, but that cDNA is patent eligible
because it is not naturally occurring.”); id. at 2116–19.
4. 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).
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investigation of the patentee’s discovery of the patent-ineligible
isolated genes. This Article proposes that Myriad’s abandonment of
those judicial glosses presents an opportunity for the Supreme Court
to hit “reset” on its § 101 jurisprudence in future cases.
It is hardly a matter of controversy to observe that § 101 case
law has become a morass, as lower courts have struggled mightily to
apply the Supreme Court’s various judicial glosses on, and
exceptions to, patent eligibility. The result has been inconsistency,
uncertainty, and disagreement between and among district and
appellate judges—and, indeed, conflicts between and within
Supreme Court cases themselves. One need look no further than the
Federal Circuit’s recent case of CLS Bank International v. Alice
Corp. Pty. Ltd.5, in which an “irreconcilably fractured”6 en banc
court failed to articulate any approach to the § 101 analysis that
could garner majority support among the judges. As Chief Judge
Rader remarked, “though much is published today discussing the
proper approach to the patent eligibility inquiry, nothing said today
beyond our judgment has the weight of precedent.”7 In the midst of
such a morass, Myriad’s straightforward analysis is a welcome
change.
At the same time, we recognize that the Supreme Court’s
juridical glosses on, and exceptions to, § 101 have been motivated by
legitimate—and, indeed, weighty—policy concerns. These concerns
include striking the proper balance between spurring innovation
through the grant of a patent monopoly and ensuring that the patent
system does not hamper innovation by restricting the exploitation
and investigation of matters that properly belong in the public
domain. However, in our view, the patent laws provide other tools in
addition to § 101 for striking this balance, and in many cases those
other tools provide a more logical and predictable analysis. Under
the approach to § 101 that we advance in this Article—an approach
that takes its cues from Myriad and the statute itself—most of the
§ 101 cases that we survey may well have turned out the same way,
albeit by a different legal route.
5. 717 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en banc).
6. Id. at 1314 (Moore, J., dissenting) (lamenting the fact that the Federal Circuit “is
irreconcilably fractured over these system claims [when] there are many similar cases pending
before our court and the district courts”).
7. Id. at 1292 n.1 (Rader, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

Fall 2013]

PATENT-ELIGIBILITY

121

This Article begins with an analysis of § 101, including its
constitutional basis and its statutory predecessors. We then survey
the history of the Supreme Court’s case law on patent eligibility,
focusing on the development of the Court’s “judicial exceptions” to
§ 101 and the inconsistencies from case to case in the Court’s
application of those judicial exceptions. We proceed with a
discussion of why, in our view, the Court’s patent-eligibility case law
has diverged too far from the statutory scope of § 101, and we show
how the Court’s frameworks have proven to be unmanageable for
lower courts to apply. We end by considering how future application
and interpretation of Myriad may provide a pivotal opportunity for
the Court to hit “reset” on its § 101 jurisprudence and to bring muchneeded certainty and predictability to this troubled area of the law.
Finally, we note the obvious: the thesis we present here is not
intended to be a descriptive summary on the state of the law today.
Myriad has not, of course, overruled prior Supreme Court cases sub
silentio. It is up to the Supreme Court alone to decide whether, and to
what extent, it will change course in its § 101 jurisprudence. Until
then, lower courts and litigators must apply Supreme Court precedent
as it currently stands, including the judicial glosses and exceptions
that continue in full force under prevailing Supreme Court precedent.
II. PATENT ELIGIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY BASES
Section 101 of the Patent Act defines the categories of subject
matter that are patent eligible. It reads, in its entirety, as follows:
“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the
conditions and requirements of this title.”8
On its face, § 101 states that “any” new and useful “process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter” constitutes patenteligible subject matter.9 However, despite this plain language, the
Supreme Court has recognized “three specific exceptions to § 101’s
broad patent eligibility principles: ‘laws of nature, physical
phenomena, and abstract ideas’” are not patent eligible.10
8. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
9. Id.
10. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010) (emphasis added) (quoting Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980)).
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The task of defining and consistently applying these vague,
judicially created “exceptions” to § 101—which are “not required by
the statutory text”11—has confounded courts, commentators, and
practitioners for more than 150 years. In an attempt to lend a
modicum of clarity to more than a century of confusion, Parts II and
III walk through and analyze the history of patent-eligible subject
matter, starting with the U.S. Constitutional Convention, and ending
with the Supreme Court’s June 13, 2013, decision in Myriad.12
A. Intellectual Property Clause
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution, known as
the “Intellectual Property Clause,” bestows upon Congress the
power: “To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”13
While a plain reading clearly indicates that the Intellectual
Property Clause is expansive in scope, an analysis of the Clause’s
origins is instructive. We begin with the Constitutional Convention
of 1787, wherein James Madison of Virginia and Charles Pinckney
of South Carolina each proposed multiple separate provisions
relating to federal power over intellectual property rights.14 The
Convention Journal for August 18, 1787, listed twenty “powers
proposed to be vested in the Legislature of the United States,” among
which were the following provisions relating to intellectual property:
To secure to literary authors their copy rights for a limited
time
....
To encourage, by proper premiums and provisions, the
advancement of useful knowledge and discoveries
....
To grant patents for useful inventions
To secure to authors exclusive rights for a certain time

11. Id.
12. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2107 (2013).
13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
14. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 321–25 (Max Farrand
ed., 1937); see also S. REP. NO. 1979, 82nd Cong., 2d Sess. (1952), reprinted in 1952
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2396 (describing the history of the Intellectual Property Clause of the U.S.
Constitution when enacting the Patent Act of 1952).
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To establish public institutions, rewards and immunities for
the promotion of agriculture, commerce, trades, and
manufactures.15
Although the Convention Journal does not state who proposed
each of these powers, James Madison’s journal entry for August 18,
1787, indicates that Madison offered the first two proposed powers,
while Pinckney offered the latter three.16 On September 5, 1787, the
Committee of Eleven—which included Madison—merged the
foregoing proposals into a single provision that would become the
Intellectual Property Clause: “To promote the progress of science
and useful arts by securing for limited times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and
discoveries.”17
The Committee unanimously approved the Intellectual Property
Clause without recorded debate,18 and the Clause later became
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution (with only
minor changes in capitalization and punctuation).19
Describing the Intellectual Property Clause in the Federalist
papers, Madison stated that “[t]he utility of this power will scarcely
be questioned,” as the “public good fully coincides in both cases [of
copyrights and patents] with the claims of individuals.”20 Madison’s
reference to the “public good” can best be understood as invoking
the policy goal of incentivizing innovation, which is reflected in the
Intellectual Property Clause’s grant of power to “promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts” by securing to authors and
inventors “the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.”21 This language reflects Madison’s broad proposal
“[t]o encourage, by proper premiums and provisions, the
advancement of useful knowledge and discoveries.”22

15. THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 14, at 321–22.
16. Id. at 324–25.
17. Id. at 505–09.
18. Id. at 505–09, 547.
19. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. (“To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries.”).
20. James Madison, THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 309 (1788).
21. Id.; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (same).
22. THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 14, at 321–22; 324–
25.
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Indeed, the Intellectual Property Clause reflects many of the
broader provisions proposed by Madison and Pinckney, while
eschewing many of the narrow ones. For example, Pinckney
narrowly proposed to “grant patents for useful inventions,” while
Madison broadly proposed protections for “useful knowledge and
discoveries.”23 The Committee of Eleven apparently merged these
two proposals into the Intellectual Property Clause, omitting the
narrow term “patents” and broadly including both the terms
“Inventors” and “Discoveries.”24 Further, the phrase “To promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts” in the Intellectual Property
Clause reflects Madison’s broad proposal “To encourage . . . the
advancement of useful knowledge.”25 As Congress and
commentators have noted, in the late eighteenth century, the word
“Science” in this context was generally understood to mean
“knowledge in general.”26
Similarly, on the copyright front, Madison narrowly proposed to
secure “literary authors their copy rights,” while Pinckney broadly
proposed to secure “authors [their] exclusive rights.”27 The
Intellectual Property Clause again incorporates language akin to the
broader proposal, authorizing Congress to secure to “Authors . . . the
exclusive Right to their . . . Writings.”28 The narrower term
“copyrights”—like the terms “patents” and “inventions”—does not
appear in the Intellectual Property Clause.29
Finally, Pinckney’s narrowest proposal—”To establish public
institutions, rewards and immunities for the promotion of agriculture,
23. Id. (compare Pinckney’s first proposal and Madison’s second proposal) (emphasis
added).
24. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
25. THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 14, at 321–22; 324–
25 (Madison’s second proposal).
26. S. REP. NO. 1979, 82nd Cong., 2d Sess. (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394,
2396 (Committee Report accompanying the Patent Act of 1952, commenting on the history of the
Intellectual Property Clause); see also Giles S. Rich, The Principles of Patentability, 42 J. PAT.
OFF SOC’Y 75, 79–80 (1960) (addressing the meaning of “science” in 1787); Arthur H. Seidel,
The Constitution and a Standard of Patentability, 48 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 5, 11–12 n.14 (1966)
(same); Edward C. Walterscheid, Conforming the General Welfare Clause and the Intellectual
Property Clause, 13 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 87, 93, n.21 (1999) (noting that Samuel Johnson’s A
Dictionary of the English Language, an authoritative dictionary at the time, lists “knowledge” as
the first definition of “science”).
27. THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 14, at 321, 325
(emphasis added) (compare Madison’s first proposal with Pinckney’s second proposal).
28. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
29. Id.
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commerce, trades, and manufactures”30—is not reflected in the
Intellectual Property Clause in any way.31
Overall, the broad language of the Intellectual Property Clause,
coupled with the fact that multiple narrower proposals by Madison
and Pinckney were considered and rejected, suggests that the
Framers intended the Intellectual Property Clause to be expansive in
scope.
B. Legislative History of Section 101
Pursuant to the legislative power granted by the Intellectual
Property Clause, Congress enacted the first patent statute in 1790.32
Congress titled the law “An Act to promote the progress of useful
Arts,” mirroring the language of the Intellectual Property Clause
itself.33 Section 1 of the 1790 Act included the first statutory
provision defining the categories of patent-eligible subject matter,
stating that a patent may be sought by anyone who has invented or
discovered “any useful art, manufacture, engine, machine, or device,
or any improvement therein not before known or used.”34
Patent applications under the 1790 Act were to be submitted to a
Patent Board consisting of the secretary of state, the secretary of war,
and the attorney general, which was entitled to grant a patent if it
“deem[ed] the invention or discovery sufficiently useful and
important.”35 Pursuant to section 2 of the 1790 Act, applicants who
were approved for patent grants were thereafter required to file with
the secretary of state a “specification in writing, containing a
description . . . of the invention or discovery” in sufficient detail “to
enable a workman or other person skilled in the art or
manufacture . . . to make, construct, or use the same, to the end that
the public may have the full benefit thereof, after the expiration of
the patent term.”36 During the brief pendency of the 1790 Act, the
Secretary of State and leader of the Patent Board was “Thomas
30. THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 14, at 325
(Pinckney’s third proposal).
31. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
32. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109 (1790) (repealed 1793).
33. Id.; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“To promote the Progress of . . . useful
Arts . . . .”).
34. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109 (1790) (repealed 1793).
35. Id.
36. Id. ch. 7, § 2. The foregoing provision in section 2 of the 1790 act was clearly the
beginning of the modern written description and enablement requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112.
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Jefferson, who was personally deeply interested in the subject matter
of patent law.”37
The administrative requirements of the 1790 Act proved too
time consuming for the small Patent Board to handle, particularly
considering the numerous other demands placed on the offices of the
secretary of state, the secretary of war, and the attorney general.38
Accordingly, the 1790 Act was replaced after only three years by the
Patent Act of 1793, authored by Thomas Jefferson.39 The 1793 Act
created a registration system whereby patents were granted to anyone
who fulfilled the formal filing requirements and provided an “oath or
affirmation” of the applicant’s belief “that he is the true inventor or
discoverer.”40 The 1793 Act also modified the categories of patenteligible subject matter to include “any new and useful art, machine,
manufacture or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement [thereof], not known or used before.”41
The broad patent-eligibility language in the 1793 Act “embodied
Jefferson’s philosophy that ‘ingenuity should receive a liberal
encouragement.’”42 Moreover, the patent-eligibility provision of the
1793 Act included several notable changes from that of the 1790 Act.
First, the 1793 Act eliminated the “engine” and “device”
categories from the definition of patent-eligible subject matter, while
simultaneously adding a new category for “composition[s] of
matter.”43 This change can best be viewed as broadening the scope of
patent-eligible subject matter, as the eliminated “engine” and
“device” categories were substantially duplicative of the “machine”
category, whereas the broad new “composition of matter” category
was not clearly duplicative of any previously included category.
37. S. REP. NO. 1979, 82nd Cong., 2d Sess. (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394,
2396 (Committee Report accompanying the Patent Act of 1952).
38. Id. at 2397.
39. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318 (1793); see also Diamond v. Chakrabarty,
447 U.S. 303, 308–09 (1980) (referencing Thomas Jefferson as the author of the 1793 Act).
40. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 3, 1 Stat. 321 (1793); see also S. REP. NO. 1979, 82nd
Cong., 2d Sess. (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2397 (Committee Report
accompanying the Patent Act of 1952, discussing the history of the 1793 Act).
41. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 319 (1793) (emphasis added).
42. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308–09 (quoting 5 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 75–76
(Washington ed. 1871)).
43. Compare Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 2, 1 Stat. 110 (1790) (repealed 1793) (categories of
patent-eligible subject matter including “art, manufacture, engine, machine, or device”), with
Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 319 (1793) (categories of patent-eligible subject matter
including “art, machine, manufacture or composition of matter”).
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Second, the 1793 Act added the word “new” to the definition of
patent-eligible subject matter—i.e., “any new and useful art,
machine, manufacture or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement” thereof.44 This is notable because, at the time,
the foregoing provision already included a statement in the same
sentence that the invention or discovery must be “not before known
or used” (1790 Act),45 or “not known or used before the application”
(1793 Act).46 This suggests that Congress (and Jefferson) intended
the word “new” to have a different meaning in the context of patenteligible subject matter, unlinked to the concept of novelty then
reflected in the “known or used” language.47 Otherwise, the addition
of the word “new” would have been redundant. We posit that the
term “new” was added to the definition of patent-eligible subject
matter to convey that something must be “new” to the world to be
patent eligible, even if it was “not known or used” prior to its
discovery. Indeed, as we will discuss in Part V.F and elsewhere
throughout this Article, we believe that the word “new” offers
perhaps the only concrete statutory support for any part of the
Supreme Court’s judicial “exceptions” to § 101.48
Another notable feature of the 1793 Act was its express
recognition that a patent might sometimes dominate later patents that
claim improvements to the originally patented invention, potentially
blocking downstream inventors from practicing their patented
improvements. Specifically, section 2 of the 1793 Act states:
Provided always, and be it further enacted, That any
person, who shall have discovered an improvement in the
principle of any machine, or in the process of any
composition of matter, which shall have been patented, and
shall have obtained a patent for such improvement, he shall
not be at liberty to make, use or vend the original discovery,
nor shall the first inventor be at liberty to use the
improvement.49

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 319 (1793) (emphasis added).
Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 110 (1790) (repealed 1793).
Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 319 (1793).
Id.; see also 35 U.S.C. § 102 (providing the modern novelty requirement).
See infra Part III.
Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 2, 1 Stat. 318 (1793).
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This is significant, as it shows that the patent laws were by design
intended to allow inventors to exclude others from practicing their
patented inventions, even if doing so might preempt later inventors
from practicing their own innovations that build upon or make use of
the earlier patented invention.50
The 1793 Act remained in force until 1836, whereupon it was
replaced in response to dissatisfaction with the granting of patents for
inventions without any formal examination as to novelty or the other
requirements of patentability.51 The 1836 Act established a Patent
Office tasked with examining applications for patentability and given
the power to reject applications if required.52 Despite this change, the
substantive language pertaining to patent-eligible subject matter
remained substantially unchanged in the 1836 Act, as well as in
subsequent revisions to the statute made in 1870 and 1874.53
In 1952, when Congress re-codified the patent laws, it replaced
the word “art” with “process” in the definition of patent-eligible
subject matter, creating the modern embodiment of § 101: “Whoever
invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefore, subject to the
conditions and requirements of this title.”54
The Committee Report to the 1952 Act indicates that this minor
change was merely intended to clarify—not modify—the scope of
patent-eligible subject matter, because the term “art” as used in the
statute had always been interpreted to mean “process or method.”55
50. See, e.g., Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(“A ‘blocking patent’ is an earlier patent that must be licensed in order to practice a later
patent.”).
51. See S. DOC. NO. 338, 24th Cong., 1st Sess. (1836) (report of Senate committee appointed
to study the patent system and propose necessary changes, finding that “[a] considerable portion
of the patents granted are worthless and void, as conflicting and infringing upon one another, or
upon public rights not subject to patent privileges”); see also S. REP. NO. 1979, 82nd Cong., 2d
Sess. (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, at 2397 (Committee Report accompanying
the Patent Act of 1952, discussing the history of the 1836 Act).
52. Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 1, 5 Stat. 117 (1836).
53. Id.; see also Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (“Subsequent patent
statutes in 1836, 1870, and 1874 employed the same broad language.”).
54. Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, § 101, 66 Stat. 792 (1952) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 101)
(emphasis added).
55. See S. REP. NO. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 5, 17 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2394, 2398–99 (“‘Art’ in this place in the present statute has a different meaning than the words
‘useful art’ in the Constitution, and a different meaning than the use of the word ‘art’ in other
places in the statutes, and it is interpreted by the courts to be practically synonymous with process
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Further, section 100(b) of the 1952 Act expressly and broadly
defined the term “process,” stating: “The term ‘process’ means
process, art or method, and includes a new use of a known process,
machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or material.”56 The
Committee Report further states that the foregoing broad definition
was added specifically to quell any remaining doubts as to the
expansive scope of patent-eligible processes.57
Another notable change in the 1952 Act was that, for the first
time, Congress clearly separated the definition of patent-eligible
subject matter from the novelty requirement, codifying these distinct
requirements in sections 101 and 102, respectively.58 The 1952 Act
also included an express non-obviousness requirement for the first
time (section 103),59 and it included a separate section dedicated to
the disclosure requirements (section 112).60 Within section 101’s
definition of patent-eligible subject matter, the novelty-related
language included in prior versions of the statute (e.g., “not known or
used”)61 was deleted and replaced with a statement that the listed
categories of subject matter are patentable “subject to the conditions
and requirements of this title,”62 referring to the additional necessity
of satisfying the separate patentability requirements defined in
sections 102, 103, and 112. Notably, however, Congress retained the
word “new” in section 101’s definition of patent-eligible subject
matter despite moving the novelty requirement to section 102,
indicating that the word “new” in section 101 must mean something
other than mere novelty.63

or method. The word ‘process’ has been used to avoid the necessity of explanation that the word
‘art’ as used in this place means ‘process or method,’ and that it does not mean the same thing as
the word ‘art’ in other places.”).
56. Patent Act of 1952, Pub L. No 82-593, § 100(b), 66 Stat. 792 (1952) (codified at 35
U.S.C. § 100(b)).
57. See S. REP. NO. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2394, 2399 (“The definition of ‘process’ has been added in section 100 to make it clear that
‘process or method’ is meant, and also to clarify the present law as to the patentability of certain
types of processes or methods as to which some insubstantial doubts have been expressed.”).
58. See Patent Act of 1952, Pub L. No 82-593, §§ 100(b) & 101, 66 Stat. 792 (1952)
(codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 100(b) & 101).
59. Id. § 103 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 103).
60. Id. § 112 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 112).
61. See, e.g., Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109 (1790); Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11,
§ 1, 1 Stat. 318 (1793); Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 6, 5 Stat. 117 (1836).
62. Patent Act of 1952, Pub L. No 82-593, § 101, 66 Stat. 792 (1952).
63. See infra Part V.F.
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Finally, the 1952 Act is notable for the fact that the
accompanying Committee Report interpreted the scope of patenteligible subject matter under section 101 to broadly include
“anything under the sun that is made by man.”64 This statement has
been often cited and hotly debated. Some judges and commentators
have suggested that the statement has been taken out of context, as it
was immediately followed by the statement: “but it is not necessarily
patentable under section 101 unless the conditions of the title are
fulfilled.”65 We disagree. To the contrary, proponents of the out-ofcontext argument have themselves taken the relevant statement out
of its context, choosing to analyze only the single sentence: “A
person may have ‘invented’ a machine or a manufacture, which may
include anything under the sun that is made by man, but it is not
necessarily patentable under section 101 unless the conditions of the
title are fulfilled.”66 However, viewing the foregoing statement in its
full context throws cold water on the out-of-context argument, as the
Committee Report to the 1952 Act states:
Section 101 sets forth the subject matter that can be
patented, “subject to the conditions and requirements of this
title.” The conditions under which a patent may be obtained
follow, and section 102 covers the conditions relating to
novelty.
A person may have ‘invented’ a machine or a manufacture,
which may include anything under the sun that is made by
man, but it is not necessarily patentable under section 101
unless the conditions of the title are fulfilled.

64. S. REP. NO. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394,
2399 (emphasis added).
65. See, e.g., Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1303–
04 (2012) (emphasizing the language “but it is not necessarily patentable under section 101”); In
re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 1000 (2008) (Mayer, J., dissenting) (“This statement does not support the
contention that Congress intended ‘anything under the sun’ to be patentable. To the contrary, the
language supports the opposite view: a person may have ‘invented’ anything under the sun, but it
is ‘not necessarily patentable’ unless the statutory requirements for patentability have been
satisfied. Thus, the legislative history oft-cited to support business method patents undercuts,
rather than supports, the notion that Congress intended to extend the scope of section 101 to
encompass such methods.”); Robin Feldman, A Conversation on Judicial Decision-Making, 5
HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 1, 8 (2013).
66. S. REP. NO. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394,
2399.
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Section 102 in paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) repeats the
conditions in the existing law relating to novelty.67
Considered in its full context, we believe that the meaning of the
foregoing passage is quite clear: “Section 101 sets forth the subject
matter that can be patented,” which “may include anything under the
sun that is made by man.”68 However, even if a particular invention
or discovery constitutes patent-eligible subject matter under section
101, it is only patentable “subject to the conditions of and
requirements of this title.”69 “The conditions under which a patent
may be obtained follow [section 101],” in provisions such as “section
102,” which “covers the conditions relating to novelty.”70
Accordingly, we posit that the foregoing passage from the
Committee Report to the 1952 Act does indeed evidence a
congressional intent to broadly define the categories of patenteligible subject matter listed in section 101—i.e., to “include
anything under the sun that is made by man.”71 The statement that
such an invention or discovery will still not be patentable “unless the
conditions of the title are fulfilled” merely conveyed the
unremarkable proposition that the requirements of sections 102, 103,
and 112 must also be satisfied in order to obtain a patent.72
III. A HISTORY OF THE “JUDICIAL EXCEPTIONS” TO SECTION 101
The Supreme Court has recognized “three specific exceptions to
§ 101’s broad patent eligibility principles: ‘laws of nature, physical
phenomena, and abstract ideas’” are not patent eligible.73 In this
part, we analyze relevant Supreme Court cases over the past two
centuries in an effort to determine the bases for and scope of these
judicial exceptions to patent eligibility.
A. The Early Cases
The earliest Supreme Court decision typically cited as relevant
to patent-eligible subject matter is the 1852 case of Le Roy v.
67. Id. (emphasis added).
68. Id. (emphasis added).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103, 112.
73. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010) (emphasis added) (quoting Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980)).
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Tatham.74 The patent at issue in Le Roy described and claimed an
improved machine for manufacturing metal pipes.75 The claimed
machine was designed to exploit the patentees’ discovery “that lead,
when recently become set, and while under heat and extreme
pressure in a close vessel, would reunite perfectly, after a separation
of its parts,” allowing pipes of any length to be crafted without
casting in a mold.76
The primary issue on appeal in Le Roy was the propriety of a
jury instruction pertaining to novelty.77 The trial court had instructed
the jury “that the originality of the invention did not consist in the
novelty of the machinery, but in bringing a newly discovered
principle into practical application.”78 However, the Supreme Court
construed the patent as claiming a “combination of . . . machinery”
for manufacturing pipes, not a method of manufacturing pipes.79
As such, the Court held that it was error to instruct the jury that “the
novelty of the combination of the machinery, specifically claimed by
the patentees as their invention, was not a material fact.”80
It was not disputed in Le Roy that the claimed machine for
manufacturing pipes constituted patent-eligible subject matter.
Moreover, the Court specifically noted that “[t]he question whether
the newly developed property of lead, used in the formulation of
pipes, might have been patented, if claimed as developed, without
the invention of machinery, was not in the case.”81 Nonetheless, for
whatever reason, the Court chose to opine at length on the subject.
Writing for the Court, Justice McLean offered the following:
It is admitted, that a principle is not patentable. A principle,
in the abstract, is a fundamental truth; an original cause; a
motive; these cannot be patented, as no one can claim in
either of them an exclusive right. Nor can an exclusive right
exist to a new power, should one be discovered in addition
to those already known. Through the agency of machinery a
new steam power may be said to have been generated. But
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

55 U.S. 156 (1852).
Id. at 171.
Id. at 173.
Id. at 176–77.
Id. at 176–77.
Id. at 176.
Id. at 177.
Id.
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no one can appropriate this power exclusively to himself,
under the patent laws. The same may be said of electricity,
and of any other power in nature, which is alike open to all,
and may be applied to useful purposes by the use of
machinery.
In all such cases, the processes used to extract, modify, and
concentrate natural agencies, constitute the invention. The
elements of the power exist; the invention is not in
discovering them, but in applying them to useful objects.82
The Court did not cite the Patent Act or its legislative history in
support of the above sweeping dicta. Rather, the Court offered a pure
policy rationale, expressing concern as to the potential preemptive
effects broad patents might have on downstream innovation:
A patent is not good for an effect, or the result of a certain
process, as that would prohibit all other persons from
making the same thing by any means whatsoever. This, by
creating monopolies, would discourage arts and
manufacturers, against the avowed policy of the patent
laws.83
And thus, with a stroke of the pen—without any statutory
interpretation, and in a case that did not raise patent-eligibility
concerns—the Court set in motion a snowball that would grow to
define more than 160 years of patent-eligibility jurisprudence.
A year later, in the 1853 case of O’Reilly v. Morse,84 the
Supreme Court considered a patent directed to Samuel Morse’s
famed invention, the electromagnetic telegraph. The Court found that
Morse was the first and true inventor of the telegraph,85 and it
discerned no flaws in the first seven claims of Morse’s patent, all of
which were directed to the telegraph device and its use.86 However,
the Court took exception to Claim Eight, which read as follows:
Eighth. I do not propose to limit myself to the specific
machinery or parts of machinery described in the foregoing
specification and claims; the essence of my invention being
the use of the motive power of the electric or galvanic
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 174–75.
Id. at 175.
56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1853).
Id. at 109.
Id. at 112.
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current, which I call electro-magnetism, however developed
for making or printing intelligible characters, signs, or
letters, at any distances, being a new application of that
power of which I claim to be the first inventor or
discoverer.87
The Court found that Claim Eight’s broad scope captured more
than Morse was entitled to claim as his invention.88 Although Morse
invented the telegraph, he had “not discovered, that the electric or
galvanic current will always print at a distance, no matter what may
be the form of machinery or mechanical contrivances through which
it passes.”89 The Court expressed concern that Claim Eight could
capture advancements by future inventors who, “in the onward
march of science, may discover a mode of writing or printing at a
distance by means of the electric or galvanic current, without using
any part of the process or combination set forth in the plaintiff’s
specification.”90
The Court found that the disclosure in Morse’s specification
(describing the telegraph and its use) was not commensurate with the
broader scope of Claim Eight (reciting the use of electromagnetism,
by any means, to print characters at a distance). Referring to the
disclosure requirements set forth in sections 5 and 6 of the Patent Act
of 1836,91 the Court stated:
The act of Congress above recited, requires that the
invention shall be so described, that a person skilled in the
science to which it appertains, or with which it is most

87. Id. (emphasis added).
88. Id. at 112–13 (“He claims the exclusive right to every improvement where the motive
power is the electric or galvanic current, and the result is the marking or printing intelligible
characters, signs, or letters at a distance . . . [H]e claims an exclusive right to use a manner and
process which he has not described and indeed had not invented, and therefore could not describe
when he obtained his patent. The court is of the opinion that the claim is too broad, and not
warranted by law.”).
89. Id. at 117.
90. Id. at 113 (emphasis added).
91. Id. at 118 (citing Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, §§ 5 & 6, 5 Stat. 117 (1836)); see also
Patent Act of 1836 § 5 (requiring a patent to include claims “specifying what the patentee claims
as his invention or discovery,” while “referring to the specifications for the particulars thereof”);
id. § 6 (requiring “a written description of [the] invention or discovery, and of the manner and
process of making, constructing, using, and compounding the same, in such full, clear, and exact
terms, avoiding unnecessary prolixity, as to enable any person skilled in the art or science to
which it appertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make, construct, compound, and
use the same”).
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nearly connected, shall be able to construct the
improvement from the description by the inventor.
Now, in this case, there is no description but one, of a
process by which signs or letters may be printed at a
distance. And yet he claims the exclusive right to any other
mode and any other process, although not described by him,
by which the end can be accomplished, if electromagnetism is used as the motive power. That is to say—he
claims a patent, for an effect produced by the use of electromagnetism distinct from the process or machinery
necessary to produce it. The words of the acts of Congress
above quoted show that no patent can lawfully issue upon
such a claim. For he claims what he has not described in
the manner required by law.92
It thus appears that the Supreme Court rested its holding in
Morse on enablement grounds,93 not on any finding regarding patenteligible subject matter.94 We view Morse as an early application of
92. O’Reilly, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 120 (emphasis added).
93. Today, the enablement requirement is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 112, which states:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner
and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to
enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly
connected, to make and use the same . . . .
35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012). In reaching its holding in Morse, the Court analyzed section 6 of the
Patent Act of 1836, which stated the enablement requirement in similar terms to the present-day
statute:
But before any inventor shall receive a patent for any such new invention or discovery,
he shall deliver a written description of his invention or discovery, and of the manner
and process of making, constructing, using, and compounding the same, in such full,
clear, and exact terms, avoiding unnecessary prolixity, as to enable any person skilled
in the art or science to which it appertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to
make, construct, compound, and use the same . . . .
Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 6, 5 Stat. 117 (1836).
94. We join a number of commentators in making the straightforward yet important
observation that Morse was decided on enablement grounds. See, e.g., CRAIG ALLEN NARD, THE
LAW OF PATENTS 61–62 (2008) (“The majority in Morse held claim eight invalid because the
breadth of the claim was not commensurate with the specification. . . . The Court employed the
enablement requirement to constrain claim scope, limiting Morse to his first seven claims.”);
Benjamin Hattenbach, On Illuminating Black Holes in Patent Disclosures: Toward a Structured
Approach to Identifying Omitted Elements Under the Written Description Requirement of Patent
Law, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 1195, 1200 n.21 (2001) (“In evaluating enablement, the question is not
whether something within the scope of the claim is enabled, but whether everything is enabled.
For example, in the infamous telegraph case, [Morse], the Court decided that Morse’s
specification describing the telegraph might have supported claims to the telegraph, but did not
enable claims to all means of using electro-magnetism to communicate at a distance.” (citations
omitted)); A. Samuel Oddi, Regeneration in American Patent Law: Statutory Subject Matter, 46
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the principle that, “[t]o be enabling, the specification of a patent must
teach those skilled in the art how to make and use the full scope of
the claimed invention without ‘undue experimentation.’”95 The
“full scope” enablement doctrine requires a patent’s disclosure to be
“commensurate with the scope of the claims,” thereby preventing
“overbroad claiming that might otherwise attempt to cover more than
was actually invented.”96 In Morse, although the patent specification
enabled a species of invention (i.e., the telegraph), it failed to enable
the full scope of a claim that recited a genus (i.e., the use of
electromagnetism, by any means, to print characters at a distance).97
As the Court explained, Morse’s disclosure of the telegraph “confers
on him the exclusive right to use the means he specifies to produce
the result or effect he describes, and nothing more.”98
Despite the fact that O’Reilly v. Morse is best viewed as a
landmark decision regarding enablement, it would somehow grow to
become synonymous with patent-eligibility jurisprudence over the
coming 160 years, with the Supreme Court and lower courts citing
Morse as support for the maxim that a patent claim may not be so
broad as to wholly “preempt” the use of a fundamental principle.99
IDEA 491, 514 (2006) (“In modern theory, the issue [in Morse] would better be categorized as
one of enablement rather than undue breadth and certainly not one of patentable subject matter.”);
Aaron J. Zakem, Rethinking Patentable Subject Matter: Are Statutory Categories Useful?, 30
CARDOZO L. REV. 2983, 2992 (2009) (“The majority’s concern with the broad coverage of
Morse’s claim would seem to indicate that its primary concern is enablement . . . .”).
95. MagSil Corp. v. Hitachi Global Storage Techs., Inc., 687 F.3d 1377, 1381 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (emphasis added) (quoting Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk, A/S, 108 F.3d 1361, 1365
(Fed. Cir. 1997)); see also Wyeth & Cordis Corp. v. Abbott Labs, 720 F.3d 1380, 1384 (Fed. Cir.
2013) (“Claims are not enabled when, at the effective filing date of the patent, one of ordinary
skill in the art could not practice their full scope without undue experimentation.”).
96. MagSil, 687 F.3d at 1380–81 (quoting Sitrick v. Dreamworks, LLC, 516 F.3d 993, 999
(Fed. Cir. 2008)).
97. O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 120 (1853).
98. Id. at 119 (emphasis added); see also id. at 119–20 (“Indeed, if the eighth claim of the
patentee can be maintained, there was no necessity for any specification, further than to say that
he had discovered that, by using the motive power of electro-magnetism, he could print
intelligible characters at any distance. We presume it will be admitted on all hands, that no patent
could have issued on such a specification. Yet this claim can derive no aid from the specification
filed. It is outside of it, and the patentee claims beyond it.” (emphasis added)).
99. See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3253 (2010) (citing Morse, 56 U.S. (15
How.) at 113) (describing Morse as “explaining that Morse’s patent on electromagnetism for
writing would preempt a wide swath of technological developments”).
To the contrary, Morse actually suggested precisely the opposite—i.e., that one can patent a
broadly-claimed invention if the scope of the claim is fully enabled. See Morse, 56 U.S. (15
How.) at 119 (“Whoever discovers that a certain useful result will be produced, in any art,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, by the use of certain means, is entitled to a
patent for it; provided he specifies the means he uses in a manner so full and exact, that any one

Fall 2013]

PATENT-ELIGIBILITY

137

In the 1874 case of Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard,100 the
Supreme Court considered a patent directed to “a new and useful
rubber head for lead-pencils.”101 The claimed invention comprised a
piece of rubber (i.e., an eraser) containing a socket “so made as to fit
upon a lead-pencil at or near the end thereof.”102 In analyzing this
patent, the Court began by noting that rubber erasers “had long been
known” in the art.103 The Court then noted that “[e]verybody knew,
when the patent was applied for, that if a solid substance was
inserted into a cavity in a piece of rubber smaller than itself, the
rubber would cling to it.”104 The Court then found the patent invalid,
offering the following reasoning:
What, therefore, is left for this patentee but the idea that if a
pencil is inserted into a cavity in a piece of rubber smaller
than itself the rubber will attach itself to the pencil, and
when so attached become convenient for use as an eraser?
An idea of itself is not patentable, but a new device by
which it may be made practically useful is. The idea of this
patentee was a good one, but his device to give it effect,
though useful, was not new. Consequently he took nothing
by his patent.105
The Court’s holding in Rubber-Tip Pencil was rather
ambiguous. The Court’s analysis of the facts—finding that rubber
erasers and rubber sockets were well-known in the art—appeared to
raise concerns regarding obviousness.106 Indeed, only a few years
later, the Supreme Court repeatedly characterized Rubber-Tip Pencil
as having been decided on obviousness grounds.107
skilled in the science to which it pertains, can, by using the means he specifies, without any
addition to, or subtraction from them, produce precisely the result he describes.” (emphasis
added)).
100. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 498 (1874).
101. Id. at 505.
102. Id. at 502.
103. Id. at 505.
104. Id. at 507.
105. Id. (emphasis added).
106. In 1874, at the time of the Rubber-Tip Pencil decision, the Patent Act did not yet include
an express non-obviousness requirement. See Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 566, 571–72
(1870).
107. See, e.g., Wilson Packing Co. v. Chicago Packing & Provision Co., 105 U.S. 566, 571
(1881) (citing Rubber-Tip Pencil for the proposition that a claimed invention “must involve
something more than what is obvious to persons skilled in the art”); Reckendorfer v. Faber, 92
U.S. 347, 356–57 (1875) (citing Rubber-Tip Pencil for the proposition that the mere application
of “mechanical skill” is not “invention”).
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However, the rhetoric at the end of Rubber-Tip Pencil—i.e., that
“[a]n idea of itself is not patentable”—can arguably be read as
addressing the issue of patent eligibility.108 In our view, this vague
and unsupported statement thrown out at the end of the opinion was
largely divorced from the facts of the case. The patent at issue did
not claim an “idea” in the ether; rather, it disclosed and claimed a
specific “rubber head for lead-pencils,” which the Court expressly
found was a “new article of manufacture” (albeit one that required
little ingenuity to create).109 Indeed, it is difficult to fathom how a
specific, new, and useful physical device, which was created by man,
can lack patent eligibility. Perhaps it is for this reason that the facts
and reasoning of Rubber-Tip Pencil have largely been swept into the
dustbin of history. However, the broad statement that “[a]n idea of
itself is not patentable” has lived on, resurrected by the Supreme
Court a century later as support for the maxim that “abstract ideas”
are not patent eligible.110
In 1876, in Cochrane v. Deener,111 the Supreme Court expressly
opined on the patent eligibility of a “process [of] manufacturing
flour.”112 The claimed process included several steps of using cloth
filters to remove impurities from flour while blasting it with air,
leaving behind only “superfine” flour.113 The patent claims at issue
were “not limited to any special arrangement of machinery,” but
rather recited only the steps needed to perform the process.114 In a
cursory analysis without citations, the Court waived off any concerns
as to patent eligibility, holding that “the process may be patentable,
irrespective of the particular form of the instrumentalities used.”115
The Court reasoned that a process “is just as patentable as is a piece
of machinery,” because “[i]n the language of the patent law, [a
process] is an art”116—presumably referring to the subject-matter
108. Rubber-Tip Pencil, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) at 507.
109. Id. at 505.
110. See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981) (“An idea of itself is not
patentable.” (quoting Rubber-Tip Pencil, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) at 507)); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409
U.S. 63, 67 (1972) (noting “the longstanding rule that ‘[a]n idea of itself is not patentable.’”
(quoting Rubber-Tip Pencil, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) at 507)).
111. 94 U.S. 780 (1876).
112. Id. at 784.
113. Id. at 785.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 787.
116. Id. at 788.
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categories of “art” and “machine” listed in the Patent Act of 1870.117
Then, for whatever reason, the Court decided to go further, casually
endeavoring to define the term “process” in the following dictum: “A
process is a mode of treatment of certain materials to produce a given
result. It is an act, or a series of acts, performed upon the subjectmatter to be transformed and reduced to a different state or thing.”118
This seemingly innocuous statement—made in dicta, and without
explanation or citation to authority—was the genesis of what would
later become the “machine-or-transformation test,” discussed
infra.119
The Supreme Court’s next important patent-eligibility decision
came in 1881 with the case of Tilghman v. Proctor.120 Tilghman had
discovered that fat can be separated into its component parts (fat
acids and glycerine) through “the single and simple process of
subjecting the neutral fat, whilst in intimate mixture with water, to a
high degree of heat under sufficient pressure to prevent the water
from being converted into steam.”121 Tilghman’s patent recited a
single claim directed to the foregoing process, irrespective of the
form of machinery used to carry it out.122 The Court held that this
claim was directed to patent-eligible subject matter, stating:
That a patent can be granted for a process, there can be no
doubt. The patent law is not confined to new machines and
new compositions of matter, but extends to any new and
useful art or manufacture. A manufacturing process is
clearly an art, within the meaning of the law.123
Had the Court stopped there, Tilghman would have been a fairly
unremarkable case. However, the Court instead went on to
distinguish O’Reilly v. Morse—the enablement case decided 28 years
prior—by interpreting the holding of Morse in a broad (and we
believe incorrect) manner:

117. See Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 24, 16 Stat. 198, 201 (1870) (“Sec. 24. And be it
further enacted, That any person who has invented or discovered any new and useful art,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, . . .
may . . . obtain a patent therefor.” (emphasis altered)).
118. Cochrane, 94 U.S. at 788.
119. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3221 (2010).
120. Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707 (1880).
121. Id. at 712.
122. Id. at 709–10, 715.
123. Id. at 722.
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The eighth claim of Morse’s patent was held to be invalid,
because it was regarded by the court as being not for a
process, but for a mere principle. It amounted to this,
namely, a claim of the exclusive right to the use of electromagnetism as a motive power for making intelligible marks
at a distance; that is, a claim to the exclusive use of one of
the powers of nature for a particular purpose.124
In contrast, the Court explained, Tilghman claimed a “process of
‘manufacturing fat acids and glycerine from fatty bodies by the
action of water at a high temperature and pressure.’”125 This was a
claim for a patent-eligible “process” and “not for a mere principle,”
the Court reasoned, because it “does not claim every mode of
accomplishing [the] result” of separating fat into its component
parts.126
The foregoing holding was a key turning point in the history of
patent-eligibility jurisprudence. We view the core error of Tilghman
to be the Court’s interpretation of Morse as having invalidated a
claim due to the type of subject matter claimed, as opposed to
invalidating a claim because its breadth was unsupported by a
sufficiently enabling disclosure.127 This led the Tilghman Court to
draw a vague and unsteady distinction between claiming an
unpatentable “principle” and claiming a patent-eligible “process.”128
To be sure, the Tilghman Court could have instead distinguished
Morse on enablement grounds. The Court analyzed the specification
of Tilghman’s patent at length and concluded that it provided a
sufficiently enabling disclosure to support Tilghman’s process
claim.129 Although the process claim was not limited to the use of
any particular machinery, the Court found that the particular
apparatus used “was not material” to the disclosed invention, as the
specification disclosed that the process could be implemented using
means of heating water under pressure that were already well known
in the art.130 This is in stark contrast to Morse, where the patent
124. Id. at 726 (emphasis added) (citing O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 62 (1853)).
125. Id. at 721.
126. Id. at 729.
127. See supra notes 93–98 and accompanying text.
128. Tilghman, 102 U.S. at 721, 726–27, 729.
129. Id. at 718–722.
130. Id. at 718 (“The specification then goes on to describe, by the aid of the drawing referred
to, the particular device mentioned. But it is evident, and indeed is expressly announced, that the
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disclosed a new apparatus (the electromagnetic telegraph), yet
attempted to claim any means of using electromagnetism to print
characters at a distance.131 Morse had “not discovered, that the
electric or galvanic current will always print [characters] at a
distance.”132 Tilghman, on the other hand, had discovered—and
disclosed in his patent—that fat will always separate into its
component parts when one “subject[s] the neutral fat, whilst in
intimate mixture with water, to a high degree of heat under sufficient
pressure to prevent the water from being converted into steam.”133
Thus, unlike the claim at issue in Morse, the “full scope” of
Tilghman’s process claim was enabled by the patent’s
specification.134 Nonetheless, rather than focusing on these core
differences in disclosure and claim scope, the Tilghman Court chose
to distinguish Morse by attributing to that case a sweeping, vaguely
defined, per se patent-eligibility exclusion of any claim directed to a
“mere principle.”135
The Supreme Court appeared to back away from the foregoing
interpretation of Morse only a few years later. In 1888, the Court
decided Dolbear v. American Bell Telephone Co.,136 which
concerned a patent relating to Alexander Graham Bell’s invention of
the telephone. Bell was the first to discover that voices or other
sounds could be transmitted over wires by “creating changes of
intensity in a continuous current of electricity, exactly corresponding
to the changes of density in the air caused by the vibrations which
accompany vocal or other sounds.”137 The Court characterized this as

process claimed does not have reference to this particular device, for the apparatus described was
well known, being similar to that used for producing the hot-blast and for heating water for the
purpose of warming houses.”); id. at 722 (“The apparatus for performing the process was not
patented, and was not material.”); id. (“One may discover a new and useful improvement in [a]
process . . . , irrespective of any particular form of machinery or mechanical device.”); id. at 729
(“The mixing of certain substances together, or the heating of a substance to a certain
temperature, is a process. If the mode of doing [the claimed process], or the apparatus in or by
which it may be done, is sufficiently obvious to suggest itself to a person skilled in the particular
art, it is enough, in the patent, to point out the process to be performed, without giving
supererogatory directions as to the apparatus or method to be employed.”).
131. O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 112 (1853).
132. Id. at 117 (emphasis added).
133. Tilghman, 102 U.S. at 712.
134. See supra notes 95–98 and accompanying text.
135. Tilghman, 102 U.S. at 726–27.
136. 126 U.S. 1 (1888).
137. Id. at 533–34.
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a “discovery [which] astonished the scientific world.”138 Claim Five
of Bell’s patent recited his invention as follows: “The method of and
apparatus for transmitting vocal or other sounds telegraphically, as
herein described, by causing electrical undulations, similar in form to
the vibrations of air accompanying the said vocal or other sounds,
substantially as set forth.”139
At first glance, Claim Five of Bell’s patent may appear to bear
similarities to invalidated Claim Eight of Morse’s patent, which
recited “the use of . . . electro-magnetism, however developed for
marking or printing intelligible characters . . . at any distances.”140
The Court, however, expressly distinguished Morse, stating that
Claim Eight of Morse’s patent had been found invalid because it
recited “the use of [electro]magnetism as a motive power, without
regard to the particular process with which it was connected in the
patent.”141 The Court viewed Bell’s claim differently, as it stated:
In the present case the claim is not for the use of a current
of electricity in its natural state as it comes from the battery,
but for putting a continuous current, in a closed circuit, into
a certain specified condition, suited to the transmission of
vocal and other sounds, and using it in that condition for
that purpose. . . . We see nothing in Morse’s case to defeat
Bell’s claim; on the contrary, it is in all respects sustained
by that authority. It may be that electricity cannot be used at
all for the transmission of speech, except in the way Bell
has discovered, and that therefore, practically, his patent
gives him its exclusive use for that purpose; but that does
not make his claim one for the use of electricity distinct
from the particular process with which it is connected in his
patent. It will, if true, show more clearly the great
importance of his discovery, but it will not invalidate his
patent.142
The foregoing statements indicate that the Dolbear Court was
focused on comparing the claim’s scope to the scope of the patent’s
disclosure—i.e., “the particular process with which [the claim] is
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id. at 539.
Id. at 531.
O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 112 (1853).
Dolbear, 126 U.S. at 534 (emphasis added).
Id. at 534–55 (emphasis added).
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connected in [the] patent.”143 Claim Eight of Morse’s patent was
invalid because it improperly attempted to claim all processes that
use electromagnetism to print characters at a distance, including even
processes not disclosed in the patent.144 In contrast, Claim Five of
Bell’s patent was valid because it claimed the use of electricity to
transmit voices only according to the particular process disclosed in
the patent—i.e., “causing electrical undulations, similar in form to
the vibrations of air accompanying the said vocal or other sounds.”145
Notably absent from the Dolbear Court’s analysis, however, was
any mention of Morse standing for the proposition that claims
directed to “mere principles” are per se excluded from patent
eligibility.146 Indeed, such an approach might have invalidated Bell’s
patent, as Claim Five could have easily been characterized as reciting
the mere principle of using electricity, varied in intensity according
to sound vibrations, to transmit sounds at a distance.
The Supreme Court’s next important decision with implications
for patent eligibility came over 50 years later, in the 1939 case of
Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. v. Radio Corp. of America.147 The
patent at issue was directed to an antenna configuration for the
directional transmission of radio waves.148 At the time of the
invention, it had been well-known in the art that a mathematical
equation (Abraham’s formula) could predict the angle of radio
transmission off of a single charged wire, calculated as a function of
wire length and radio frequency.149 The patentee designed an antenna
comprising multiple wires in a “V” configuration, with the angle of
the V chosen according to Abraham’s formula to ensure that all of
the wires transmit along the axis intersecting the V’s apex.150 The
Court quickly dismissed any patent-eligibility concerns regarding the
claimed antenna, but in doing so, the Court stated the following:
While a scientific truth, or the mathematical expression of
it, is not [a] patentable invention, a novel and useful
structure created with the aid of knowledge of [the]
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id.
Id. at 534.
Id. at 531, 535.
Contra Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707, 726–27 (1880).
306 U.S. 86 (1939).
Id. at 88–90.
Id. at 93–94.
Id. at 90, 93–94.
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scientific truth may be. . . . We assume, without deciding
the point, that [the claimed] advance was invention even
though it was achieved by the logical application of a
known scientific law to a familiar type of antenna.151
This statement—made in dicta and without analysis or citation to
authority—would later come to be repeatedly cited by the Supreme
Court as support for the vague proposition that “laws of nature,”
“abstract ideas,” and “mathematical algorithms” are not patent
eligible, whereas applications of such principles may be.152
With the foregoing decisions—from Le Roy in 1852 to Mackay
Radio in 1939—the Supreme Court had amassed a body of shaky
judicial proclamations that would in time snowball to become the
judicial “exceptions” that govern patent eligibility today.153 We note
two important observations regarding the foregoing body of case
law.
First, by as late as 1939, the Court had conducted very little
statutory interpretation or analysis relevant to the patent-eligibility
inquiry. The Court rarely even cited to the language of the Patent Act
regarding patent eligibility, much less delved into the Act’s
legislative history.
Second, in each of the key decisions above, the Court did not
clearly find any patent claim invalid on patent-eligibility grounds.154
151. Id. at 94 (emphasis added).
152. See, e.g., Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294
(2012) (citing Mackay Radio, 306 U.S. at 94); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188 (1981)
(same); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 591–92 (1978) (same); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63,
67 (1972) (same); Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948) (same).
153. See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010) (“The Court’s precedents
provide three specific exceptions to § 101’s broad patent eligibility principles: ‘laws of nature,
physical phenomena, and abstract ideas.’” (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309
(1980))).
154. One outlier was the case of American Fruit Growers v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1 (1931),
in which the Court invalidated a product claim directed to a “[f]resh citrus fruit of which the rind
or skin carries borax in [an] amount that is very small but sufficient to render the fruit resistant to
blue mold decay.” Id. at 6. The Court narrowly held that an orange treated with borax was not a
“manufacture” within the meaning of the Patent Act, because the “[a]ddition of borax to the rind
of natural fruit does not produce from the raw material an article for use which possesses a new or
distinctive form, quality, or property.” Id. at 11. “There is no change in the name, appearance, or
general character of the fruit,” the Court reasoned, adding that “[i]t remains a fresh orange, fit
only for the same beneficial uses as theretofore.” Id. at 12. The Court offered no explanation for
why such factors were relevant to patent eligibility. Further, the Court’s holding was factually
flawed, as the Court itself recognized that the orange treated with borax did have a new quality
and beneficial use—namely, increased mold resistance and a resulting longer shelf life. See id. at
8, 11–12. Perhaps for these reasons, American Fruit Growers is generally viewed today as an
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In the cases of Le Roy, Cochrane, Tilghman, Dolbear, and Mackay
Radio, the Court found the claimed inventions patentable, while
offering unsupported and vague dicta that could be construed as
narrowing patent eligibility.155 The Court found the claims in Morse
and Rubber-Tip Pencil invalid, but these holdings arguably rested on
enablement and obviousness grounds, respectively.156
Thus, as of 1939, the jurisprudence of patent eligibility was rife
with unclear rhetoric, yet almost entirely devoid of substance.
B. The Competing Biotechs: Funk Bros. and Chakrabarty
We view the modern era of jurisprudence—and confusion—
regarding patent-eligible subject matter as beginning in 1948 with
the case of Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co.157
At the time the patent in Funk Bros. was filed, it was wellknown in the art that root-nodule bacteria (Rhizobium) could be used
to inoculate the seeds of leguminous plants, creating a symbiotic
relationship that assists the resulting plants in gathering nitrogen
from the air.158 Multiple strains of root-nodule bacteria existed, but
no individual strain could inoculate all species of legumes.159
Further, it was believed that the different strains of bacteria could not
be combined in a mixture, as they would mutually inhibit each
other’s effects.160 Farmers were thus often required to buy multiple
packages of inoculants containing different strains of bacteria for use
with their different crops.161
However, the patentee in Funk Bros. discovered that certain
strains of root-nodule bacteria would not mutually inhibit each other
and could be used together in mixed cultures, thus allowing a single

outlier with little or no precedential value, as its holding and reasoning have not been relied upon
by the Supreme Court in any subsequent case, and it has generally been distinguished by lower
courts. See, e.g., DONALD S. CHISUM, 1 CHISUM ON PATENTS: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
PATENTABILITY, VALIDITY AND INFRINGEMENT § 1.02[3][a] (2013) (“[T]he American Fruit
Growers treatment of the meaning of ‘manufacture’ is of little or no precedential value. . . .
Lower court and administrative decisions since American Fruit Growers distinguish its
holding.”).
155. See supra notes 74–83, 112–152 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 84–110 and accompanying text.
157. 333 U.S. 127 (1948).
158. Id. at 128–29.
159. Id. at 129.
160. Id. at 129–30.
161. Id. at 131.
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mixture to inoculate many different plant species.162 The resulting
patent recited a series of claims directed to the new mixture of noninhibitive bacteria, including Claim Four, which read as follows:
An inoculant for leguminous plants comprising a plurality
of selected mutually non-inhibitive strains of different
species of bacteria of the genus Rhizobium, said strains
being unaffected by each other in respect to their ability to
fix nitrogen in the leguminous plant for which they are
specific.163
The Supreme Court held that the patentee’s claims were invalid
for failing to recite patent-eligible subject matter.164 The Court began
by expressly announcing that “phenomena of nature” and “laws of
nature” are per se excluded from patent eligibility:
[P]atents cannot issue for the discovery of phenomena of
nature. The [non-inhibitive] qualities of these bacteria, like
the heat of the sun, electricity, or the qualities of metals, are
part of the storehouse of knowledge of all men. They are
manifestations of laws of nature, free to all men and
reserved exclusively to none. He who discovers a hitherto
unknown phenomenon of nature has no claim to a
monopoly of it which the law recognizes.165
In support of this sweeping decree, the Court merely cited—without
any explanation or analysis—the dicta from its prior cases such as Le
Roy, Dolbear, and Mackay Radio.166 The Court did not address the
relevant language of the Patent Act or the Act’s legislative history.167
In applying the announced per se exclusion to the claims at
issue, the Funk Bros. Court appeared to follow a two-step analysis.
First, the Court identified what it viewed as the “phenomena of
nature” or “law of nature” underlying the patent claims at issue. For
this, the Court pointed to the discovery “that certain strains of each
species of these bacteria can be mixed without harmful effect to the
properties of either”—i.e., “their qualities of non-inhibition.”168 The
Court held that the patentee’s observation of these effects was “no
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id. at 130.
Id. at 128 n.1.
Id. at 132.
Id. at 130 (citations omitted).
Id.
See id. at 128–32.
Id. at 131.
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more than the discovery of some of the handiwork of nature and
hence [was] not patentable.”169
Second, the Court proceeded to consider whether the claims at
issue recited some “invention” beyond the natural principle itself.170
The Court acknowledged that the claimed “aggregation of select
strains of [bacteria] into one product is an application of [the] newlydiscovered natural principle.”171 However, the Court found that this
application “fell short of invention.”172 No matter “how[] ingenious
the discovery of that natural principle,” the Court reasoned that,
“once nature’s secret of the non-inhibitive quality of certain strains
of the [bacteria] was discovered, the state of the art made the
production of a mixed inoculant a simple step.”173 In other words, the
Court apparently treated the natural principle as if it had been wellknown, then found that the claimed application was too “simple” to
be considered an “invention” in view of the known natural
principle.174 As we discuss at length throughout this Article, the
foregoing two-step analysis applied in Funk Bros. was the genesis of
what later became the “inventive concept” test for patent
eligibility.175
In holding that the claimed mixture of bacteria did not include
an inventive concept, the Court emphasized that each individual
strain of bacteria in the mixture was unchanged from its natural state:
Each of the species of root-nodule bacteria contained in the
package infects the same group of leguminous plants which
it always infected. No species acquires a different use. The
combination of species produces no new bacteria, no
change in the six species of bacteria, and no enlargement of
the range of their utility. Each species has the same effect it
always had. The bacteria perform in their natural way. Their
combination does not improve in any way their natural
functioning. They serve the ends nature originally provided
and act quite independently of any effort of the patentee.176
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Id.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. at 132.
Id.
See infra Parts III.D–G.
Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 131.
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It is unclear why the Court chose to focus on individual components
(i.e., each strain of bacteria) as opposed to the claimed invention as a
whole (i.e., the mixture of multiple non-inhibitive bacteria strains).
Indeed, the Court itself acknowledged that the claimed mixture was
“new and useful,” as it allowed a farmer to “buy one package and use
it for any or all of his crops of leguminous plants.”177
Concurring in the Funk Bros. judgment, Justice Frankfurter
raised concerns regarding the workability of the majority’s approach
to the patent-eligibility inquiry. With respect to the new per se
exclusion from patent eligibility, Justice Frankfurter stated the
following:
It only confuses the issue, however, to introduce such terms
as “the work of nature” and the “laws of nature.” For these
are vague and malleable terms infected with too much
ambiguity and equivocation. Everything that happens may
be deemed “the work of nature,” and any patentable
composite exemplifies in its properties “the laws of nature.”
Arguments drawn from such terms for ascertaining
patentability could fairly be employed to challenge almost
every patent.178
Justice Frankfurter further took issue with the majority’s application
of its own framework, stating:
Nor can it be contended that there was no invention because
the composite has no new properties other than its
ingredients in isolation. [The patentee’s] mixture does in
fact have the new property of multi-service applicability.
Multi-purpose tools, multivalent vaccines, vitamin complex
composites, are examples of complexes whose sole new
property is the conjunction of the properties of their
components. Surely the Court does not mean unwittingly to
pass on the patentability of such products by formulating
criteria by which future issues of patentability may be
prejudged.179
Justice Frankfurter would have instead found the patentee’s claims
invalid under an apparent “full scope” enablement theory,180 because
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id.
Id. at 134–35 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Id. at 135.
See supra notes 95–98 and accompanying text.
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while the patent disclosed only that certain specific strains of bacteria
were non-inhibiting, it attempted to broadly claim all mixtures
containing any strains of bacteria that were non-inhibiting.181
About thirty-two years after Funk Bros., in the 1980 case of
Diamond v. Chakrabarty,182 the Supreme Court once again addressed
the patent eligibility of a claimed invention relating to bacteria. The
patent at issue claimed a genetically engineered bacterium capable of
breaking down crude oil.183 Unlike in Funk Bros., the Chakrabarty
Court expressly analyzed the language of the Patent Act pertaining to
patent eligibility, codified in section 35 U.S.C. § 101.184
The Court began by “caution[ing] that courts ‘should not read
into the patent laws limitations and conditions which the legislature
has not expressed.’”185 Addressing the statutory categories of patenteligible subject matter (i.e., “any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter”),186 the Court reasoned that,
“[i]n choosing such expansive terms as ‘manufacture’ and
‘composition of matter,’ modified by the comprehensive ‘any,’
Congress plainly contemplated that the patent laws would be given
wide scope.”187 The Court further noted that the term “‘composition
of matter’ has been construed consistent with its common usage to
include ‘all compositions of two or more substances and . . . all
composite articles, whether they be the results of chemical union, or

181. Id. at 133–34 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“[The patentee] makes no claim that
Funk Brothers used the same combination of strains that he had found mutually compatible. He
appears to claim that since he was the originator of the idea that there might be mutually
compatible strains and had practically demonstrated that some such strains exist, everyone else is
forbidden to use a combination of strains whether they are or are not identical with the
combinations that [the patentee] selected and packaged together. . . . The consequences of such a
conclusion call for its rejection. Its acceptance would require, for instance in the field of alloys,
that if one discovered a particular mixture of metals, which when alloyed had some particular
desirable properties, he could patent not merely this particular mixture but the idea of alloying
metals for this purpose, and thus exclude everyone else from contriving some other combination
of metals which, when alloyed, had the same desirable properties.”).
182. 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
183. Id. at 305.
184. Id. at 307 (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a
patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.” (quoting 35 U.S.C.
§ 101)).
185. Id. at 308 (quoting United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 199
(1933)).
186. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976).
187. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308 (quoting Dubilier, 289 U.S. at 199).
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of mechanical mixture, or whether they be gases, fluids, powders or
solids.’”188
Turning to the legislative history of the Patent Act of 1952, the
Court stated that “the Committee Reports accompanying the 1952
Act inform us that Congress intended statutory subject matter to
‘include anything under the sun that is made by man.’”189 The Court
viewed this as reflecting “Jefferson’s philosophy that ‘ingenuity
should receive a liberal encouragement.’”190
Referring to prior cases, the Chakrabarty Court acknowledged
the existence of certain per se patent-eligibility exclusions:
This is not to suggest that § 101 has no limits or that it
embraces every discovery. The laws of nature, physical
phenomena, and abstract ideas have been held not
patentable. Thus, a new mineral discovered in the earth or a
new plant found in the wild is not patentable subject matter.
Likewise, Einstein could not patent his celebrated law that
E=mc2; nor could Newton have patented the law of gravity.
Such discoveries are “manifestations of . . . nature, free to
all men and reserved exclusively to none.”191
However, the patentee’s genetically engineered bacterium was patent
eligible, the Court held, because “[h]is claim is not to a hitherto
unknown natural phenomenon, but to a nonnaturally occurring
manufacture or composition of matter—a product of human
ingenuity ‘having a distinctive name, character [and] use.’”192 The
Court distinguished Funk Bros. on the basis that, while the patent in
Funk Bros. recited a mixture of naturally occurring bacteria, the
patentee in Chakrabarty had “produced a new bacterium with
markedly different characteristics from any found in nature.”193
188. Id. (quoting Shell Development Co. v. Watson, 149 F. Supp. 729, 280 (D.C. 1957)).
189. Id. at 309 (emphasis added) (quoting S. REP. NO. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1952);
H.R. REP. NO. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1952)). The Court also noted that the same language
was employed by P.J. Federico, a principal draftsman of the 1952 recodification, in his testimony
regarding that legislation: “[U]nder section 101 a person may have invented a machine or a
manufacture, which may include anything under the sun that is made by man. . . .” Id. at 309 n.6
(quoting Hearings on H.R. 3760 before Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Committee on the
Judiciary, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 37 (1951)).
190. Id. at 308–09 (quoting 5 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 75–76 (Washington ed.
1871)).
191. Id. at 309 (emphasis added) (quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333
U.S. 127, 130 (1948) (internal citations omitted)).
192. Id. at 309–10 (quoting Hartranft v. Wiegmann, 121 U.S. 609, 615 (1887)).
193. Id. at 310 (emphasis added).
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C. Benson’s Nutshell
Beginning in the 1970s, the Supreme Court decided three
landmark cases concerning the patent eligibility of “process” claims
directed to the use of mathematical formulas or algorithms. These
cases raised issues pertaining to the Court’s per se exclusion of
“abstract ideas” from patent eligibility.
In 1972, in Gottschalk v. Benson,194 the Supreme Court
considered a patent directed to a method of converting binary-coded
decimal (BCD) numbers into pure binary using a general purpose
computer.195 The Court described the method as an “algorithm” that
was “not limited to any particular art or technology, to any particular
apparatus or machinery, or to any particular end use.”196 The
question presented, the Court said, was “whether the method
described and claimed is a ‘process’ within the meaning of the Patent
Act.”197
However, the Benson Court’s brief reference to the Patent Act
and the “process” category of patent-eligible subject matter was
apparently mere lip service. Without making any attempt to engage
in statutory interpretation or to analyze the Act’s legislative history,
the Court immediately looked to the dicta and unsupported
statements of the Court’s own precedents, stating as follows:
The Court stated in [Mackay Radio] that “[w]hile a
scientific truth, or the mathematical expression of it, is not
patentable invention, a novel and useful structure created
with the aid of knowledge of scientific truth may be.” That
statement followed the longstanding rule that “[a]n idea of
itself is not patentable.” [Rubber-Tip Pencil]. “A principle
in the abstract, is a fundamental truth; an original cause; a
194. 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
195. Id. at 64–66.
The decimal system uses the digits 0-9 arranged in placeholder positions representing powers of
ten. For example, the number 13 in decimal format represents 10 (1*10^1) + 3 (3*10^0).
A pure binary system uses only the digits 0 and 1, arranged in placeholder positions representing
powers of two. Thus, the decimal number 13 in pure binary is represented as 1101,
conceptualized as 8 (1*2^3) + 4 (1*2^2) + 0 (0*2^1) + 1 (1*2^0).
A binary-coded decimal (BCD) system is the same as pure binary, except that each digit of a
decimal number is individually represented by its four-digit binary form. Thus, the number 13 in
BCD form is represented as 0001 0011.
The patent at issue in Benson was directed to an algorithm for converting BCD numbers into pure
binary. Thus, for the number 13, it would convert 0001 0011 (BCD) into 1101 (pure binary).
196. Id. at 64–65.
197. Id. at 64 (citing and quoting 35 U.S.C. §§ 100(b) and 101 (1970)).
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motive; these cannot be patented, as no one can claim in
either of them an exclusive right.” [Le Roy]. Phenomena of
nature, though just discovered, mental processes, and
abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable, as they are
the basic tools of scientific and technological work. As we
stated in [Funk Bros.], “He who discovers a hitherto
unknown phenomenon of nature has no claim to a
monopoly of it which the law recognizes. If there is to be
invention from such a discovery, it must come from the
application of the law of nature to a new and useful end.”198
The Benson Court then analogized the claimed method of BCDto-binary conversion to the overbreadth of Claim Eight in Morse,199
stating that “the ‘process’ claim is so abstract and sweeping as to
cover both known and unknown uses of the BCD to pure binary
conversion.”200 The Court further reasoned that, because “[t]he
mathematical formula involved here has no substantial practical
application except in connection with a digital computer, . . . the
patent would wholly preempt the mathematical formula and in
practical effect would be a patent on the algorithm itself.”201
Accordingly, the Court found that the claimed method of BCD-tobinary conversion failed to recite patent-eligible subject matter.202
In the end, Benson offered little more than the “nutshell” that
claims directed to “algorithm[s]” are not patent eligible:
What we come down to in a nutshell is the following. It is
conceded that one may not patent an idea. But in practical
effect that would be the result if the formula for converting
BCD numerals to pure binary numerals were patented in
this case. The mathematical formula involved here has no
substantial practical application except in connection with a
digital computer, which means that if the judgment below is
affirmed, the patent would wholly pre-empt the
198. Id. at 67 (citing and quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127,
130 (1948); Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939);
Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 498, 507 (1874); Le Roy v. Tatham, 55
U.S. (14 How.) 156, 175 (1852)).
199. Id. at 68–69 (citing and quoting O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1853)); see
also supra notes 84–99 and accompanying text.
200. Id. at 68 (emphasis added).
201. Id. at 71–72 (emphasis added).
202. Id. at 72–73.
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mathematical formula and in practical effect would be a
patent on the algorithm itself.203
As Judge Rich aptly stated in his concurring opinion in Application
of Christensen,204 “[t]he Supreme Court in Benson appears to have
held that claims drafted in such terms [to cover an ‘algorithm’] are
not patentable—for what reason remaining a mystery.”205
As a side note, the Benson Court at one point repeated the
dictum of Cochrane v. Deener regarding the definition of a
“process,” stating, “Transformation and reduction of an article ‘to a
different state or thing’ is the clue to patentability of a process claim
that does not include particular machines.”206 However, the Court
then clarified this language:
It is argued that a process patent must either be tied to a
particular machine or apparatus or must operate to change
articles or materials to a ‘different state or thing.’ We do not
hold that no process patent could ever qualify if it did not
meet the requirements of our precedents.207
D. The “Inventive Concept” Conundrum: Flook and Diehr
The Supreme Court’s next major foray into patent-eligible
subject matter came in 1978, in Parker v. Flook.208 Unlike the claims
in Benson (at least as the Supreme Court interpreted them), the
claims in Flook did not attempt to claim an algorithm itself. Rather,
they claimed a specific industrial process that included the use of a
novel209 algorithm in one of its steps.210 In fact, the Court noted that
Flook’s claims did not “cover every conceivable application” of the
applicant’s algorithm.211
Specifically, Flook claimed a method of updating “alarm limits”
(i.e., numeric warning thresholds) used to signal the presence of
abnormal conditions during a catalytic conversion process.212 The
203. Id. at 71–72 (1972).
204. 478 F. 2d 1392 (C.C.P.A. 1973)
205. Id. at 1396.
206. Benson, 409 U.S. at 70 (quoting Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 788 (1876)).
207. Id. at 71 (emphasis added).
208. 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
209. The Court noted that, “[f]or the purpose of our analysis, we assume that respondent’s
formula is novel and useful and that he discovered it.” Id. at 588.
210. Flook, 437 U.S. at 596–97 (appendix to opinion of the Court).
211. Id. at 586.
212. Id. at 585.
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claimed method generally comprised three steps: (1) measuring the
present value of a process variable (e.g., temperature) during a
catalytic conversion process; (2) calculating an updated alarm limit
using both the process variable and a mathematical algorithm; and
(3) adjusting the alarm limit to reflect the updated value.213 Noting
that the “only novel feature” of the claimed method was the
mathematical formula, the Court framed the issue as “whether the
discovery of this feature makes an otherwise conventional method
eligible for patent protection.”214
The Court began its analysis by noting that “[t]his case turns
entirely on the proper construction of § 101 of the Patent Act, which
describes the subject matter that is eligible for patent protection.”215
However, after merely quoting the statute, the Court immediately
concluded that “[t]he plain language of § 101 does not answer the
question.”216 The Court acknowledged that the claimed method was
“a ‘process’ in the ordinary sense of the word,” but it found that such
a “literal reading” of the Patent Act was incorrect.217
The Flook Court reached this conclusion without any discussion
of legislative history or traditional canons of statutory
construction.218 Rather, the Court once again looked to its own
precedents. First referring to Benson, the Court reasoned that “[t]he
holding that the discovery of [the BCD-to-binary] method could not
be patented as a ‘process’ forecloses a purely literal reading of
§ 101.”219 The Court explained that, because “an algorithm, or
mathematical formula, is like a law of nature, Benson applied the
established rule that a law of nature cannot be the subject of a
patent.”220 As evidence of the “established rule,” the Court quoted
language from many of the cases discussed above, including Le Roy,
Morse, Cochrane, Tilghman, Mackay Radio, and Funk Bros.221 The
213. Id.
214. Id. at 588.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 588–89.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 589 (emphasis added) (citing Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71–72 (1972)).
220. Id. (citing Benson, 409 U.S. at 71–72) (emphasis added).
221. Id. at 589–92 (citing and quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Incculant Co., 333 U.S.
127, 130 (1948); Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939);
Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707, 728 (1880); Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 787–88 (1876);
O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 112–21 (1853); Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.)
156, 175 (1852)).
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Court rejected the argument that, “if a process application
implements a principle in some specific fashion, it automatically falls
within the patentable subject matter of § 101.”222 Rather, the Court
explained, “[t]he rule that the discovery of a law of nature cannot be
patented rests, not on the notion that natural phenomena are not
processes, but rather on the more fundamental understanding that
they are not the kind of ‘discoveries’ that the statute was enacted to
protect.”223 As support for this proposition, the Court cited a patent
law treatise.224
The patentee argued that, unlike the process in Benson, the
claims at issue in Flook did not “wholly preempt the mathematical
formula,” as the claims were limited to catalytic conversion
processes, and they included additional steps such as updating the
alarm limit.225 However, the Court rejected the “notion that postsolution activity, no matter how conventional or obvious in itself, can
transform an unpatentable principle into a patentable process,”
because any “competent draftsman could attach some form of postsolution activity to almost any mathematical formula,” thereby
“exalt[ing] form over substance.”226
Thus, in analyzing the specific claims at issue, the Flook Court
again appeared to adopt a two-step approach similar to that applied
in Funk Bros.227 First, the Court identified what it viewed as the
unpatentable “law of nature” or “idea” underlying the claims—in this
case, the “mathematical algorithm” for calculating alarm limits.228
Second, the Court considered whether the claims recited some
“inventive concept” beyond the mathematical algorithm itself.229 For
this analysis, the Court reasoned that the mathematical algorithm, “as
one of the ‘basic tools of scientific and technological work,’ [must
be] treated as though it were a familiar part of the prior art.”230 In
other words, the Court effectively analyzed Flook’s claim as though
its novel algorithm were not part of the claim at all. The Court
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
594.

Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 (1978).
Id.
Id. at 593 n.15 (quoting P. ROSENBERG, PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS 4, at 13 (1975)).
Id. at 589–90.
Id. at 590 (emphasis added).
See Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Incculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 131–32 (1948).
Flook, 437 U.S. at 589–90.
Id. at 594.
Id. at 591–92 (quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)); see also id. at
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explained that the claimed “process is unpatentable under § 101, not
because it contains a mathematical algorithm as one component, but
because once that algorithm is assumed to be within the prior art, the
application, considered as a whole, contains no patentable
invention.”231 Essentially excising the algorithm of step 2 from the
claim, the Court concluded that the remaining method steps were
already well-known in the art, and on that basis concluded that
Flook’s claim was not directed to patent-eligible subject matter:
Here it is absolutely clear that respondent’s application
contains no claim of patentable invention. The chemical
processes involved in catalytic conversion of hydrocarbons
are well known, as are the practice of monitoring the
chemical process variables, the use of alarm limits to trigger
alarms, the notion that alarm limit values must be
recomputed and readjusted, and the use of computers for
“automatic monitoring-alarming.”232
The Court thus held that “the discovery of such a phenomenon [i.e.,
an algorithm or formula] cannot support a patent unless there is some
other inventive concept in its application.”233 Summing up, the Court
stated, “[v]ery simply, our holding today is that a claim for an
improved method of calculation, even when tied to a specific end
use, is unpatentable subject matter under § 101.”234
The Flook Court recognized that the case raised significant
policy issues as to the proper scope of patent protection, but it
announced that it was up to Congress, not the Court, to resolve those
policy issues.235 This was somewhat ironic, given that the Court
never explained why Congress’s broad language in § 101 did not
itself settle the question, nor did the Court identify the specific
statutory basis for its rejection of Flook’s claims as patent ineligible.
Indeed, the Court elsewhere indicated that its decision was based on
the “absence of precedent [from its own case law] supporting
231. Id. at 594.
232. Id. at 594–95 (emphasis added).
233. Id. at 594.
234. Id. at 595 n.18.
235. Id. at 595–96. (“Difficult questions of policy concerning the kinds of programs that may
be appropriate for patent protection and the form and duration of such protection can be answered
by Congress on the basis of current empirical data not equally available to this tribunal. It is our
duty to construe the patent statutes as they now read, in light of our prior precedents, and we must
proceed cautiously when we are asked to extend patent rights into areas wholly unforeseen by
Congress.”).
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patentability”—case law, in fact, that the Court recognized was from
a different era of technology.236
Justice Stewart dissented, joined by Chief Justice Burger and
Justice Rehnquist.237 Justice Stewart took issue with the majority’s
conflation of patent eligibility (§ 101) with the separate requirements
of novelty (§ 102) and obviousness (§ 103):
The Court today says it does not turn its back on [its] wellsettled precedents, but it strikes what seems to me an
equally damaging blow at basic principles of patent law by
importing into its inquiry under 35 U.S.C. § 101 the criteria
of novelty and inventiveness. Section 101 is concerned only
with subject-matter patentability. Whether a patent will
actually issue depends upon the criteria of §§ 102 and 103,
which include novelty and inventiveness, among many
others. It may well be that under the criteria of §§ 102 and
103 no patent should issue on the process claimed in this
case, because of anticipation, abandonment, obviousness, or
for some other reason. But in my view the claimed process
clearly meets the standards of subject-matter patentability
of § 101.238
In 1981, three years after Flook, the Supreme Court decided
Diamond v. Diehr.239 Similar to the “method for updating alarm
limits” invalidated in Flook, the Court again considered the patent
eligibility of an industrial process that included the use of a
mathematical formula. The industrial process in Diehr was a process
for molding and curing synthetic rubber.240 The claimed process
generally comprised the steps of: (1) constantly measuring the
temperature inside a rubber molding press; (2) feeding the
measurements into a computer that would repeatedly recalculate the
cure time using a known mathematical formula (the “Arrhenius
equation”); and (3) causing the computer to signal a device to open
the press at the optimal time.241
236. Id. at 595 (“To a large extent our conclusion is based on reasoning derived from opinions
written before the modern business of developing programs for computers was conceived. The
youth of the industry may explain the complete absence of precedent supporting patentability.”).
237. Id. at 598 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
238. Id. at 600.
239. 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
240. Id. at 177.
241. Id. at 178–79 & n.5.
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Unlike in Flook, however, the Diehr Court found that this
process was a patent-eligible application of a mathematical
formula.242 In attempting to distinguish Flook, the Court reasoned as
follows:
Parker v. Flook presented a similar situation. The claims
were drawn to a method for computing an ‘alarm limit.’ An
‘alarm limit’ is simply a number and the Court concluded
that the application sought to protect a formula for
computing this number. . . . In contrast, the respondents
here do not seek to patent a mathematical formula. Instead,
they seek patent protection for a process of curing synthetic
rubber. Their process admittedly employs a well-known
mathematical equation, but they do not seek to pre-empt the
use of that equation. Rather, they seek only to foreclose
from others the use of that equation in conjunction with all
of the other steps in their claimed process. These include
installing rubber in a press, closing the mold, constantly
determining the temperature of the mold, constantly
recalculating the appropriate cure time through the use of
the formula and a digital computer, and automatically
opening the press at the proper time.243
Focusing on the physical steps of the claimed process, the Diehr
Court recited the dictum from Cochrane v. Deener defining the term
“process,” stating as follows: “A process is a mode of treatment of
certain materials to produce a given result. It is an act, or series of
acts, performed upon the subject-matter to be transformed and
reduced to a different state or thing.”244 The Court further cited the
related dictum from Benson: “Transformation and reduction of an
article ‘to a different state or thing’ is the clue to the patentability of
a process claim that does not include particular machines.”245 The
Court then applied this language to the patent at issue:
Analyzing respondents’ claims according to the above
statements from our cases, we think that a physical and
chemical process for molding precision synthetic rubber
products falls within the § 101 categories of possibly
242.
243.
244.
245.

Id. at 192–93.
Id. at 186–87 (emphasis added).
Id. at 183 (quoting Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 787–88 (1876)).
Id. at 184 (quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70 (1972)).
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patentable subject matter. That respondents’ claims involve
the transformation of an article, in this case raw, uncured
synthetic rubber, into a different state or thing cannot be
disputed. The respondents’ claims describe in detail a stepby-step method for accomplishing such, beginning with the
loading of a mold with raw, uncured rubber and ending with
the eventual opening of the press at the conclusion of the
cure. Industrial processes such as this are the types which
have historically been eligible to receive the protection of
our patent laws.246
Justice Stevens dissented, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall,
and Blackmun.247 The dissent argued that the relevant facts of Diehr
were “strikingly reminiscent” of those in Flook:
[Flook] involved the use of a digital computer in connection
with a catalytic conversion process. During the conversion
process, variables such as temperature, pressure, and flow
rates were constantly monitored and fed into the computer;
in [Diehr], temperature in the mold is the variable that is
monitored and fed into the computer. In Flook, the digital
computer repetitively recalculated the ‘alarm limit’—a
number that might signal the need to terminate or modify
the catalytic conversion process; in [Diehr], the digital
computer repetitively recalculates the correct curing time—
a number that signals the time when the synthetic rubber
molding press should open.
The essence of the claimed discovery in both cases was an
algorithm that could be programmed on a digital computer.248
In our view, Flook and Diehr are irreconcilable. They conflict in
a number of respects:
First, the Diehr Court did not apply the two-step “inventive
concept” analysis employed in Flook and previously employed in

246. Id. at 184 (emphasis added); see also id. at 192 (“[W]hen a claim containing a
mathematical formula implements or applies that formula in a structure or process which, when
considered as a whole, is performing a function which the patent laws were designed to protect
(e.g., transforming or reducing an article to a different state or thing), then the claim satisfies the
requirements of § 101.” (emphasis added)).
247. Id. at 193 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
248. Id. at 209.
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Funk Bros.249 Rather, the Diehr Court expressly held that “the
‘novelty’ of any element or steps in a process, or even of the process
itself, is of no relevance in determining whether the subject matter of
a claim falls within the § 101 categories.”250
Second, Diehr retreated from Flook’s holding “that a
mathematical algorithm must be assumed to be within the ‘prior
art,’” as a literal application of this rule “would, if carried to its
extreme, make all inventions unpatentable because all inventions can
be reduced to underlying principles of nature which, once known,
make their implementation obvious.”251 The Diehr Court’s patenteligibility analysis thus did not effectively excise the algorithm from
the claims, in direct contrast to the methodology employed in Flook.
Third, Flook and Diehr are factually indistinguishable regarding
the grounds relevant to the patent-eligibility inquiry. The Diehr
Court purported to distinguish Flook under the theory that the claims
in Flook sought to protect a “mathematical formula,” whereas “the
respondents [in Diehr] do not seek to patent a mathematical
formula.”252 But that statement is simply not accurate. As discussed
above, the applicant in Flook did not attempt to patent a
mathematical formula. Instead, exactly as in Diehr, Flook attempted
to patent an industrial process that simply used a mathematical
formula in one of its steps. The Diehr Court further noted that the
respondents’ “process admittedly employs a well-known
mathematical equation, but they do not seek to pre-empt the use of

249. See id. at 204 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that, “[u]nder [the Flook] procedure, the
algorithm is treated for § 101 purposes as though it were a familiar part of the prior art; the claim
is then examined to determine whether it discloses ‘some other inventive concept.’” (quoting
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 591–95 (1978))).
250. Id. at 188–89; see also id. at 189–91 (“It has been urged that novelty is an appropriate
consideration under § 101. Presumably, this argument results from the language in § 101 referring
to any ‘new and useful’ process, machine, etc. Section 101, however, is a general statement of the
type of subject matter that is eligible for patent protection ‘subject to the conditions and
requirements of this title.’ Specific conditions for patentability follow and § 102 covers in detail
the conditions relating to novelty. The question therefore of whether a particular invention is
novel is ‘wholly apart from whether the invention falls into a category of statutory subject
matter.’ . . . In this case, it may later be determined that the respondents’ process is not deserving
of patent protection because it fails to satisfy the statutory conditions of novelty under § 102 or
nonobviousness under § 103. A rejection on either of these grounds does not affect the
determination that respondents’ claims recited subject matter which was eligible for patent
protection under § 101.” (citations omitted)).
251. Id. at 189 n.12.
252. Id. at 186–87.
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that equation.”253 But this was equally true in Flook. Indeed, the
Flook Court specifically noted that Flook’s claims did not “cover
every conceivable application” of the applicant’s algorithm.254
The conflict between Flook and Diehr is even apparent in the
lineup of the Justices in each case. In Flook, Justice Stevens authored
the majority opinion (joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall,
Blackmun, White, and Powell), and Justice Stewart dissented (joined
by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist).255 In Diehr, Justice
Rehnquist authored the majority opinion (joined by Chief Justice
Burger and Justices Stewart, White, and Powell), and Justice Stevens
dissented (joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun).256
Notably, Justices White and Powell were the only Justices that were
members of the majority in both cases. The inconsistencies between
the Court’s opinions in Flook and Diehr thus appear to be explained
by the fact that Justices White and Powell switched factions, for
reasons unknown. In our view, the conflict between Flook and Diehr
continues to generate significant confusion in the case law on § 101.
Following Diehr, the Supreme Court was largely silent
regarding the issue of patent-eligible subject matter for nearly thirty
years.257 Then, beginning in 2010, the Supreme Court decided three
more cases concerning patent eligibility: Bilski v. Kappos,258 Mayo
Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.,259 and
Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.260
These cases substantially covered the gamut of patent-eligible
subject matter, addressing the “abstract idea,” “law of nature,” and
“physical phenomena” exceptions, respectively.
E. The Abstract Concept of Abstractness: Bilski
In Bilski, decided in 2010, the Supreme Court considered a
patent application which claimed a method of hedging financial risk
in commodities markets.261 The application also included dependent
253. Id. at 187.
254. Flook, 437 U.S. at 586.
255. Id. at 584.
256. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 176.
257. The one exception was J.E.M Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S.
124 (2001), which concerned statutory provisions specific to the protection of crossbred plants.
258. 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
259. 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).
260. 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013).
261. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3224. Claim 1 of the patent application in Bilski reads as follows:
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claims limiting the method’s use to “energy” commodities, as well as
a claim directed to using well-known random analysis techniques to
determine how much a seller would gain from each transaction under
different weather patterns.262 The Court held that all claims failed to
recite patent-eligible subject matter under § 101.263 In doing so, the
Court affirmed the judgment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, but rejected the lower court’s reasoning.
In an effort to clarify the confused state of patent-eligibility
jurisprudence, the Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, had adopted the
“machine-or-transformation test” as the “sole test” governing the
patent eligibility of a claimed “process.”264 Under this test, a claimed
process would be patent eligible under § 101 only if: “(1) it is tied to
a particular machine or apparatus, or (2) it transforms a particular
article into a different state or thing.”265 In the Federal Circuit’s
view, the Supreme Court had “enunciated” this as the “definitive
test” for the patent eligibility of a process, based on statements made
by the Court in Cochrane, Benson, Flook, and Diehr.266 Finding that
the claimed method of hedging risk did not satisfy either prong of the
A method for managing the consumption risk costs of a commodity sold by a
commodity provider at a fixed price comprising the steps of:
(a) initiating a series of transactions between said commodity provider and consumers
of said commodity wherein said consumers purchase said commodity at a fixed rate
based upon historical averages, said fixed rate corresponding to a risk position of said
consumers;
(b) identifying market participants for said commodity having a counter-risk position
to said consumers; and
(c) initiating a series of transactions between said commodity provider and said market
participants at a second fixed rate such that said series of market participant
transactions balances the risk position of said series of consumer transactions.
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 949 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc); see also Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3223–24
(same).
262. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3224.
263. Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2111, 2116–18.
264. Id. at 3224 (quoting In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 954–56).
265. Id. (quoting In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 954).
266. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450
U.S. 175, 192 (1981) (holding that use of mathematical formula in process “transforming or
reducing an article to a different state or thing” constitutes patent-eligible subject matter); Parker
v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589 n.9 (1978) (“An argument can be made [that the Supreme] Court has
only recognized a process as within the statutory definition when it either was tied to a particular
apparatus or operated to change materials to a ‘different state or thing.’”); Gottschalk v. Benson,
409 U.S. 63, 70 (1972) (“Transformation and reduction of an article ‘to a different state or thing’
is the clue to the patentability of a process claim that does not include particular machines.”);
Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 788 (1876) (“A process is . . . an act, or a series of acts,
performed upon the subject-matter to be transformed and reduced to a different state or thing.”)).
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machine-or-transformation test, the Federal Circuit found that all
claims failed to recite patent-eligible subject matter under § 101.267
In reviewing the Federal Circuit’s decision, the Bilski Court
began by reaffirming that “[t]he Court’s precedents provide three
specific exceptions to § 101’s broad patent eligibility principles:
‘laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas.’”268 For
perhaps the first time, the Court openly conceded that “these
exceptions are not required by the statutory text,” although it
opined—without explanation—that “they are consistent with the
notion that a patentable process must be ‘new and useful.’”269 Citing
the famous dicta of Le Roy v. Tatham, the Court reasoned that, “in
any case, these exceptions have defined the reach of the statute as a
matter of statutory stare decisis going back 150 years.”270 And thus,
the Court reaffirmed the authority of its own precedents, divorced
from any actual statutory interpretation.271
However, in reviewing the Federal Circuit’s adoption of the
machine-or-transformation test, the Court inconsistently cautioned
that “courts should not read into the patent laws limitations and
conditions which the legislature has not expressed.”272 The Court
further stated that, “as in all statutory construction, ‘[u]nless
otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary,
contemporary, common meaning.’”273 “Any suggestion in this
Court’s case law that the Patent Act’s terms deviate from their
ordinary meaning [had] only been an explanation for the exceptions
for laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas”—i.e., the
exceptions to the statute that the Supreme Court had itself created.274

267. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 963–66.
268. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3225 (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980)).
269. Id. (emphasis added).
270. Id. (citing Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 174–75 (1852)); see also supra
note 82 and accompanying text.
271. Given the history of the Supreme Court’s patent-eligibility jurisprudence reviewed here,
and the Court’s own recognition in Bilski that its judicial exceptions to section 101 are beyond the
statutory text, it is somewhat ironic that the Court concluded its analysis in Bilski with the
statement that, “[t]oday, the Court once again declines to impose limitations on the Patent Act
that are inconsistent with the Act’s text.” Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3231.
272. Id. at 3226 (citations omitted) (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
273. Id. (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
274. Id.
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The Court reasoned that it was “unaware of any ‘ordinary,
contemporary, common meaning’ of the definitional terms ‘process,
art or method’ that would require these terms to be tied to a machine
or to transform an article.”275 The Court had never endorsed the
machine-or-transformation test as the “exclusive test” for the patent
eligibility of a process; rather, in Benson, the Court had “explicitly
declined to ‘hold that no process patent could ever qualify if it did
not meet [machine or transformation] requirements.’”276 Thus, the
Court held that, while the “machine-or-transformation test is a useful
and important clue, an investigative tool, . . . [it] is not the sole test
for deciding whether an invention is a patent-eligible ‘process.’”277
The Court further rejected arguments that computer programs278 and
business methods279 were per se excluded from patent eligibility.
The Bilski Court declined to “define further what constitutes a
patentable ‘process.’”280 Instead, the Court directed lower courts to
“look[] to the guideposts in Benson, Flook, and Diehr.”281 These
precedents, the Court held, show that the claims at issue recited
unpatentable “abstract ideas.”282 But aside from referring to Benson,
Flook, and Diehr, the Court did not explain how lower courts should
assess whether a claim is directed to non-statutory subject matter as
an “abstract idea.” The Court did not define what an “abstract idea”
is in this context. The Court also did not explain how to distill an
“abstract idea” from a claim, nor did it identify the types of claim
elements that may be disregarded—for example, as mere “postsolution activity”—in determining whether a claim is impermissibly
directed to an “abstract idea.”
Turning to Bilski’s claims, the Court characterized two claims as
broadly reciting the “concept of hedging, or protecting against risk,”
which the Court held was “an unpatentable abstract idea, just like the

275. Id. (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981)).
276. Id. at 3227 (quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71 (1972)).
277. Id. (emphasis added).
278. Id. at 3227 (“It is true that patents for inventions that did not satisfy the machine-ortransformation test were rarely granted in earlier eras . . . But this fact does not mean that
unforeseen innovations such as computer programs are always unpatentable.”).
279. Id. at 3228 (“Section 101 similarly precludes the broad contention that the term ‘process’
categorically excludes business methods.”).
280. Id. at 3231.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 3229–30.
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algorithms at issue in Benson and Flook.”283 As in Benson, the Court
reasoned that “[a]llowing petitioners to patent risk hedging would
pre-empt use of this approach in all fields, and would effectively
grant a monopoly over an abstract idea.”284
The Court characterized the narrower claims as “broad examples
of how hedging can be used in commodities and energy markets.”285
In finding these claims invalid, the Court cited Flook for the
principle that “limiting an abstract idea to one field of use or adding
token postsolution components did not make the concept
patentable.”286 In the Court’s view, “[t]hese claims attempt to patent
the use of the abstract idea of hedging risk in the energy market and
then instruct the use of well-known random analysis techniques to
help establish some of the inputs into the equation”—limitations
which the Court reasoned “add even less to the underlying abstract
principle than the invention in Flook, [which] was at least directed to
the narrower domain of signaling dangers in operating a catalytic
converter.”287
Notably, in relying on Flook to find that mere “field of use”
limitations and “token postsolution” activity did not render an
underlying abstract idea patent eligible, the Bilski Court effectively
applied the two-step “inventive concept” analysis employed in Flook
and Funk Bros., even if it did not explicitly acknowledge doing so.288
F. Return of the “Inventive Concept”: Mayo
Two years later, in the 2012 case of Mayo Collaborative
Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., the Supreme Court
unanimously reaffirmed its two-step “inventive concept” analysis,
finding that a claimed medical diagnostic method was not patent
283. Id. at 3231.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. See id. at 3230 (quoting Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589–90 (1978)) (rejecting the
proposition that “post-solution activity, no matter how conventional or obvious in itself, can
transform an unpatentable principle into a patentable process” (emphasis added)). Indeed, the
Bilski Court repeatedly stressed the lack of inventiveness in the claimed method steps. See id. at
3231 (“Hedging is a fundamental economic practice long prevalent in our system of commerce
and taught in any introductory finance class.” (quoting In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 1013 (2008)
(Rader, J., dissenting))); id. at 3224, 3231 (holding that the addition of “well-known random
analysis techniques” did not make the claimed method of hedging patent eligible) (emphasis
added).
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eligible.289 The patent claims at issue in Mayo were directed to a
method of determining the optimal dosage of thiopurine drugs for
patients with autoimmune diseases.290 Because the way in which
patients metabolize thiopurine varies, it was difficult to determine
whether a patient’s dosage was too high (risking harmful side
effects) or too low (and thus possibly ineffective).291 However, the
patentees discovered that certain concentrations of thiopurine
metabolites in the blood were correlated with the dosage level being
either too high or too low.292 The patentees claimed this discovery in
the form of process claims that generally recited the following
method steps: (1) an “administering” step—giving a patient a dose of
thiopurine; (2) a “determining” step—measuring the patient’s
thiopurine metabolite level; and (3) a “wherein” step—wherein a
metabolite level below or above specific threshold levels “indicate[s]
a need” to respectively increase or decrease the thiopurine dosage.293
The Mayo Court began by reiterating its “long held” rule that
“[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not
patentable.”294 These “are the basic tools of scientific and
technological work,” the Court explained, the monopolization of
which “might tend to impede innovation more than it would tend to
promote it.”295 The Court noted that, “to transform an unpatentable
law of nature into a patent-eligible application of such a law, one
must do more than simply state the law of nature while adding the
words ‘apply it.’”296 The Court proceeded to analyze the claimed
method under its two-step “inventive concept” framework.
First, the Court identified the “law of nature” underlying the
claims, which it characterized as “relationships between the
concentration in the blood of certain thiopurine metabolites and the
likelihood that the drug dosage will be ineffective or induce harmful
side effects.”297 The Court reasoned that these relationships were “a
consequence of the ways in which thiopurine compounds are
289. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1305 (2012).
290. Id. at 1294–95.
291. Id. at 1295.
292. Id.
293. Id.; see also id. at 1297 (characterizing the claims as having “administering,”
“determining,” and “wherein” steps).
294. Id. at 1293 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
295. Id. (quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)).
296. Id. at 1294.
297. Id.; see also id. at 1296 (same).
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metabolized by the body—entirely natural processes”—and thus
were not patent eligible.298
Second, the Court expressly held that, to be patent eligible, “a
process that focuses upon the use of a natural law [must] also contain
other elements or a combination of elements, sometimes referred to
as an ‘inventive concept,’ sufficient to ensure that the patent in
practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the natural
law itself.”299 Under this analysis, the Court explained, pre- or
“‘post-solution activity’ that is purely ‘conventional or obvious . . .
can[not] transform an unpatentable principle into a patentable
process.’”300
Reviewing its precedents, the Court noted that it had previously
applied the “inventive concept” analysis in Flook,301 Funk Bros.,302
and Bilski.303 The Mayo Court also suggested that it applied the
“inventive concept” analysis in Diehr.304 The Mayo Court reasoned
that Diehr had “nowhere suggested that all [of the claimed] steps [in
the rubber curing process], or at least the combination of those steps,
were in context obvious, already in use, or purely conventional.”305
In the Mayo Court’s view, “[t]hese other steps apparently added to
the formula something that in terms of patent law’s objectives had
significance—they transformed the process into an inventive
application of the formula.”306
The Mayo Court turned Diehr on its head. In analyzing subjectmatter eligibility, the Diehr Court never considered whether the
298. Id. at 1297.
299. Id. at 1294 (emphasis added) (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594 (1978)).
300. Id. at 1298–99 (quoting Flook, 437 U.S. at 589, 590).
301. Id. at 1294 (citing Flook, 437 U.S. at 594); id. at 1299 (noting that, in Flook, “the notion
that alarm limit values must be recomputed and readjusted, and the use of computers for
‘automatic monitoring-alarming’ were all ‘well known,’ to the point where, putting the formula to
the side, there was no ‘inventive concept’ in the claimed application of the formula” (quoting
Flook, 437 U.S. at 594)).
302. Id. at 1294 (quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130
(1948)) (“If there is to be invention from [a discovery of a law of nature], it must come from the
application of the law of nature to a new and useful end.”).
303. Id. (quoting Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010) (“[T]he prohibition against
patenting abstract ideas ‘cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a
particular technological environment’ or adding ‘insignificant postsolution activity.’” (citation
omitted)); id. at 1300–01 (quoting Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3231) (acknowledging the fact that some
claims limited the method of hedging to energy markets and specified “well-known random
analysis techniques . . . did not make the concept patentable”).
304. Id. at 1298–99 (citing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 177–79, 187 (1981)).
305. Id. at 1299 (emphasis added) (citing Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187).
306. Id. (emphasis added).
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claimed process entailed an “inventive application” of the Arrhenius
formula. To the contrary, Diehr expressly held that the novelty and
subject-matter eligibility inquiries entail completely separate
determinations: “[t]he question therefore of whether a particular
invention is novel is wholly apart from whether the invention falls
into a category of statutory subject matter.”307 As the Diehr Court
elaborated, “the ‘novelty’ of any element or steps in a process, or
even of the claimed process as a whole, is of no relevance in
determining whether the subject matter of a claim falls within the
§ 101 categories.”308 In an attempt to reconcile its precedents, the
Mayo Court engaged in some revisionist history.
In any event, applying the “inventive concept” test to the case at
hand, the Mayo Court found that the claims at issue did not “add
enough to their statements of the [metabolite] correlations” to satisfy
the test.309 The Court reasoned that “the steps in the claimed
processes (apart from the natural laws themselves) involve[d] wellunderstood, routine, conventional activity previously engaged in by
researchers in the field.”310 For example, with respect to the claimed
“administering” step, the Court noted that “doctors used thiopurine
drugs to treat patients suffering from autoimmune disorders long
before anyone asserted these claims.”311 Similarly, the Court
reasoned that the “determining” step of testing a patient’s metabolite
levels merely “tells doctors to engage in well-understood, routine,
conventional activity previously engaged in by scientists who work
in the field.”312 The Court further viewed the “wherein” step as
merely “tell[ing] a doctor about the relevant natural laws” and
suggesting to “take those laws into account” when treating a
patient.313 Finally, the Court found that reciting these three steps in
an ordered combination added nothing inventive to the underlying
laws of nature, as “[a]nyone who wants to make use of these laws
must first administer a thiopurine drug and measure the resulting
metabolite concentrations.”314
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.

Diehr, 450 U.S. at 190 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 188–189.
Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1297.
Id. at 1294.
Id. at 1297.
Id.
Id. at 1291, 1297.
Id. at 1298.
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In addition to applying the “inventive concept” analysis, the
Mayo Court also emphasized general concerns regarding
preemption.315 The Court again cited Morse—an enablement
case316—for the proposition that a patent claim must not be so broad
as to “inhibit further discovery by improperly tying up the future use
of laws of nature.”317 In applying this amorphous principle to the
claims at issue, the Court reasoned as follows:
The laws of nature at issue here are narrow laws that may
have limited applications, but the patent claims that embody
them nonetheless implicate this concern. They tell a treating
doctor to measure metabolite levels and to consider the
resulting measurements in light of the statistical
relationships they describe. In doing so, they tie up the
doctor’s subsequent treatment decision whether that
treatment does, or does not, change in light of the inference
he has drawn using the correlations. And they threaten to
inhibit the development of more refined treatment
recommendations . . . that combine [the patentee’s]
correlations with later discovered features of metabolites,
human physiology or individual patient characteristics.318
The Mayo Court additionally rejected the theory, applied by the
Federal Circuit below, that the machine-or-transformation test
rendered the claims patent eligible “since they involve transforming
the human body by administering a thiopurine drug and transforming
the blood by analyzing it to determine metabolite levels.”319 The
Court held that these transformations were “irrelevant” and that, at
any rate, “in stating that the ‘machine-or-transformation’ test is an
‘important and useful clue’ to patentability, we have neither said nor
implied that the test trumps the ‘law of nature’ exclusion.”320
Finally, in finding the patent claims invalid, the Mayo Court
suggested that the claimed diagnostic method may be distinguishable
from drug treatment methods: “Unlike, say, a typical patent on a new
drug or a new way of using an existing drug, the patent claims do not

315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.

Id. 1292, 1294, 1299.
See supra notes 92–98 and accompanying text.
Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1301.
Id. at 1302 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. at 1303 (emphasis added) (quoting Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010)).
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confine their reach to particular applications of [natural] laws.”321
However, the Court offered no explanation or reasoning to support
any such distinction.
In fact, such a distinction—between diagnostic methods and
drug treatment methods—would make little sense within the
framework of the Mayo Court’s analysis. Consider a patent directed
to the novel discovery that an existing drug known to treat disease X
can also be administered to treat disease Y. The patentee accordingly
files for a “typical” patent on this “new way of using an existing
drug.”322 But under Mayo, the fact that this drug can treat disease Y is
surely a “law of nature,” because the drug’s therapeutic effects on
disease Y are the “consequence of . . . entirely natural processes.”323
The specific manner in which the drug is administered—e.g., orally
or intravenously—is also surely conventional. As a result, the
claimed method would presumably be patent ineligible under Mayo,
as there is no “inventive concept” supporting the treatment method
aside from the “law of nature” that the drug can treat disease Y.
Precisely because patents directed to drug treatment methods such as
this are, in fact, “typical,” applying Mayo’s law of nature/inventive
concept test would have a devastating effect on the U.S.
pharmaceutical industry. This is no doubt why the Mayo Court
attempted to waive off such fears—even while failing to provide a
principled basis for distinguishing patent-ineligible diagnostic
methods from drug treatment methods.
G. Retreat of the “Inventive Concept”: Myriad
The Supreme Court issued its most recent decision regarding
patent eligibility on June 13, 2013, in the case of Association for
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.324 In that case, Myriad
had discovered the precise location and coding of two human DNA
sequences—the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes—which, when mutated,
indicate a substantially increased risk of breast or ovarian cancer.325
This knowledge enabled Myriad to develop tests for assessing cancer
risk by analyzing a patient’s DNA.326 Myriad sought to patent its
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.

Id. at 1302.
Id. at 1302.
Id. at 1297.
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013).
Id. at 2110–11.
Id. at 2109.
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discovery in the form of “composition of matter” claims directed to
(a) “isolated” DNA sequences relating to the BRCA1 and BRCA2
genes; and (b) synthetically created DNA sequences, known as
complementary DNA (“cDNA”), derived from the BRCA1 and
BRCA2 genes.327 For the reasons below, the Court unanimously held
that cDNA is (generally) a patent-eligible “composition of matter,”
whereas isolated DNA is an unpatentable “product of nature.”328
Human DNA in its natural state is encoded with a sequence of
millions of chemically joined nucleotide pairs, with the nucleotide
pairs connected by covalent bonds in a “double helix” structure.329
Contiguous segments of the DNA’s nucleotide sequence known as
“exons” contain coding information for creating amino acids.330 The
remaining segments, which do not code for amino acids, are known
as “introns.”331 The BRCA1 and BRCA2 sequences discovered by
Myriad are each about eighty thousand nucleotides long.332 If only
the exon sequences are counted, BRCA1 is about 5,500 nucleotides
long, and BRCA2 is about 10,200 nucleotides long.333
Two DNA manipulation techniques were relevant to Myriad’s
patent claims. First, well-known laboratory methods could be used to
isolate segments of DNA—e.g., the BRCA1 or BRCA2 sequences,
or any contiguous segment thereof—by breaking the covalent bonds
that connect the segment to the rest of the DNA sequence.334 Second,
other well-known laboratory methods could be used to create cDNA
by synthetically removing all intron sequences from a DNA segment,
leaving only the exon sequences behind (which remain sequenced in
their natural order, save for the absence of any intervening
introns).335 As stated, Myriad’s patents recited multiple “composition
of matter” claims directed to isolated DNA and to cDNA.336
The Court began its analysis by reiterating the exceptions to
§ 101: “Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are

327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.

Id. at 2111–12.
Id. at 2117, 2119.
Id. at 2111, 2114.
Id. at 2111.
Id.
Id. at 2112.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2113.
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not patentable.”337 However, the Court cautioned that this rule “is not
without limits,” as “‘all inventions at some level embody, use,
reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or
abstract ideas,’ and ‘too broad an interpretation of this exclusionary
principle could eviscerate patent law.’”338 The Court framed the
ultimate issue by quoting the language of § 101, stating that “[w]e
must apply this well-established standard to determine whether
Myriad’s patents claim any ‘new and useful . . . composition of
matter.’”339
The Court first considered Myriad’s claims directed to isolated
DNA. Claim 1, for example, recited “[a]n isolated DNA coding for a
BRCA1 polypeptide”—i.e., the entire isolated BRCA1 sequence.340
Claim 5 similarly recited “[a]n isolated DNA having at least 15
nucleotides of the DNA of claim 1,” effectively claiming any
isolated DNA segment containing a sequence of fifteen or more
nucleotides found within the BRCA1 sequence.341 In analyzing these
claims, the Court stated the following:
It is undisputed that Myriad did not create or alter any of the
genetic information encoded in the BRCA1 and BRCA2
genes. The location and order of the nucleotides existed in
nature before Myriad found them. Nor did Myriad create or
alter the genetic structure of DNA. Instead, Myriad’s
principal contribution was uncovering the precise location
and genetic sequence of the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes
within chromosomes 17 and 13.342
The Court compared Myriad’s isolated DNA claims to Chakrabarty,
in which the Court had held that a claim to a modified bacterium was
patent eligible because “the patent claim was ‘not to a hitherto
unknown natural phenomenon, but to a nonnaturally occurring
manufacture or composition of matter.’”343 In contrast, the Court
reasoned, “Myriad found the location of the BRCA1 and BRCA2
337. Id. at 2116 (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct.
1289, 1290 (2012)).
338. Id. at 2116.
339. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006)).
340. Id. at 2113.
341. Id.
342. Id. at 2116 (emphasis added).
343. Id. at 2116–17 (emphasis added) (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 305
(1980)).
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genes, but that discovery, by itself, does not render the BRCA genes
‘new . . . composition[s] of matter’ that are patent eligible.”344 The
act of isolating a naturally occurring DNA sequence did not change
this conclusion, the Court held, as merely “separating that gene from
its surrounding genetic material is not an act of invention.”345
Accordingly, the Court held that “naturally occurring, isolated DNA
segments” are “product[s] of nature” which are not patent eligible.346
The Court next turned to Myriad’s cDNA claims. Claim 2, for
example, recited cDNA derived from isolated BRCA1—i.e., a
nucleotide sequence containing only the exons from BRCA1, with all
intervening introns removed.347 Claim 6 similarly recited “[a]n
isolated DNA having at least fifteen nucleotides of the DNA of claim
2,” effectively claiming any sequence of fifteen or more nucleotides
found within cDNA derived from the BRCA1 sequence.348
The Court reasoned that “cDNA does not present the same
obstacles to patentability as naturally occurring, isolated DNA
segments,” because “creation of a cDNA sequence . . . results in an
exons-only molecule that is not naturally occurring.”349 The Court
found it irrelevant that “[t]he nucleotide sequence of [the exons in]
cDNA is dictated by nature, not by the lab technician.”350 The key
fact, the Court held, was that “the lab technician unquestionably
creates something new when cDNA is made.”351 As a result, the
Court held, “cDNA is not a ‘product of nature’ and is patent eligible
under § 101.”352 The one exception, the Court held, was for “very
short series of DNA [with] no intervening introns to remove when
creating cDNA,” resulting in cDNA that is still “indistinguishable

344. Id. at 2117 (emphasis added) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006)).
345. Id.; see also id. at 2118 (“Nor are Myriad’s claims saved by the fact that isolating DNA
from the human genome severs chemical bonds and thereby creates a nonnaturally occurring
molecule. Myriad’s claims are simply not expressed in terms of chemical composition, nor do
they rely in any way on the chemical changes that result from the isolation of a particular section
of DNA. Instead, the claims understandably focus on the genetic information encoded in the
BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes.”).
346. Id. at 2119.
347. Id. at 2113.
348. Id.
349. Id. at 2119 (emphasis added).
350. Id.
351. Id. (emphasis added).
352. Id.
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from natural DNA.”353 Thus, the determinative factor in the Court’s
analysis was whether the exact nucleotide sequence claimed is
“naturally occurring.”354 In this regard, we view Myriad as
representing a significant (and welcome) departure from the Supreme
Court’s “inventive concept” jurisprudence.
As we have surveyed above, the Supreme Court’s “inventive
concept” jurisprudence—beginning with Funk Bros. and continuing
in at least Flook, Bilski, and Mayo—generally teaches the following:
The fact that a patent claim is not specifically directed to a verboten
judicial exception does not suffice to render the claim patent eligible.
Instead, the claim must include some specific “inventive” concept
separate and apart from the ineligible subject matter. For example,
the patentee in Funk Bros. claimed a non-naturally occurring mixture
of inoculants that was not, per se, a “law of nature”—or even a
“product of nature.” The problem for the Court was that, putting
aside the discovery of the law of nature and the naturally occurring
inoculants individually, the claimed mixture “is hardly more than an
advance in the packaging of the inoculants.”355 In other words, the
claims lacked an inventive concept beyond the patent-ineligible
elements of the patentee’s discovery. Similarly in Mayo, the claims
were not directed to a law of nature per se, but rather to a diagnostic
method that applied a law of nature. But because the application
involved merely conventional “post-solution activity,” the claims
were deemed directed to patent-ineligible subject matter.
Myriad completely abandoned—sub silentio—the Court’s prior
“inventive concept” framework. The Court’s determination that the
claimed cDNA was not “naturally occurring” ended the patenteligibility analysis. The Court did not proceed to apply an “inventive
concept” test, or examine whether the (patent-eligible) cDNA

353. Id. Although the Court did not elaborate as to which specific claims were invalidated by
its holding, this exception suggests that Claim 2 (cDNA containing all exons from BRCA1) was
patent eligible, whereas Claim 6 (any 15+ nucleotide sequence found in the cDNA of Claim 2)
was not patent eligible. Individual exons often contain more than 15 nucleotides. See, e.g., I.
Dunham et al., The DNA Sequence of Human Chromosome 22, 402 NATURE,489, 491 (1999)
(finding on chromosome 22 a mean exon length of 266 nucleotide base pairs and a median exon
length of 135 nucleotide base pairs). As such, Claim 6 likely encompassed at least some
nucleotide sequences found entirely within an individual exon—i.e., a “very short series of DNA
[with] no intervening introns to remove when creating cDNA.” Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2119.
354. Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2119.
355. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 131 (1948).
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differed from the (patent-ineligible) isolated DNA as a result of mere
“post-solution” activity.
Perhaps most notably, the facts in Myriad were neatly aligned
for another application of the Court’s “inventive concept” test. The
patentee’s discovery was undoubtedly a “law of nature” in the
lexicon of Funk Bros. and Mayo: the patentee discovered that DNA
sequences at a “precise location” in the human genome are
associated with a significant increase in an individual’s risk of
developing breast and ovarian cancer when mutated.356 The patentee
could not claim those isolated DNA sequences (the BRCA1 and
BRCA2 genes), because such claims are directed to a “product of
nature,” which is per se patent ineligible.357 The patentee also
applied well-known processes to those patent-ineligible DNA
sequences to produce cDNA sequences. In fact, the Court even
expressly acknowledged that the cDNA was created through
“processes similarly well known in the field of genetics.”358
Nevertheless, the Court held that cDNA was patent eligible under
§ 101—despite the fact that those claims were based on nothing
more than applying well-known processes (cDNA synthesizing
techniques) to the patent-ineligible discovery of the BRCA1 and
BRCA2 genes.359 The Court required no “inventive concept” beyond
the patent-ineligible discovery of the patentee.360 Instead, the Court
applied a bright-line rule, determining simply whether the claimed
subject matter was naturally occurring or not.361
The Court’s decision in Myriad diverged from prior case law in
other significant respects as well. Importantly, the Myriad Court
omitted any discussion of concerns relating to “preemption,” which
factored heavily in the Court’s prior decisions in Benson, Flook,
Diehr, Bilski, and Mayo.362 Indeed, the Court did not once utter any
356. Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2110–11.
357. Id. at 2111.
358. Id. at 2112.
359. Id. at 2111.
360. Id.
361. Id. at 2111, 2121.
362. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294 (2012)
(noting that the Court’s cases “warn us against upholding patents that claim process that too
broadly preempt the use of a natural law”); Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010)
(“Allowing petitioners to patent risk hedging would pre-empt use of this approach in all fields
and would effectively grant a monopoly over an abstract idea.”); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S.
175, 187 (1981) (“Their process admittedly employs a well-known mathematical equation, but
they do not seek to pre-empt the use of that equation. Rather, they seek only to foreclose from
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variation of the word “preempt” in the Myriad opinion. In finding
isolated DNA patent ineligible, the Court focused solely on the fact
that the specific sequence claimed was “naturally occurring”—i.e., a
“product of nature.”363 The Court did not seek to justify this holding
by referring to concerns that downstream uses of the isolated DNA
would be preempted. Similarly, in finding cDNA patent eligible, the
Court again focused solely on the fact that the specific nucleotide
sequence claimed was “not naturally occurring.”364 In other words,
unlike DNA, the cDNA was a “new . . . composition[] of matter” and
therefore was patent eligible under § 101.365 The Court did not
analyze what quantum of downstream innovation might be
preempted by the patent claims covering cDNA sequences derived
from the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes.
Finally, it is notable that the Myriad Court did not even cite the
prior cases of Le Roy, Morse, Rubber-Tip Pencil, Cochrane,
Dolbear, Mackay Radio, Benson, Flook, Diehr, or Bilski—
precedents which have typically been cited ad nauseum in patenteligibility cases. Rather, the Myriad Court relied heavily on
Chakrabarty, a case in which the Court took perhaps its most
expansive view of patent eligibility in noting that “Congress intended
statutory subject matter to ‘include anything under the sun that is
made by man.’”366
As will be discussed throughout the remainder of this Article,
we believe that Myriad’s foregoing deviations from precedent
present an opportunity for the Supreme Court to hit “reset” on its
patent-eligibility jurisprudence, providing a new foundation for a
clear and workable framework that is firmly grounded in the
statutory text.

others the use of that equation in conjunction with all of the other steps in their claimed
process.”); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590 (1978) (finding claim directed to patent-ineligible
subject matter, even though the claim technically did not “wholly preempt” the underlying
mathematical formula); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71–72 (1972) (“The mathematical
formula involved here has no substantial practical application except in connection with a digital
computer, which means that if the judgment below is affirmed, the patent would wholly preempt
the mathematical formula and in practical effect would be a patent on the algorithm itself.”).
363. Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2111, 2116–18.
364. Id. at 2111, 2119 (emphasis added).
365. Id. at 2110 (emphasis added).
366. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (quoting S. REP. NO. 1979, 82d
Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1952); H.R. REP. NO. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1952)); see also Myriad,
133 S. Ct. at 2109 (“Diamond v. Chakrabarty is central to the patent eligibility inquiry . . . .”).
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IV. THE SYMPTOMS: CONFOUNDING THE LOWER COURTS
The concerns Justice Frankfurter expressed in his concurring
opinion in Funk Bros.—that it “only confuses the issue” to
“introduce such terms as ‘the work of nature’ and the ‘laws of
nature’” into the § 101 analysis367—proved prescient. The “vague
and malleable terms” on which the Supreme Court erected its
“judicial exceptions” to § 101 have sown confusion and
disagreement in the lower courts tasked with the difficult job of
applying inconsistent Supreme Court precedents.368 The Supreme
Court’s renewed interest in patent-eligible subject matter beginning
with Bilski has only exacerbated confusion in the lower courts.
Nowhere has the chaos wrought by the Supreme Court’s patenteligibility jurisprudence been more pronounced than in the case of
CLS Bank International v. Alice Corp. Pty Ltd., recently decided by
the Federal Circuit en banc.369 In CLS Bank, the Federal Circuit set
out to clarify the Supreme Court’s “abstract idea” exception to § 101
as it pertains to software-related claims.370 The result, however, was
inconclusive at best, as no majority of the en banc panel could agree
on a coherent interpretation of the relevant Supreme Court case law.
The claims at issue in CLS Bank were directed to a
computerized trading platform for settling financial transactions
using a trusted third-party intermediary.371 There were three types of
claims at issue: method claims, computer-readable medium, and
system claims.372 The method claims generally claimed the following
steps: (1) creating a “shadow record” that mirrors the accounts for
each party; (2) obtaining a start-of-day balance for each party; (3)
adjusting the shadow records for each transaction throughout the
day; and (4) instructing, at the end of each day, the parties to settle
the trades for which funds are available.373 The parties stipulated that
these claims required computer implementation.374 The computerreadable medium claims recited “computer readable storage medium
367. Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 134–35 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
368. Id.
369. CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 717 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en banc).
370. Id. at 1277 (Lourie, J., concurring) (explaining that “[w]hat is needed is a consistent,
cohesive, and accessible approach to the § 101 analysis—a framework that will provide guidance
and predictability for patent applicants and examiners, litigants, and the courts”).
371. Id. at 1274.
372. Id. at 1274, 1284.
373. Id. at 1285.
374. Id.
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having computer readable program code” for performing the same
method.375 Likewise, the system claims recited a “data processing
system,” a “data storage unit,” and a “computer” programmed
specifically to perform the same method.376
The district court held that all claims were patent ineligible
under § 101.377 A divided panel of the Federal Circuit reversed,
finding all claims patent eligible.378 The court then voted to rehear
the case en banc. In a two-sentence per curiam judgment, the en banc
court affirmed the district court decision that all claims at issue were
patent ineligible under § 101.379 This judgment was followed by six
opinions, none of which garnered a majority. The en banc court was
evenly divided (5-5) as to the patent eligibility of the system
claims.380 Procedurally, the tie vote operated as an affirmance,
leaving the district court ruling of patent ineligibility unchanged.
And while a majority of seven judges agreed that the method and
computer-readable medium claims were patent ineligible, no
majority agreed as to the legal rationale for that conclusion.381 Chief
Judge Rader aptly summarized the discord:
No portion of any opinion issued today other than our Per
Curiam Judgment garners a majority. The court is evenly
split on the patent eligibility of the system claims. Although
a majority of the judges on the court agree that the method
claims do not recite patent eligible subject matter, no
majority of those judges agrees as to the legal rationale for
that conclusion. Accordingly, though much is published
today discussing the proper approach to the patent
eligibility inquiry, nothing said today beyond our judgment
has the weight of precedent.382
Judge Lourie and Chief Judge Rader authored the primary
opinions.383 Judge Lourie’s proposed framework can be summarized
as proceeding along the following steps:
375. Id. at 1287–88.
376. Id. at 1289.
377. Id. at 1275.
378. Id. at 1273.
379. Id. at 1273 (per curiam).
380. Id. at 1292 n.1 (Rader, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
381. Id.
382. Id.
383. Id. at 1273 (Lourie, J., concurring); Id. at 1292 (Rader, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
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First, the court must ask whether the claim literally falls within
the scope of § 101—i.e., does the claim literally recite a “process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter”?384 Applying this
step, Judge Lourie found that the claimed method, computer-readable
medium, and system claims each fell within the § 101 categories.385
Second, assuming the claim literally falls within § 101, “the
analysis turns to the judicial exceptions to subject-matter
eligibility.”386 With respect to the “abstract idea” exception, the
initial question to ask is, “Does the claim pose any risk of
preempting an abstract idea”?387 Judge Lourie found that each of the
claims at issue in CLS Bank raised such concerns.388
Third, if the claim poses a risk of preempting an “abstract idea,”
then the court must unambiguously “identify and define whatever
fundamental concept appears wrapped up in the claim.”389 Judge
Lourie defines an “abstract idea” as a “disembodied concept . . . a
basic building block of human ingenuity, untethered from any realworld application.”390 Judge Lourie identified the abstract idea
underlying the claims at issue as “the abstract idea of reducing
settlement risk by effecting trades through a third-party intermediary
(here, the supervisory institution) empowered to verify that both
parties can fulfill their obligations before allowing the exchange—
i.e., a form of escrow.”391
Finally, the “balance of the claim” is evaluated to “determine
whether it contains additional substantive limitations that narrow,
confine, or otherwise tie down the claim so that, in practical terms, it
does not cover the full abstract idea itself.”392 Judge Lourie equates
his requirement for “additional substantive limitations” with the
Supreme Court’s “inventive concept test.”393 However phrased, what
is needed is a “product of human ingenuity,” which must be more
than a “well-understood, routine, conventional activity previously
engaged in by researchers in the field,” “token or trivial limitations,”
384.
385.
386.
387.
388.
389.
390.
391.
392.
393.

Id. at 1282 (Lourie, J., concurring); accord 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
Id. at 1285, 1288–89 (Lourie, J., concurring).
Id. at 1282.
Id.
Id. at 1286, 1288–89.
Id. at 1282.
Id. at 1286.
Id.
Id. at 1282.
Id.
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“bare field-of-use limitations,” or “insignificant post-solution
activity.”394 Applying this standard, Judge Lourie found that all
claims at issue failed to recite an “inventive concept” beyond the
underlying “abstract idea” he had identified.395 In particular, for the
system claims, Judge Lourie found that the claimed hardware
limitations “provide no significant ‘inventive concept’” and “are
instead akin to stating the abstract idea of third-party intermediation
and adding the words: ‘apply it’ on a computer.”396
Chief Judge Rader proposed a framework that led to the
opposite conclusion on the system claims, which he found to be
patent eligible.397 The first few steps of Chief Judge Rader’s
framework track Judge Lourie’s framework: Does the claim literally
recite a process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter,
and if so, does the claim have “elements of abstractness” that warrant
“further examination of its eligibility”?398 Chief Judge Rader offered
a different definition for an “abstract idea” itself, which he defined as
an idea that “has no reference to material objects or specific
examples—i.e., is not concrete.”399 Chief Judge Rader identified the
particular “abstract idea” underlying the claims at issue as “the
general and theoretical concept of using a neutral intermediary in
exchange transactions to reduce risk that one party will not honor the
deal, i.e., an escrow arrangement.”400
Finally, Chief Judge Rader’s approach asks whether the claim,
considered as a whole, includes “meaningful limitations restricting it
to an application, rather than merely an abstract idea.”401 Under this
inquiry, a claim may be “meaningfully limited” if, for example, “it
requires a particular machine implementing a process or a particular
transformation of matter,” or if “in addition to the abstract idea, the
claim recites added limitations which are essential to the
invention.”402 For Chief Judge Rader, this is not an “inventiveness”
inquiry—”whether a new process, machine, and so on is ‘inventive’

394.
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.
400.
401.
402.

Id. at 1283 (citations omitted).
Id. at 1286–87, 1288, 1290–91
Id. at 1291.
Id. at 1292 (Rader, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 1311.
Id. at 1299.
Id. at 1311.
Id. at 1299.
Id. at 1301.
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is not an issue under Section 101.”403 Moreover, in Chief Judge
Rader’s view, “Pre-emption is only a subject matter eligibility
problem when a claim preempts all practical uses of an abstract
idea,” because “it is important to remember that all patents ‘preempt’ some future innovation in the sense that they preclude others
from commercializing the invention without the patentee’s
permission.”404
Applying this standard, Chief Judge Rader concluded that the
asserted system claims were patent eligible, as the claims recited
“meaningful limitations” such as “a computer, a first party device, a
data storage unit, and a communications controller.”405 He further
noted that “a claim embodying [a] machine itself, with all its
structural and functional limitations, [will] rarely, if ever, be an
abstract idea.”406
In short, the Federal Circuit was deeply divided on how to
analyze (1) whether a claim is impermissibly directed to an “abstract
idea,” including how to even define what an “abstract idea” is;
(2) whether a claim includes a sufficient “inventive concept” in
addition to a patent-ineligible “abstract idea,” and the role of
“inventiveness” in the § 101 analysis; and (3) the role of
“preemption” in the § 101 analysis. Judge Moore had perhaps the
harshest assessment of the court’s en banc handiwork, remarking that
“[t]here has never been a case which could do more damage to the
patent system than this one.”407 More generally, Judge Moore
observed: “I am concerned that the current interpretation of § 101,
and in particular the abstract idea exception, is causing a free fall in
the patent system.”408
Needless to say, it would be a massive understatement to
observe that in CLS Bank the Federal Circuit failed to find
meaningful guidance in the Supreme Court’s “guideposts” regarding
patent eligibility, including Benson, Flook, Diehr, Bilski, and Mayo.
Indeed, two patent-eligibility cases the Federal Circuit has decided
since CLS Bank only serve to further highlight the divisions in the
court as to the proper approach for analyzing patent eligibility.
403.
404.
405.
406.
407.
408.

Id. at 1294.
Id. at 1300.
Id. at 1307 (emphasis removed).
Id. at 1305.
Id. at 1313 n.1 (Moore, J., dissenting in part).
Id. at 1313.
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In Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, the court addressed the
patent eligibility of a method for distributing copyrighted content
over the Internet, where the user receives the product for free in
exchange for viewing an advertisement, and the advertiser pays for
the copyrighted content.409 The district court had held that the
claimed method was patent ineligible and dismissed the patentee’s
complaint.410 Applying the framework he proposed in CLS Bank,
Chief Judge Rader held that the claimed method was patent eligible
under § 101, reversing the decision of the district court.411
Chief Judge Rader drew a distinction between claiming an
abstract idea itself, which is patent ineligible, and claiming an
application of an abstract idea, which is patent eligible.412 Chief
Judge Rader characterized the “abstract idea” underlying the claims
as the “idea that advertising can be used as a form of currency.”413
However, focusing on the specific steps recited in the claims, Chief
Judge Rader held that the claims were not directed to the abstract
idea itself, but to a specific application of the idea, which involved
“an extensive computer interface.”414
Judge Lourie concurred, agreeing that the abstract idea at issue
was “us[ing] advertising as an exchange or currency.”415 And like the
majority, he found that the claims “require more than just that
abstract idea as part of the claimed method.”416 In particular, Judge
Lourie found that, “unlike the method claims in CLS Bank,” the
“added limitations in these claims represent significantly more than
the underlying abstract idea of using advertising as an exchange or
currency and, as a consequence, do not preempt the use of that idea
in all fields.”417
Chief Judge Rader and Judge Lourie recently squared off in yet
another patent-eligibility case in Accenture Global Services v.
Guidewire Software.418 But unlike in Ultramercial, they reached
409.
410.
411.
412.
413.
414.
415.
416.
417.
418.
2013).

Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 722 F.3d 1335, 1337–38 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
Id. at 1337.
Id.
Id. at 1343.
Id. at 1349.
Id. at 1352.
Id. (Lourie, J., concurring).
Id.
Id.
Accenture Global Servs., GmbH v. Guidewire Software, Inc., 728 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir.
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different conclusions regarding the outcome. The claims at issue in
Accenture were directed to systems and methods for generating tasks
to be performed in an insurance organization.419 The representative
system claim included a number of structural limitations, including:
an “insurance transaction database” organized in a particular way; a
“task library database”; a “client component” with a specified
functionality; and a “server component” with an “event processor,”
“task engine” and “task assistant” programmed in a particular way.420
The district court had held that the claims were directed to “concepts
for organizing data” and ruled that they were patent ineligible under
§ 101 as abstract ideas.421
Judge Lourie disagreed with the district court’s characterization
of the underlying “abstract idea” at issue. Judge Lourie instead
articulated the abstract idea as “generating tasks [based on] rules . . .
to be completed upon the occurrence of an event.”422 Nevertheless,
based on this definition of the “abstract idea,” Judge Lourie agreed
with the district court that the system claim was not directed to
419. Id. at 1337–38.
420. Id. at 1338–39. Claim 1 of the patent at issue reads in its entirety as follows:
A system for generating tasks to be performed in an insurance organization, the system
comprising:
an insurance transaction database for storing information related to an insurance
transaction, the insurance transaction database comprising a claim folder containing the
information related to the insurance transaction decomposed into a plurality of levels
from the group comprising a policy level, a claim level, a participant level and a line
level, wherein the plurality of levels reflects a policy, the information related to the
insurance transaction, claimants and an insured person in a structured format;
a task library database for storing rules for determining tasks to be completed upon an
occurrence of an event;
a client component in communication with the insurance transaction database
configured for providing information relating to the insurance transaction, said client
component enabling access by an assigned claim handler to a plurality of tasks that
achieve an insurance related goal upon completion; and
a server component in communication with the client component, the transaction
database and the task library database, the server component including an event
processor, a task engine and a task assistant;
wherein the event processor is triggered by application events associated with a change
in the information, and sends an event trigger to the task engine; wherein in response to
the event trigger, the task engine identifies rules in the task library database associated
with the event and applies the information to the identified rules to determine the tasks
to be completed, and populates on a task assistant the determined tasks to be
completed, wherein the task assistant transmits the determined tasks to the client
component.
Id.
421. Id. at 1340.
422. Id. at 1344 (alterations in original) (citation omitted).
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patent-eligible subject matter, stating that “[t]he limitations of the
system claims of the ‘284 patent do not provide sufficient additional
features or limit the abstract concept in a meaningful way.”423
However, he did not explain why one could not “generat[e] tasks
based on rules to be completed upon the occurrence of an event”
without using the specific “insurance transaction database,” “task
library database,” “client component,” and “server component” as
claimed.
Judge Lourie also distinguished Ultramercial, stating that “[t]he
claims in Ultramercial contained additional limitations from the
abstract idea of using advertising as currency, such as limiting the
transaction to an Internet website, offering free access conditioned on
viewing a sponsor message, and only applying to a media
product.”424 He did not, however, explain why limiting a claim to an
“Internet website” should have greater significance, for purposes of a
§ 101 analysis, than limiting a claim to the insurance field. Nor did
he explain why the specific claim limitations he singled out from the
claim at issue in Ultramercial were more concrete than the claim
limitations recited in the system claim at issue in Accenture, such as
the specific “insurance transaction database,” “task library database,”
“client component,” and “server component,” all claimed in a
particular way.
Chief Judge Rader dissented, stating the following:
[A]ny claim can be stripped down, simplified, generalized,
or paraphrased to remove all of its concrete limitations,
until at its core, something that could be characterized as an
abstract idea is revealed. A court cannot go hunting for
abstractions by ignoring the concrete, palpable, tangible
limitations of the invention the patentee actually claims.425
In sum, the deeply conflicted Federal Circuit cases described
above—CLS Bank,426 Ultramercial,427 and Accenture428—clearly
exemplify the chaos that has been wrought by the Supreme Court’s
patent-eligibility jurisprudence. Apparently recognizing this fact, on
423. Id. at 1345.
424. Id.
425. Id. at 1346 (Rader, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC., 722 F.3d
1335, 1344 (2013)).
426. 717 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en banc).
427. 722 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
428. 728 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
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December 6, 2013, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear CLS
Bank.429 As of the date of this writing, CLS Bank remains under
consideration by the Court, teeing off an opportunity for yet another
landmark § 101 decision.
V. THE DIAGNOSIS: STATUTORY ABANDONMENT
In this part, we assess whether the Supreme Court’s body of
patent-eligibility jurisprudence is consistent with a sound analysis of
the Patent Act under traditional principles of statutory interpretation.
We conclude that the Court’s exceptions to patent eligibility for
“laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas” are
overbroad, misguided, and largely inconsistent with the statute.430
While we do find statutory support for a subset of the Court’s
exceptions—namely, “products of nature”—we feel the Court has
failed to properly articulate the basis for and scope of this exclusion.
Ultimately, we agree with the resonating plea of Chief Judge Rader
of the Federal Circuit: “When all else fails, consult the statute!”431
A. Lost in the Echo Chamber
In Flook, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the patenteligibility inquiry “turns entirely on the proper construction of § 101
of the Patent Act.”432 It should therefore be axiomatic that the inquiry
necessarily “begin[s] with the language of the statute.”433 The Court
has further recognized that, “in patent law, as in all statutory
construction, ‘[u]nless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted
as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.’”434
Indeed, the “Court has ‘more than once cautioned that [lower] courts
should not read into the patent laws limitations and conditions which
the legislature has not expressed.’”435
429. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 734 (2013) (granting petition for writ
of certiorari).
430. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010) (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447
U.S. 303, 309 (1980)).
431. CLS Bank, 717 F.3d at 1335 (Rader, C.J., additional reflections) (emphasis added).
432. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 588 (1978).
433. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981); see also Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S.
647, 656 (1986) (“Here, as in other contexts, the starting point in construing a statute is the
language of the statute itself.”).
434. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3226 (quoting Diehr, 450 U.S. at 182).
435. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Diehr, 450 U.S. at 182) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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Given the foregoing principles—which should generally be
uncontroversial—it is remarkable how little effort the Supreme Court
has actually devoted to analyzing § 101 using traditional tools of
statutory interpretation. Quite simply, the Court has not practiced
what it preaches. As our review of history has shown,436 the Court
has repeatedly looked past substantive analysis of the statute,
choosing instead to craft sweeping and vaguely defined exceptions to
patent eligibility based on little more than dicta and unsupported
statements, repeated and compounded in a judicial echo chamber.
For clarity, we succinctly connect the dots below.
In Le Roy (1852), a case where patent eligibility was not at
issue,437 the Court stated, in dictum and without any statutory
analysis, that “[a] principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental truth; an
original cause; a motive; these cannot be patented, as no one can
claim in either of them an exclusive right.”438 The Court thereafter
expressly relied upon this statement as support for the judicial
exceptions in Funk Bros., Benson, Flook, Chakrabarty, Diehr, Bilski,
and Mayo.439
In Morse (1853), which is best viewed as an enablement case,440
the Court found a broad claim invalid because it recited a genus (the
use of electromagnetism for printing characters at a distance) while
the specification disclosed only a species (the telegraph).441
436. See supra Part III.
437. Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 176–77 (1852) (primary issue on appeal was
the propriety of a jury instruction pertaining to novelty; issue of patent eligibility was “not in the
case”).
438. Id. at 175.
439. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012)
(“The Court has long held that [§ 101] contains an important implicit exception. [L]aws of nature,
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable.” (internal quotation marks omitted)
(citing Le Roy, 55 U.S. at 175)); Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225, 3230 (2010) (noting
that the judicial exceptions “have defined the reach of the statute as a matter of statutory stare
decisis going back 150 years” (citing Le Roy, 55 U.S. (14 How.) at 174)); Diamond v. Diehr, 450
U.S. 175, 185 (1981) (quoting Le Roy, 55 U.S. (14 How.) at 175); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447
U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (“The laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas have been
held not patentable.” (citing Le Roy, 55 U.S. (14. How.) at 175)); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584,
589 (1978) (quoting Le Roy, 55 U.S. (14 How.) at 175); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67
(1972) (quoting Le Roy, 55 U.S. (14 How.) at 175); Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co.,
333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948) (“[P]atents cannot issue for the discovery of phenomena of nature.”
(citing Le Roy, 55 U.S. (14 How.) at 175)).
440. O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 118–21 (1853); see also supra note 94 (“We
join a number of commentators in making the straightforward yet important observation that
Morse was decided on enablement grounds.”).
441. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 120.
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However, the Court recast Morse’s holding in Tilghman (1881),
stating, in dictum, that “[t]he eighth claim of Morse’s patent was
held to be invalid, because it was regarded by the court as being not
for a process, but for a mere principle. . . . that is, a claim to the
exclusive use of one of the powers of nature for a particular
purpose.”442 The Court thereafter expressly relied upon Morse and/or
Tilghman as support for the judicial exceptions in Benson, Flook,
Chakrabarty, Diehr, Bilski, and Mayo.443 The Court now interprets
Morse as standing for the vague proposition that a patent may not
“too broadly preempt the use of a natural law.”444
In Rubber-Tip Pencil (1874), a decision best viewed as an
obviousness case,445 the Court stated, in dictum, that “[a]n idea of
itself is not patentable, but a new device by which it may be made
practically useful is.”446 The Court thereafter expressly relied upon
this unsupported statement in Benson (1981) to establish “the
longstanding rule that ‘[a]n idea of itself is not patentable,’”447 thus
forming the “abstract ideas” exception to patent eligibility.448
In Cochrane (1876), after waiving off patent-eligibility
concerns, the Court stated, in dictum, that a “process” is “an act, or a
series of acts, performed upon the subject matter to be transformed
and reduced to a different state or thing.”449 The Court thereafter

442. Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707, 726 (1880) (citing Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 62).
443. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294, 1300–02 (citing Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 112–20);
Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3253 (citing Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 113); Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187–88
(citing Morse, 56 U.S. at 62); Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309 (citing Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at
112–21); Flook, 437 U.S. at 592 (citing Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 112–21); id. at 589 (citing
Tilghman, 102 U.S. at 728); Benson, 409 U.S. at 68–69 (citing Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 111–
13); id. at 70 (citing Tilghman, 102 U.S. at 721, 729).
444. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294 (citing Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 112–20) (emphasis added);
id. at 1301 (“The Court has repeatedly emphasized . . . a concern that patent law not inhibit
further discovery by improperly tying up the future use of laws of nature.” (citing Morse, 56 U.S.
(15 How.) at 112–20)); see also Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3253 (citing Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at
113) (describing Morse as “explaining that Morse’s patent on electromagnetism for writing would
preempt a wide swath of technological developments.”).
445. Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 498, 507 (1874); see also supra
note 107 and accompanying text (collecting cases classifying Rubber-Tip Pencil as an
obviousness case).
446. Rubber-Tip, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) at 507.
447. Benson, 409 U.S. at 67 (quoting Rubber-Tip Pencil, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) at 507).
448. See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185 (“Excluded from such patent protection are laws of nature,
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.” (citing Benson, 409 U.S. at 67)).
449. Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 788 (1876).
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quoted this definition in Benson and Flook,450 and it applied the
definition to find a process claim patent eligible in Diehr.451 The
Court then clarified in Bilski that the so-called “machine-ortransformation test” is a “useful and important clue,” but “is not the
sole test” for the patent eligibility of a claimed process.452 Finally,
the Court further clarified in Mayo that satisfying the machine-ortransformation test does not “trump[] the ‘law of nature’
exclusion.”453
In Mackay Radio (1939), after finding a claimed radio antenna
patent eligible, the Court stated, in dictum and without citation to
authority, that “[w]hile a scientific truth, or the mathematical
expression of it, is not patentable invention, a novel and useful
structure created with the aid of knowledge of scientific truth may
be.”454 The Court later cited Mackay Radio as support for the judicial
exceptions in Funk Bros., Benson, Flook, Diehr, and Mayo.455
In Funk Bros. (1948), the Court expressly held that “patents
cannot issue for the discovery of the phenomena of nature” or “laws
of nature,” as they are “part of the storehouse of knowledge . . . free
to all men and reserved exclusively to none.”456 The Court further
held that even an “application of [a] newly-discovered natural
principle” is not patent eligible unless it includes some “invention”
450. Benson, 409 U.S. at 70 (“Transformation and reduction of an article ‘to a different state
or thing’ is the clue to the patentability of a process claim that does not include particular
machines.” (quoting Cochrane, 94 U.S. at 787–88)); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 588 n.9
(1978) (“An argument can be made . . . that this Court has only recognized a process as within the
statutory definition when it either was tied to a particular apparatus or operated to change
materials to a ‘different state or thing.’” (quoting Cochrane, 94 U.S. at 787–88)). In both cases,
however, the Court noted that it was “not hold[ing] that no process patent could ever qualify if it
did not meet the requirements of our prior precedents.” Benson, 409 U.S. at 71; see also Flook,
437 U.S. at 588 n.9. (“As in Benson, we assume that a valid process patent may issue even if it
does not meet one of these qualifications of our earlier precedents.”).
451. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 184 (“That respondents’ claims involve the transformation of an
article, in this case raw, uncured synthetic rubber, into a different state or thing cannot be
disputed.” (citing Benson, 409 U.S. at 70; Cochrane, 94 U.S. at 787–88)).
452. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3227 (2010).
453. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1303 (2012) (citing
Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3225).
454. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939).
455. See Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948) (citing
Mackay Radio, 306 U.S. at 94); Benson, 409 U.S. at 67 (quoting Mackay Radio, 306 U.S. at 94);
Flook, 437 U.S. at 591 (quoting and analyzing Mackay Radio, 306 U.S. at 94); Diehr, 450 U.S. at
188 (“We think this statement in Mackay takes us a long way toward the correct answer in this
case.”) (quoting Mackay Radio, 306 U.S. at 94)); Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294 (quoting Mackay
Radio, 306 U.S. at 94).
456. Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 130.
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beyond the natural principle itself, rather than a mere “simple
step.”457 The Court did not conduct any analysis of the Patent Act in
reaching these holdings; rather, it relied upon the Court’s prior
unsupported statements in cases such as Le Roy and Mackay
Radio.458 The Court thereafter relied upon Funk Bros. in at least
Flook and Mayo as support for what became the two-step “inventive
concept” test.459
In Benson (1972), the Court held that “abstract intellectual
concepts are not patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific
and technological work.”460 The Court further held that a patent
claim may not “wholly preempt the [use of a] mathematical formula”
or “algorithm.”461 The Court conducted no analysis of § 101 in
reaching these holdings, beyond citing the statutory language in a
footnote.462 Rather, the Court based its ruling entirely upon
unsupported statements from prior cases such as Le Roy, Morse,
Rubber-Tip Pencil, Cochrane, Tilghman, Mackay Radio, and Funk
Bros.463
In Flook (1978), the Court superficially acknowledged that the
patent-eligibility inquiry “turns entirely on the proper construction of
§ 101 of the Patent Act.”464 However, after merely quoting the
statute in a footnote,465 the Court held that “[t]he plain language of
§ 101 does not answer the question.”466 Without conducting any
statutory analysis, the Court reasoned that the “holding [of

457. Id. at 132.
458. Id. at 130 (citing Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 175 (1852); Mackay Radio,
306 U.S. at 94).
459. See Flook, 437 U.S. at 591–92 (quoting Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 130); Mayo, 132 S. Ct.
at 1294 (“[The Court’s precedents] insist that a process that focuses upon the use of a natural law
[must] also contain other elements or a combination of elements, sometimes referred to as an
‘inventive concept,’ sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more
than a patent upon the natural law itself.”); id. (quoting Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 130 (“If there is
to be invention from [a discovery of a law of nature], it must come from the application of the law
of nature to a new and useful end.”)).
460. Benson, 409 U.S. at 67.
461. Id. at 71–72.
462. Id. at 64 n.2 (quoting 35 U.S.C. §§ 100(b) & 101 (1952)).
463. Id. at 67–70 (citing and quoting Le Roy, 55 U.S. at 175; O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62,
111–13 (1853)); Mackay Radio, 30 U.S. at 94; Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 130; Tilghman v. Proctor,
102 U.S. 707, 721 (1880); Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876); Rubber-Tip Pencil Co.
v. Howard, 87 U.S. 498, 507 (1874)).
464. Flook, 437 U.S. at 588.
465. Id. at 588 n.8 (quoting 35 U.S.C. §§ 100(b) & 101 (1952)).
466. Id. at 588.
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Benson] . . . forecloses a purely literal reading of § 101,”467 ignoring
that Benson never actually analyzed the statute. The Court cast
Benson as having “[r]eason[ed] that an algorithm, or mathematical
formula, is like a law of nature,” applying the “established rule that a
law of nature cannot be the subject of a patent.”468 As support for the
“established rule,” the Flook Court cited and quoted prior cases such
as Le Roy, Morse, Cochrane, Tilghman, Mackay Radio, and Funk
Bros.469
In Chakrabarty (1980), the Court acknowledged the three
judicial exceptions to patent eligibility, stating that “laws of nature,
physical phenomena, and abstract ideas have been held not
patentable.”470 As support for this proposition, the Court cited
Le Roy, Morse, Funk Bros., Benson, and Flook.471
In Diehr (1981), the Court again stated that “[t]his Court has . . .
recognized limits to § 101,” including exclusions for “laws of nature,
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.”472 As support, the Court
cited Le Roy, Morse, Rubber-Tip Pencil, Cochrane, Mackay Radio,
Funk Bros., Benson, Flook, and Chakrabarty.473
In Bilski (2010), the Court reaffirmed that “[t]he Court’s
precedents provide three specific exceptions to § 101’s broad patent
eligibility principles: ‘laws of nature, physical phenomena, and
abstract ideas.’”474 The Court relied upon Le Roy, Cochrane, Funk
Bros., Benson, Flook, Chakrabarty, and Diehr.475 The Court
467. Id. at 589 (analyzing Benson, 409 U.S. at 67) (emphasis added).
468. Id. (citing Benson, 409 U.S. at 71–72) (emphasis added).
469. Id. at 588–92 (citing and quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S.
127, 130 (1948); Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939);
Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 728 (1880); Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 787–88 (1876);
O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 112–21 (1853); Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.)
156, 175 (1852)).
470. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (emphasis added).
471. Id. (citing Le Roy, 55 U.S. (14 How.) at 175; Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 112–21; Funk
Bros., 333 U.S. at 130; Benson, 409 U.S. at 67; Flook, 437 U.S. at 584).
472. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981).
473. Id. at 185–88 (quoting Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309; Flook 437 U.S. at 590; Benson 409
U.S. at 71; Mackay Radio, 306 U.S. at 94; Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.)
498, 507 (1874); Le Roy, 55 U.S. (14 How.) at 175) (citing Flook, 437 U.S. at 586; Benson, 409
U.S. 63; Funk Bros., 333 U.S. 127; Cochrane, 94 U.S. at 780; Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62; Le
Roy, 55 U.S. 156).
474. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010) (quoting Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309)
(emphasis added).
475. Id. at 3225–31 (quoting Diehr, 450 U.S. at 177, 182, 187, 188, 191–92, 192–93, 195;
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308, 309, 315; Flook, 437 U.S. at 588, 590, 594; Benson, 409 U.S. at
67, 70, 71, 72; Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 130; Cochrane, 94 U.S. at 788) (citing Diehr, 450 U.S.
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similarly relied solely upon prior case law when reaffirming the three
judicial exceptions in Mayo (2012)476 and Myriad (2013).477
Thus, our review of history makes it painfully clear that, in more
than 160 years of jurisprudence—spanning from Le Roy (1852) to
the present—the Supreme Court has failed to address a simple and
yet fundamental question: Where in the Constitution, the Patent Act,
or the relevant legislative history does the Court find support for the
“laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas” exceptions
to patent eligibility?
To the contrary, in Bilski (2010), the Court finally threw up its
hands and conceded that “these exceptions are not required by the
statutory text,” thus abandoning all pretense of statutory
interpretation.478 Instead, the Court chose to hang its hat on the
concept that “these exceptions have defined the reach of the statutes
as a matter of statutory stare decisis going back 150 years.”479
But the doctrine of stare decisis is an extraordinarily weak
justification for adhering to the current status quo of patent-eligibility
jurisprudence. “Stare decisis is a ‘principle of policy,’ and not ‘an
inexorable command.’”480 Indeed, “the fact that a decision has
proved ‘unworkable’ is a traditional ground for overruling it.”481
Moreover, “[b]eyond workability, the relevant factors in deciding
whether to adhere to the principle of stare decisis include the
antiquity of the precedent, the reliance interests at stake, and of

175; Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308–09; Flook, 437 U.S. 584; Benson, 409 U.S. 63; Le Roy, 55
U.S. (14 How.) at 174–75).
476. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293–94 (2012)
(“The Court has long held that [§ 101] contains an important implicit exception. ‘[L]aws of
nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas’ are not patentable.” (alteration in original)
(quoting Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185) (citing Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309; Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.)
at 112–20; Le Roy, 55 U.S. (14 How.) at 175)).
477. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116 (2013)
(“We have ‘long held that [§ 101] contains an important implicit exception[:] Laws of nature,
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable.” (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1293)).
478. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3225 (emphasis added).
479. Id. (citing Le Roy, 55 U.S. (14 How.) at 174–75); see also Le Roy, 55 U.S. (14 How.) at
174–75 (“[A] principle is not patentable. A principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental truth; an
original cause; a motive; these cannot be patented, as no one can claim in either of them an
exclusive right.”).
480. United States v. Int'l Bus. Machines Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 856 (1996) (quoting Helvering
v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940); Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991)).
481. Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 792 (2009) (citing Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S.
808, 827 (1991)).
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course whether the decision was well reasoned.”482 Here, the factors
on balance weigh against a rigid application of stare decisis.
First, as we discussed in Part IV, supra, the current morass of
case law surrounding the Supreme Court’s judicial exceptions to
patent eligibility has thoroughly confounded lower courts, proving
wholly unworkable in practice. Further, the Supreme Court has
rejected attempts by the Federal Circuit to craft more workable
standards such as the “machine-or-transformation test,” offering no
alternative guidance other than a cryptic direction to “look[] to the
guideposts” in the Court’s vague and inconsistent precedents.483
Second, reliance interests do not justify strict adherence to stare
decisis in this instance. Given the unworkability, unpredictability,
and inconsistency of the Supreme Court’s precedents, it defies logic
to uphold the status quo of patent eligibility under the guise of
“protect[ing] the legitimate expectations of those who live under the
law.”484 Indeed, “a precedent that has proven unworkable may
generate minimal reliance because stakeholders are simply unable to
predict what results it will yield.”485 Moreover, as we discuss below
and in Part VI, infra, applying the traditional tools of statutory
interpretation to § 101 would likely result in an expansion of patenteligible subject matter. Such a change would not frustrate the
reliance interests of parties who have invested in research and
development in anticipation of obtaining a patent. Likewise, any
countervailing reliance on the presumed invalidity of existing patents
under § 101 is at best highly speculative given the unworkability and
inconsistent application of the judicial exceptions. Further, because a
correct and workable statutory interpretation of § 101 should reduce
482. Id. at 792–93 (citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009)).
483. See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3231; see also id. at 3229–30 (“Rather than adopting categorical
rules that might have wide-ranging and unforeseen impacts, the Court resolves this case narrowly
on the basis of this Court’s decisions in Benson, Flook, and Diehr, which show that petitioners’
claims are not patentable processes because they are attempts to patent abstract ideas.”).
484. Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 716 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
485. Randy J. Kozel, Stare Decisis as Judicial Doctrine, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 411, 424
(2010); see also Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in Economic Perspective: An Economic Analysis
of the Supreme Court’s Doctrine of Precedent, 78 N.C. L. REV. 643, 669–70 (2000) (“[W]hen
precedent produces confusion in the form of unpredictable results, the costs from retaining the
‘unworkable’ decision generally may outweigh the uncertainty created by overturning the
precedent.”); BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 151 (1921)
(“There should be greater readiness to abandon an untenable position when the rule to be
discarded may not reasonably be supposed to have determined the conduct of the litigants.”).
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uncertainty in the doctrine’s application, the decision of whether to
apply stare decisis should not require the typical step of “balanc[ing]
the importance of having . . . questions decided against the
importance of having them decided right.”486
Third, as we have demonstrated, the precedents giving rise to the
judicial exceptions to patent eligibility are not even based on a
“badly reasoned” statutory interpretation of § 101;487 rather, they
have been created out of whole cloth based on unsupported and
misunderstood dicta, without even the pretense that they represent a
reasoned statutory interpretation of § 101.488 Further, for the reasons
discussed in Parts V.B–F, infra, the Court’s “precedent[s]
demonstrably conflict[] with the statutory or constitutional
provision[s] [they] purport[] to interpret,” thereby further
diminishing the weight that should be placed on any reliance
interests.489 Indeed, “stare decisis cannot possibly be controlling
when . . . the decision[s] in question ha[ve] been proved manifestly
erroneous.”490
Finally, while “considerations of stare decisis weigh heavily in
the area of statutory construction, where Congress is free to change
[the] Court’s interpretation of its legislation,”491 the Court has “never
applied stare decisis mechanically to prohibit overruling [the
Court’s] earlier decisions determining the meaning of statutes.”492
“Nor is this a case where [the Court] should ‘place on the shoulders
of Congress the burden of the Court’s own error,’”493 for “[i]t is at
best treacherous to find in Congressional silence alone the adoption
of a controlling rule of law.”494 Indeed, because the judicial
exceptions have been created out of thin air, rather than based on any
486. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 378 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
487. Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 800 (2009) (Alito, J., concurring).
488. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010) (conceding that the judicial
exceptions are “not required by the statutory text”).
489. Amy Coney Barrett, Stare Decisis and Due Process, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1011, 1062
(2003).
490. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 521 (1995).
491. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 233 (2009) (quoting Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431
U.S. 720, 736 (1977)).
492. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 695 (1978).
493. Id. (quoting Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 70 (1946)); see also Altria Group,
Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 108 (2008) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“When a decision of this Court
has failed to properly interpret a statute, we should not ‘place on the shoulders of Congress the
burden of the Court’s own error.’” (quoting Girouard, 322 U.S. at 69–70)).
494. Girouard, 328 U.S. at 69.
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interpretation of specific language in the Patent Act, it is difficult to
fathom how Congress might effectively overrule the Court’s morass
of patent-eligibility jurisprudence without potentially running into
unintended consequences. In sum, this is an area where the Court
should clean up its own mess.
B. Preemption: The Statutory Scheme
The Court has repeatedly emphasized preemption as a chief
policy concern underlying the judicial exceptions excluding “laws of
nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas” from patent
eligibility. The Court first invoked preemption as a rationale for the
judicial exceptions in Benson, holding that a patent claim may not
“wholly pre-empt the [use of a] mathematical formula” or
“algorithm.”495 The Court thereafter discussed preemption as a
rationale for the judicial exceptions in Flook,496 Diehr,497 Bilski,498
and Mayo,499 even when analyzing claims that did not wholly
preempt a law of nature, physical phenomena, or abstract idea.500
The concept of preemption encompasses two logically distinct
issues.501 First, an overbroad patent claim might be said to preempt
embodiments within its scope that the patentee did not describe and
thus presumably did not invent.502 Second, a patent claim might be
495. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71–72 (1972).
496. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589–90 (1978).
497. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981) (“Their process admittedly employs a wellknown mathematical equation, but they do not seek to pre-empt the use of that equation. Rather,
they seek only to foreclose from others the use of that equation in conjunction with all of the
other steps in their claimed process.”).
498. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010) (“Allowing petitioners to patent risk
hedging would pre-empt use of this approach in all fields, and would effectively grant a
monopoly over an abstract idea.”).
499. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294 (2012).
(“[The Court’s precedents] warn us against upholding patents that claim processes that too
broadly preempt the use of a natural law.” (citing Benson, 409 U.S. at 71–72); O’Reilly v. Morse,
56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 112–120 (1853)).
500. See, e.g., Flook, 437 U.S. at 589–90 (acknowledging that the patentee did “not seek to
‘wholly preempt the mathematical formula,’ since there are uses of his formula outside the
petrochemical and oil-refining industries,” yet finding that the addition of mere “post-solution
activity” was insufficient to “transform an unpatentable principle into a patentable process”);
Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3231 (finding that a set of claims directed to hedging in “energy markets”
was not patent eligible, even though it did not “pre-empt use of [hedging] in all fields,” because
merely “limiting an abstract idea to one field of use or adding token postsolution components
[does] not make the concept patentable”).
501. See generally Katherine J. Strandburg, Much Ado About Preemption, 50 HOUS. L. REV.
563, 570–86 (2013) (recognizing the two distinct threads of the preemption analysis).
502. See id.
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said to preempt downstream innovation that requires the use of the
claimed embodiments.503 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has
often conflated these distinct concepts in its patent-eligibility
rulings.504 However, at any rate, a close analysis reveals that neither
preemption thread provides support for the judicial exceptions to
§ 101.
The first preemption thread—i.e., the concern that an overbroad
patent claim might preempt embodiments within its scope that the
patentee did not describe and thus presumably did not invent—was
the situation presented in Morse. In that case, the patent described a
single species of invention (i.e., the telegraph), yet broadly claimed a
genus (i.e., the use of electromagnetism, by any means, to print
characters at a distance).505 As the Court explained in finding
Morse’s overbroad claim invalid, “he claims an exclusive right to use
a manner and process which he has not described and indeed had not
invented, and therefore could not describe when he obtained his
patent.”506 That is, “he claims what he has not described in the
manner required by law.”507 As we have explained, claim
overbreadth of this type is a concern that is relevant to the
enablement requirement of § 112.508 That is, “[t]o be enabling [under
§ 112], the specification of a patent must teach those skilled in the art
how to make and use the full scope of the claimed invention without
‘undue experimentation.’”509 As the Federal Circuit has explained:
Enablement serves the dual function in the patent system of
ensuring adequate disclosure of the claimed invention and
503. See id. at 573; Kevin Emerson Collins, Bilski and the Ambiguity of “An Unpatentable
Abstract Idea”, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 37, 59 (2011) (“The problem in Benson is not a
problem of an abstract claim that describes too many distinct things/methods not invented by the
inventor, . . . but rather a problem of a claim that describes things/methods that were actually
invented but that are abstract because they have too many end-uses and are thus insufficiently
applied to merit patent protection.”).
504. Strandburg, supra note 501, at 570–73.
505. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 120.
506. Id. at 113 (emphasis added).
507. Id. at 120 (emphasis added).
508. See 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012); see also Wyeth & Cordis Corp. v. Abbott Labs, 720 F.3d
1380, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“Claims are not enabled when, at the effective filing date of the
patent, one of ordinary skill in the art could not practice their full scope without undue
experimentation.”); MagSil Corp. v. Hitachi Global Storage Techs., Inc., 687 F.3d 1377, 1380
(Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk, A/S, 108 F.3d 1361, 1365 (Fed. Cir.
1997); Sitrick v. Dreamworks, LLC, 516 F.3d 993, 999 (Fed. Cir. 2008)); supra notes 93–94 and
accompanying text (examining the enablement requirement of § 112(a)).
509. MagSil, 687 F.3d at 1380 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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of preventing claims broader than the disclosed invention.
This important doctrine prevents both inadequate disclosure
of an invention and overbroad claiming that might
otherwise attempt to cover more than was actually invented.
Thus, a patentee chooses broad claim language at the peril
of losing any claim that cannot be enabled across its full
scope of coverage. The scope of the claims must be less
than or equal to the scope of the enablement to ensure that
the public knowledge is enriched by the patent specification
to a degree at least commensurate with the scope of the
claims.510
“It is a truism that the claims of a patent define the invention
that is claimed.”511 As such, while the full scope of a claimed
invention must be enabled by a commensurate description in the
specification, this § 112 disclosure requirement has no logical
relevance to whether the type of invention claimed is patent eligible
under § 101. Indeed, if a claim recites a type of invention which is
not patent eligible, that conclusion should always hold true, even if
the specification does enable the full scope of the claim. Conversely,
if the specification of a patent fails to enable the full scope of a claim
under § 112, it does not follow that the type of invention claimed
may never be patented under § 101. Thus, disclosure issues falling
under the first preemption thread should always be analyzed under
§ 112, separate and distinct from the patent-eligibility analysis under
§ 101.
Indeed, conflating § 112 with § 101 runs the risk of invalidating
all patents which claim a particular type of invention, merely because
a particular patent had an inadequate specification. Yet, this is
effectively what the Court has done by repeatedly citing Morse—an
enablement case—as support for the judicial exceptions to § 101.512

510. Id. at 1380–81 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
511. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Dakocytomation Cal., Inc., 517 F.3d 1364, 1372 (Fed. Cir.
2008).
512. See, e.g., Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294
(2012) (citing Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 112–20) (holding that a patent claim may not “too
broadly preempt the use of a natural law”); id. at 1301 (expressing “a concern that patent law not
inhibit further discovery by improperly tying up the future use of laws of nature”); Bilski v.
Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3253 (2010) (“[E]xplaining that Morse’s patent on electromagnetism
for writing would preempt a wide swath of technological developments.” (citing Morse, 56 U.S.
(15 How.) at 113)).
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The second preemption thread—i.e., the concern that a patent
claim might preempt downstream innovation requiring the use of the
claimed embodiments—was the concern first expressed in Benson.
The Benson Court described the claimed invention as follows:
They claimed a method for converting binary-coded
decimal (BCD) numerals into pure binary numerals. The
claims were not limited to any particular art or technology,
to any particular apparatus or machinery, or to any
particular end use. They purported to cover any use of the
claimed method in a general-purpose digital computer of
any type.513
....
Here the ‘process’ claim is so abstract and sweeping as to
cover both known and unknown uses of the BCD to pure
binary conversion. The end use may (1) vary from the
operation of a train to verification of drivers’ licenses to
researching the law books for precedents and (2) be
performed through any existing machinery or futuredevised machinery or without any apparatus.514
The Benson Court was concerned with the potential downstream
uses of the claimed BCD-to-binary conversion process, holding that,
because the process “has no substantial practical application except
in connection with a digital computer, . . . the patent would wholly
pre-empt the [use of the] mathematical formula.”515 Unlike in Morse,
there was no suggestion in Benson that the disclosure in the patent’s
specification was insufficient to enable the full scope of the claims.
Nonetheless, the Benson Court relied upon Morse as support for its
preemption analysis, recasting that case as having invoked the
second thread of preemption concerns regarding downstream uses.516
In Mayo, the Court elaborated as to its reasoning underlying the
second preemption thread and its purported relation to § 101, stating:
These statements [from the Court’s precedents regarding
preemption] reflect the fact that, even though rewarding
with patents those who discover new laws of nature and the
like might well encourage their discovery, those laws and
513.
514.
515.
516.

Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 64 (1972) (emphasis added).
Id. at 68 (emphasis added).
Id. at 71–72 (emphasis added).
Id. at 68–69.

198

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:117

principles, considered generally, are “the basic tools of
scientific and technological work.” And so there is a danger
that the grant of patents that tie up their use will inhibit
future innovation premised upon them, a danger that
becomes acute when a patented process amounts to no more
than an instruction to “apply the natural law,” or otherwise
foreclose more future invention than the underlying
discovery could reasonably justify.517
With the foregoing line of reasoning, the Court has apparently
decided that certain patents are simply undesirable on policy
grounds. In certain cases, the Court is making an arbitrary and
subjective determination that the benefits of granting a patent to
incentivize innovation are outweighed by the preemptive scope of
the exclusive rights granted by the patent. As the Mayo Court further
explained:
[T]he underlying functional concern here is a relative one:
how much future innovation is foreclosed relative to the
contribution of the inventor. A patent upon a narrow law of
nature may not inhibit future research as seriously as would
a patent upon Einstein’s law of relativity, but the creative
value of the discovery is also considerably smaller. And, as
we have previously pointed out, even a narrow law of
nature (such as the one before us) can inhibit future
research.
In any event, our cases have not distinguished among
different laws of nature according to whether or not the
principles they embody are sufficiently narrow. And this is
understandable. Courts and judges are not institutionally
well suited to making the kinds of judgments needed to
distinguish among different laws of nature. And so the
courts have endorsed a bright-line prohibition against
patenting laws of nature, mathematical formulas and the
like, which serves as a somewhat more easily administered
proxy for the underlying “building-block” concern.518
In a surprising twist, the Court has admitted that the judiciary is
“not institutionally well suited” to make policy judgments as to the
517. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1301 (citations omitted).
518. Id. at 1303 (emphasis altered) (citations omitted).
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value of certain patents to society.519 Yet, rather than simply omitting
preemption considerations from the § 101 analysis, the Court has
paradoxically decided that the solution is “a bright-line prohibition
against patenting laws of nature, mathematical formulas and the
like.”520 But in drawing a purported “bright-line” in the form of the
judicial exceptions to § 101, the Court has ironically made the
precise kind of policy judgment it admits the judiciary is ill-equipped
to handle. The Court has further ignored the practical reality that,
without clear definitions for “abstract ideas,” “laws of nature,” and
“physical phenomena,” the application of the judicial exceptions is
inherently subjective and prone to result-driven policy decisions.
At any rate, in declaring certain types of subject matter patent
ineligible based on the Court’s view that patent rights would
“foreclose[] more future invention than the underlying discovery
could reasonably justify,”521 the Court has “usurp[ed] the legislative
role,”522 frustrating a detailed statutory scheme specifically designed
by Congress to balance (a) the policy goal of incentivizing
innovation through the grant of exclusive patent rights, with (b) the
preemptive effects that exclusive patent rights have on downstream
innovation.
For example, in § 101, Congress chose to limit patent eligibility
solely to “new and useful process[es], machine[s], manufacture[s], or
composition[s] of matter.”523 This provision reflects a conscious
policy determination by Congress that granting limited patent
monopolies to incentivize these types of innovations—and no
others—is ultimately beneficial to society.
At the same time, Congress enacted numerous provisions
specifically designed to moderate the preemptive effects inherent to
exclusive patent rights. In § 102, Congress chose to grant patents
solely for innovations that are novel,524 reflecting the view that a
patent should not capture that which is already in the public domain.
Similarly, Congress excluded “obvious” advancements over the prior
art from patentability under § 103,525 reflecting the view that some
519.
520.
521.
522.
523.
524.
525.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1301.
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 997 (2008) (Newman, J., dissenting).
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006).
35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006).
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innovations are too simplistic or trivial to justify the grant of a patent
monopoly. With the written description and enablement requirements
of § 112,526 Congress required patentees to disclose their invention to
the public as a “quid pro quo of the right to exclude,”527 while at the
same time limiting claim scope to that which the patentee has
actually invented and described.528 And with the definiteness
requirement set out in § 112,529 Congress required patentees “to
apprise potential infringers of the scope of the claims.”530 Finally,
and perhaps most importantly, under § 154, Congress limited the
term of a patent to twenty years from the filing date of the earliest
application to which the patent claims priority.531 In doing so,
Congress has made a policy determination that granting exclusive
patent rights for up to twenty years is a justifiable price to pay in
order to incentivize innovation.
In short, Congress has made a detailed policy determination that,
upon balancing the interests, it is ultimately beneficial to society to
grant exclusive patent rights (1) for up to twenty years,532 (2) for
“new and useful process[es], machine[s], manufacture[s], or
composition[s] of matter,”533 (3) provided that such inventions are
novel,534 non-obvious,535 disclosed in a fully enabling written
description,536 and claimed with sufficient definiteness.537 Yet, the
Court has crafted sweeping judicial exceptions to § 101 based
primarily on a policy view that “some categories of invention
526. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012).
527. J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 142 (2001) (quoting
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 484 (1974)).
528. MagSil Corp. v. Hitachi Global Storage Techs., Inc., 687 F.3d 1377, 1380–81 (Fed. Cir.
2012); see also Wyeth & Cordis Corp. v. Abbott Labs, 720 F.3d 1380, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2013)
(“Claims are not enabled when, at the effective filing date of the patent, one of ordinary skill in
the art could not practice their full scope without undue experimentation.”); supra notes 93–94
and accompanying text.
529. 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (2012).
530. Young v. Lumenis, Inc., 492 F.3d 1336, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
531. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006) (“Subject to the payment of fees under this title, such grant
shall be for a term beginning on the date on which the patent issues and ending 20 years from the
date on which the application for patent was filed in the United States or, if the application
contains a specific reference to an earlier filed application or applications under section 120, 121,
or 365(c), from the date on which the earliest such application was filed.”).
532. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006).
533. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
534. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006).
535. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006).
536. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012).
537. 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (2012).
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deserve no protection” because they have too many downstream
uses.538 In doing so, the Court has upset the balance of this calibrated
statutory scheme, substituting the will of the judiciary for that of
Congress.
Finally, it is important to note that all patents “preempt”
downstream innovations that require use of the claimed invention.539
This is the very essence and purpose of exclusive patent rights540—
that one who improves upon another’s patented invention may still
be precluded from practicing the claimed elements of the original
invention. “A ‘blocking patent’ is an earlier patent that must be
licensed in order to practice a later patent.”541 Indeed, the “Supreme
Court has long acknowledged the ‘well established’ rule that ‘an
improver cannot appropriate the basic patent of another and that the
improver without a license is an infringer and may be sued as
such.’”542 Indeed, this principle was even reflected in the Patent Act
of 1793, which stated the following:
[A]ny person, who shall have discovered an improvement in
the principle of any machine, or in the process of any
composition of matter, which shall have been patented, and
shall have obtained a patent for such improvement, he shall
not be at liberty to make, use or vend the original discovery,
nor shall the first inventor be at liberty to use the
improvement.543
Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, preemption issues
have no business being included in the § 101 inquiry regarding
patent-eligible subject matter. The first thread of preemption
concerns—i.e., that an overbroad patent claim might preempt
embodiments within its scope that the patentee did not describe and
thus presumably did not invent—is appropriately addressed under the
“full scope” enablement doctrine of § 112. The second thread of
preemption concerns—i.e., that a patent claim may preempt
538. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 1012 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) (Rader, J., dissenting).
539. See Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 2, 1 Stat. 318 (1793).
540. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229 (1964) (explaining that
patents are given to encourage invention by rewarding inventors with the right to exclude others
from the use of the invention).
541. Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting
Prima Tek II, L.L.C. v. A-Roo Co., 222 F.3d 1372, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
542. Id. (quoting Temco Elec. Motor Co. v. Apco Mfg. Co., 275 U.S. 319, 328 (1928)).
543. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 2, 1 Stat. 318 (1793) (emphasis altered).
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downstream innovation which requires the use of the claimed
invention—has already been specifically addressed in a detailed and
balanced statutory scheme enacted by Congress.
Perhaps for these reasons, the Supreme Court’s most recent
§ 101 decision in Myriad did not mention the concept of preemption.
The Myriad Court found cDNA patent eligible without conducting
any inquiry as to what quantum of downstream biotech research
would be preempted by Myriad’s patent.544 The Myriad Court relied
heavily on Chakrabarty for its holding, which had previously been
an outlier with respect to its omission of any preemption analysis.545
This was a welcome departure from Mayo, decided only a year
earlier, in which the Court relied heavily on preemption concerns.546
C. Abstraction: Yet Another Statutory Scheme
In Le Roy (1852), the Supreme Court stated in dictum that “[a]
principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental truth; an original cause; a
motive; these cannot be patented, as no one can claim in either of
them an exclusive right.”547 In Rubber-Tip Pencil (1874), the Court
further stated in dictum that “[a]n idea of itself is not patentable.”548
In Benson (1984), the Court relied upon these statements to hold that
“abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable, as they are the
basic tools of scientific and technological work.”549
But what exactly is an “idea,” a “principle,” or an “abstract
intellectual concept”? The Benson Court held that a mathematical
algorithm for converting BCD numerals to pure binary was a patentineligible “idea.”550 The Court vaguely defined the term “algorithm”
as a “procedure for solving a given type of mathematical
problem.”551 The Court thereafter reaffirmed in Flook (1978) and
Diehr (1981) that algorithms are patent ineligible,552 with the Court
544. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2119 (2013).
545. Id. at 2116–17 (analyzing Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 305–10 (1980)).
546. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1301–03 (2012).;
see also supra notes 517–521 and accompanying text (discussing various cases in which the
Court addressed patent preemption concerns in its analysis).
547. Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 175 (1852).
548. Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 498, 507 (1874).
549. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972) (citing Le Roy, 55 U.S. (14 How.) at 175;
Rubber-Tip Pencil, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) at 507).
550. Id. at 71–72 (emphasis added).
551. Id. at 65.
552. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191 (1981); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 585 (1978).
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describing the applicable judicial exception as an exclusion of
“abstract ideas.”553 However, aside from merely holding that
algorithms fall within the judicial exception, the Court in Benson,
Flook, and Diehr offered no definition or explanation as to what
constitutes an “abstract idea.”
In Bilski (2010), despite the fact that the claims at issue recited a
series of specific method steps, the Court characterized the claims as
broadly reciting the “concept of hedging, or protecting against risk,”
which the Court held was “an unpatentable abstract idea.”554 The
Court did not define what an “abstract idea” is, nor did it explain
what types of claim elements may be disregarded in determining
whether a claim is impermissibly directed to an “abstract idea.”
Rather, the Court merely directed lower courts to “look[] to the
guideposts in Benson, Flook, and Diehr.”555
So what then is an “abstract idea,” and what is the statutory
basis for the corresponding judicial exception to § 101? As discussed
at length in Part V.B, supra, the “abstract ideas” exception cannot be
justified merely by concerns regarding preemption, as Congress has
enacted a detailed statutory scheme specifically designed to balance
preemption concerns against the goal of incentivizing innovation.
Nor can the exception be justified based on any vague notion
that “one may not patent an idea,”556 or that “[a]n idea of itself is not
patentable.”557 These holdings are simply illogical and are in plain
conflict with the statute. All inventions are ideas at varying levels of
generality. Every patent specification describes the ideas conceived
by the patentee. Every patent claim defines the scope of the ideas the
patentee seeks to protect. Indeed, conception—the very touchstone of
invention under the patent laws—is by definition an “idea”: the
“formation in the mind of the inventor, of a definite and permanent
idea of the complete and operative invention.”558 Further, the only
way to make an invention something more than an idea is to actually
reduce it to practice—e.g., an item actually built or a process actually
performed. But the Patent Act does not require actual reduction to
practice. “It is well settled that an invention may be patented before
553.
554.
555.
556.
557.
558.

Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185.
Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010).
Id.
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71 (1972).
Id. at 67.
Coleman v. Dines, 754 F.2d 353, 359 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
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it is reduced to practice,”559 as “constructive reduction to practice
occurs when a patent application on the claimed invention is
filed.”560 Indeed, the Court in Dolbear expressly held that Alexander
Graham Bell could patent his idea for transmitting voices
electronically, even though he had not yet reduced his conception to
practice:
It is quite true that when Bell applied for his patent he had
never transmitted telegraphically spoken words so that they
could be distinctly heard and understood at the receiving
end of his line, but in his specification he did describe
accurately and with admirable clearness his process—that is
to say, the exact electrical condition that must be created to
accomplish his purpose—and he also described, with
sufficient precision to enable one of ordinary skill in such
matters to make it, a form of apparatus which, if used in the
way pointed out, would produce the required effect, receive
the words, and carry them to and deliver them at the
appointed place.561
Setting aside preemption concerns and the nonexistent rule
against patenting “ideas,” any justification for the “abstract ideas”
exception to § 101 can only lie in the concept of abstraction itself.
But what exactly are the Court’s concerns when it asks whether a
claimed invention is too “abstract” to be patent eligible under § 101?
The exception cannot be justified by mere concerns that a
claimed invention is too vague or poorly defined to be patentable.
Congress has already specifically addressed such concerns with the
claim-definiteness requirement of § 112,562 under which a patent
claim is invalid if “a person of ordinary skill in the art could not
determine the bounds of the claim.”563 Nor can the “abstract ideas”
exception be justified by a concern that a patent claim is overbroad
and captures embodiments that the patentee did not invent. As we
discussed at length in Part V.B, supra, such concerns are already
addressed by § 112 and the “full scope” enablement doctrine, under
559. Pfaff v. Wells Elecs. Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 61 (1998).
560. Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
561. Dolbear v. Am. Bell. Tel. Co., 126 U.S. 1, 535 (1888).
562. 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (2012) (“The specification shall conclude with one or more claims
particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a joint
inventor regards as the invention.”).
563. Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc. v. M-I LLC, 514 F.3d 1244, 1249 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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which “the specification of a patent must teach those skilled in the art
how to make and use the full scope of the claimed invention without
‘undue experimentation.’”564
The “abstract ideas” exception similarly cannot be justified
merely by concerns that the claimed invention is too basic, too
simplistic, or too trivial to be patentable. Congress expressly
addressed such concerns with the non-obviousness requirement of
§ 103, under which a patent claim is invalid if the “claimed invention
as a whole would have been obvious . . . to a person having ordinary
skill in the art.”565 Indeed, under the Court’s holding in KSR
International Co. v. Teleflex, a fact finder may invoke “common
sense” to find a patent claim invalid for obviousness.566
Ultimately, we believe the statutory scheme enacted by
Congress already systematically eliminates “abstract ideas” from
patentability. Stated differently—if a patent claim (a) recites an
invention that is novel567 and non-obvious,568 (b) has a definite claim
scope,569 and (c) has a claim scope which is fully enabled by the
specification,570 then that patent claim by definition does not recite an
“abstract idea.” The judicial exception to § 101 for “abstract ideas”
therefore serves no purpose other than to sow confusion and
encourage subjective validity determinations outside the appropriate
statutory frameworks regarding novelty, non-obviousness,
definiteness, and enablement. Accordingly, we propose that the
“abstract ideas” exception to § 101 should be relegated to the dustbin
of history.
D. An “Inventive Concept”: Conflating Eligibility with Obviousness
The “inventive concept” test originated in Funk Bros. (1948),
wherein the Court held that even an “application of [a] newlydiscovered natural principle” is not patent eligible unless it includes
some “invention” beyond the natural principle itself, rather than a
564. MagSil Corp. v. Hitachi Global Storage Techs., Inc., 687 F.3d 1377, 1380 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
565. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006).
566. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007) (“Rigid preventative rules that
deny factfinders recourse to common sense . . . are neither necessary under our case law nor
consistent with it.”).
567. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006).
568. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006).
569. 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (2012).
570. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012).
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mere “simple step.”571 The Court later relied upon Funk Bros. when
expressly applying the “inventive concept” test in Flook and
Mayo.572
The “inventive concept” test for patent eligibility is a two-step
inquiry: First, the Court will identify the “laws of nature, physical
phenomena, [or] abstract ideas” underlying the claim at issue.573
Second, the Court will analyze the claim’s “other elements” to
determine whether they collectively recite an “inventive concept”
that is “sufficient to ensure that the patent [claim] in practice
amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the natural law
itself.”574 For this analysis, the law of nature, physical phenomenon,
or abstract idea the Court identifies as underlying the claim “is
treated as though it were a familiar part of the prior art,” effectively
excising it from the claim.575 The required “inventive concept” will
then be found in the claim’s “other steps” or elements only if they
recite more than “well-understood, routine, conventional activity
previously engaged in by researchers in the field.”576 Mere pre- or
“‘post-solution activity’ that is purely ‘conventional or obvious’” is
insufficient.577
In a nutshell, the “inventive concept” test effectively asks
whether patent claims are obvious in view of their underlying “laws
of nature, physical phenomena, [or] abstract ideas,” which are
“treated as though [they] were a familiar part of the prior art.”578 This

571. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 132 (1948).
572. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 591–92 (1978) (quoting Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 130);
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294 (2012) (“[The
Court’s precedents] insist that a process that focuses upon the use of a natural law [must] also
contain other elements or a combination of elements, sometimes referred to as an ‘inventive
concept,’ sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a
patent upon the natural law itself.”); id. (“If there is to be invention from [a discovery of a law of
nature], it must come from the application of the law of nature to a new and useful end.” (quoting
Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 130)).
573. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1293–94.
574. Id. at 1294 (emphasis added).
575. Flook, 437 U.S. at 591–92; see also id. at 592 (“We think this case must also be
considered as if the principle or mathematical formula were well known.”); id. at 594
(“Respondent’s process is unpatentable under § 101, not because it contains a mathematical
algorithm as one component, but because once that algorithm is assumed to be within the prior
art, the application, considered as a whole, contains no patentable invention.” (emphasis added)).
576. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294.
577. Id. at 1299 (quoting Flook, 437 U.S. at 590).
578. Flook, 437 U.S. at 591–92, 598.
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inquiry is fraught with flaws that make it inconsistent with the Patent
Act and wholly unworkable in practice.
Importantly, the “inventive concept” test improperly conflates
the patent-eligibility inquiry (§ 101) with the distinct issue of
whether a patent claim is invalid due to obviousness (§ 103).579
Justice Stewart highlighted this concern with his dissent in Flook.580
The conflation of patent eligibility with obviousness directly
conflicts with the statute. For reference, we recite the current
versions of §§ 101 and 103 below:
[Section 101.] Whoever invents or discovers any new and
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may
obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and
requirements of this title.581
[Section 103.] A patent for a claimed invention may not be
obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not
identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the
differences between the claimed invention and the prior art
are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have
been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed
invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to
which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not
be negated by the manner in which the invention was
made.582
Section 101 plainly does not include any language that would
suggest an obviousness inquiry. Rather, it expressly defines the
categories of subject matter that are eligible for patenting, “subject to
the conditions and requirements of this title.”583 When section 103
was added with the Patent Act of 1952, it was titled: “Conditions for
patentability; non-obvious subject matter.”584 The Senate Committee
Report to the 1952 Act confirmed that the non-obviousness
requirement of § 103 is one of the “conditions and requirements of
this title,” stating the following:
579.
580.
581.
582.
583.
584.

Compare 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012), with 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012).
Flook, 437 U.S. at 598, 600 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (emphasis added).
35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006) (emphasis added).
35 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added).
Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, § 103, 66 Stat. 792, 798 (1952) (emphasis added).
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Section 101 sets forth the subject matter that can be
patented, “subject to the conditions and requirements of this
title.” The conditions [u]nder which a patent may be
obtained follow, and section 102 covers the conditions
relating to novelty . . . .
....
Section 103, for the first time in our statute, provides a
condition which exists in the law and has existed for more
than 100 years, but only by reason of decisions of the courts
. . . . Section 103 states this requirement in the title.585
Because § 101 defines the categories of subject matter that “can
be” patented “subject to the conditions and requirements” of § 103,
it is clear that an invention may fall within the categories of patenteligible subject matter (§ 101) even if it is ultimately unpatentable
due to obviousness (§ 103). Any other interpretation would make the
phrase “subject to the conditions and requirements of this title” mere
statutory “surplusage,”586 as this qualifier would be unnecessary if a
non-obviousness requirement were already subsumed within § 101.
As a corollary, the mere fact that a particular invention is obvious
under § 103 cannot mean that all inventions of the same type
necessarily fall outside the § 101 categories. Conflating the patenteligibility and non-obviousness requirements therefore confuses the
issues and risks unintended consequences—for example, the blanket
invalidation of an entire field of patents under § 101, based on a
particular bad patent that could otherwise be disposed of under
§ 103.
The conflation of patent eligibility with non-obviousness is
further inconsistent with the statute due to the element of time. The
current version of § 103—which became effective on September 16,
2012, as part of the America Invents Act—asks whether an invention
would have been obvious “before the [patent’s] effective filing
date.”587 Similarly, the previous version of § 103 asked whether the
invention would have been obvious “at the time the invention was
made.”588 In contrast, there is no reference to time in § 101; it simply
585.
added).
586.
587.
588.

S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 5 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2399 (emphasis
See, e.g., Freeman v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2034, 2043 (2012).
35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012) (effective Sept. 16, 2012).
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006) (effective Dec. 10, 2004–Sept. 15, 2012).
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lists the categories of subject matter that have been, are currently,
and always will be patent eligible.589 Yet, by conflating the patenteligibility and non-obviousness inquiries, the Court has effectively
imported a time element into § 101 which can be determinative of
patent eligibility.
For example, under the “inventive concept” test, a patent claim
that would recite patent-eligible subject matter if filed today might be
held patent ineligible under § 101 if filed tomorrow, solely because
certain claim elements have in the interim become “well-understood,
routine, [or] conventional.”590 This might result even if the core
discovery is still novel at the later date, since the analysis treats any
underlying law of nature, physical phenomenon, or abstract idea “as
though it were a familiar part of the prior art.”591 Under the same
logic, even if a claimed invention has been held patent eligible under
§ 101, a later improvement upon the same invention might be held
patent ineligible. This issue may arise, in particular, when (a) the
point of novelty of the improvement is viewed as a new or more
refined understanding of an underlying law of nature, physical
phenomenon, or abstract idea—which will nonetheless be treated as
“a familiar part of the prior art,”592 and (b) the “other steps” which
made the original claim patent eligible have since become “wellunderstood, routine, [or] conventional” and thus cannot save the
improvement from being found patent ineligible.593 Such a result
cannot be squared with the plain language of § 101, which expressly
mandates that, if an invention is a patent-eligible “process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter,” then “any new and useful
improvement thereof” must be patent eligible as well.594
In addition to its inconsistency with the statute, the “inventive
concept” test is wholly unworkable in practice. The core problem is
that the analysis invites subjectivity at its initial step, under which a
court must first identify the “laws of nature, physical phenomena,
[or] abstract ideas” that are “underlying” the patent claim at issue.595
This is an inherently subjective exercise, because (a) the Supreme
589.
590.
591.
592.
593.
594.
595.

35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294 (2012).
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 591–92, 594 (1978).
Id.
Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294.
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (emphasis added).
Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1293–94 (emphasis added).
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Court has not defined what constitutes a law of nature, physical
phenomenon, or abstract idea, and (b) the task of articulating the
principle underlying a patent claim is unbounded by the limitations
actually recited in the claim. A court is thus free to subjectively
articulate the underlying principle at any level of generality it
pleases. And because the underlying principle is then “treated as
though it were a familiar part of the prior art”596—effectively
excising it from the claim—this initial subjective characterization of
the underlying principal can effectively swallow the entire analysis.
For example, in Funk Bros., when considering a claimed
inoculant mixture comprising multiple strains of bacteria that would
not inhibit each other’s effects, the Supreme Court characterized the
“natural principle” underlying the claim as the “discovery that
certain strains of the several species of these bacteria are noninhibitive and may thus be safely mixed.”597 But in characterizing the
underlying “natural principle” with such specificity and then treating
it as though it were well known, the Court effectively excised the key
point of novelty from the claim, leading the Court to declare the
claimed invention patent ineligible on the ground that the remaining
claim elements failed to recite an inventive concept.598 To be sure,
the Court could have instead characterized the underlying
“phenomena of nature” at a higher level of generality, such as “the
existence of the individual strains of bacteria in nature.” Such a
characterization would not have excised the inventive concept—i.e.,
that certain strains of bacteria can be mixed without inhibiting each
other—and thus might have resulted in the claim being held patent
eligible.
As another example, in Judge Lourie’s plurality opinion in CLS
Bank, he characterized the “abstract idea” underlying the claims as
the “idea of reducing settlement risk by effecting trades through a
third-party intermediary (here, the supervisory institution)
empowered to verify that both parties can fulfill their obligations
before allowing the exchange—i.e., a form of escrow.”599 Effectively
excising these elements from the claims, Judge Lourie found that all
596. Flook, 437 U.S. at 591–92, 594.
597. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 132 (1948).
598. Id. at 131–32.
599. CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 717 F.3d 1269, 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (Lourie,
J., concurring).
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claims failed to recite an inventive concept and thus were not patent
eligible.600 But the “abstract idea” at issue could have been defined at
a higher level of generality, such as “the idea of reducing settlement
risk,” or “the concept of escrow.” Such broader characterizations
likely would have significantly changed the analysis and may have
instead resulted in a finding of patent eligibility.
Indeed, both Judge Lourie and Chief Judge Rader took such an
approach in Ultramercial, broadly characterizing the underlying
“abstract idea” as the “idea that advertising can be used as a form of
currency.”601 Unlike in CLS Bank, this more generalized articulation
of the “abstract idea” left enough specific elements in the claims for
the court to find that they recited patent-eligible subject matter.602
In short, the result of the “inventive concept” analysis is significantly
impacted—and in many cases dominated—by the initial subjective
determination as to what claim limitations are subsumed within the
articulated law of nature, physical phenomenon, or abstract idea.
Finally, the “inventive concept” test’s treatment of all laws of
nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas “as though [they are]
a familiar part of the prior art” is fundamentally flawed.603 While we
do acknowledge in Part VI.B, infra, that a limited variation of this
rule may be appropriate in certain circumstances—e.g., for products
of nature in an obviousness analysis under § 103—the Court’s
current use of the rule in the § 101 analysis is dangerously
overbroad.
First, there can be no logical justification for treating all
“abstract ideas” as though they are well known in the art. One may
certainly come up with an idea that is novel and non-obvious, yet
which can be viewed as too “abstract” for patenting. But if that idea
is then refined to a concrete application recited in a patent claim,
there is no logical reason the initial “abstract” idea should suddenly
lose its status as a point of novelty or as the patentee’s conception.
Such a rule “could eviscerate patent law,”604 because “any claim can
be stripped down, simplified, generalized, or paraphrased to remove
all of its concrete limitations, until at its core, something that could
600. Id. at 1292.
601. Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 722 F.3d 1335, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2013); id. at 1355
(Lourie, J., concurring).
602. Id. at 1354 (majority opinion); id. at 1355 (Lourie, J., concurring).
603. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 591–92, 594 (1978).
604. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012).
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be characterized as an abstract idea is revealed.”605 The “inventive
concept” test thus allows a court to excise and ignore a chunk of each
patent claim at the onset of every § 101 analysis. For example,
Alexander Graham Bell’s patent in Dolbear606 could have been
characterized as embodying the “abstract idea” of transmitting
sounds at a distance by varying the intensity of electricity to mimic
sound vibrations. Luckily for Bell, the “inventive concept” test did
not yet exist at that time, because this “abstract idea”—Bell’s key
point of novelty—might have been treated as well known and
excised from his claim, potentially rendering the claim patent
ineligible.
Second, treating as well known everything that can be
characterized as a “law of nature” or a “natural principle” directly
conflicts with the fact that “discoveries” constitute patent-eligible
subject matter. Moreover, as with abstract ideas, this rule “would, if
carried to its extreme, make all inventions unpatentable because all
inventions can be reduced to underlying principles of nature which,
once known, make their implementation obvious.”607 We address
these issues at length over the next two sections.
E. Patent-Eligible Subject Matter Includes “Discoveries”
The Court has repeatedly held that the mere discovery of “a
scientific truth, or the mathematical expression of it, is not [a]
patentable invention.”608 Indeed, a distinction between invention and
mere discovery appears to have factored heavily into the “inventive
concept” framework the Court has applied in many § 101 cases.
For example, in Funk Bros., when considering a claimed
inoculant mixture comprising multiple strains of bacteria that would
not inhibit each other’s effects, the Court stated the following:
[The patentee] does not create [the] state of inhibition or of
non-inhibition in the bacteria. Their qualities are the work
of nature. Those qualities are of course not patentable. For
patents cannot issue for the discovery of phenomena of
nature. The qualities of these bacteria, like the heat of the
605. Ultramercial, 722 F.3d at 1344.
606. Dolbear v. Am. Bell. Tel. Co., 126 U.S. 1 (1888).
607. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 189 n.12 (1981).
608. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939)
(emphasis added).
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sun, electricity, or the qualities of metals, are part of the
storehouse of knowledge of all men. They are
manifestations of laws of nature, free to all men and
reserved exclusively to none. He who discovers a hitherto
unknown phenomenon of nature has no claim to a
monopoly of it which the law recognizes. If there is to be
invention from such a discovery, it must come from the
application of the law of nature to a new and useful end.609
The Court held that the principle underlying the claimed inoculant
mixture—i.e., that certain strains of bacteria were mutually noninhibiting—was “no more than the discovery of some of the
handiwork of nature and hence [was] not patentable.”610 “[H]owever
ingenious the discovery of that natural principle,” the Court
reasoned, the mere “aggregation of species [of bacteria into a single
mixture] fell short of invention within the meaning of the patent
statutes.”611
The Court has similarly “held that the discovery of a novel and
useful mathematical formula may not be patented.”612 For example,
when the Flook Court considered a claimed method of updating
alarm limits using a mathematical formula, the Court “assume[d] that
[the] respondent’s formula [was] novel and useful and that he
discovered it.”613 However, the Court went on to hold that “the
discovery of such a phenomenon cannot support a patent unless there
is some other inventive concept in its application.”614 The Court
further reasoned that, because a mathematical formula is itself
unpatentable, “it is treated as though it were a familiar part of the
prior art.”615 The Flook Court ultimately held that, “once [the]
algorithm is assumed to be within the prior art,” the claimed method
of updating alarm limits “contains no patentable invention.”616
Likewise, in Mayo, the Court considered a claimed method of
determining an optimal drug dosage based on metabolite levels in a
609. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948) (emphases added).
610. Id. at 131 (emphasis added).
611. Id. (emphasis added).
612. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 591–92, 585 (1978) (emphasis added) (citing Gottschalk
v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972)).
613. Id. at 588.
614. Id. at 594 (emphasis added).
615. Id. at 591–92 (quoting Benson, 409 U.S. at 67); id. at 594.
616. Id. at 594 (emphasis added).
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patient’s blood.617 The Court characterized the “law of nature”
underlying the claim as “natural laws describing the relationships
between the concentration in the blood of certain [drug] metabolites
and the likelihood that the drug dosage will be ineffective or induce
harmful side-effects.”618 The Court reasoned that the discovery of
this metabolite-to-drug-dosage correlation was not patent eligible, as
it was merely “a consequence of the ways in which [the drugs] are
metabolized by the body—entirely natural processes.”619 “‘If there is
to be invention from [a discovery of a law of nature],’” the Court
reasoned, “‘it must come from the application of the law of nature to
a new and useful end.’”620 Setting aside the discovery of the natural
correlation, the Court found that the remaining steps were nothing
but “well-understood, routine, conventional activity” which included
no “inventive concept,” rendering the claim patent ineligible.621
Thus, in the three examples discussed above, the Court held that
the mere “discovery” of (a) the fact that certain bacteria strains were
mutually non-inhibiting,622 (b) a mathematical formula for updating
alarm limits,623 and (c) a correlation between metabolite levels and
optimal drug dosage,624 all did not constitute patentable “invention.”
What the Court failed to explain, however, is how these holdings
overcome the plain language of the Constitution and the Patent Act.
As we have discussed, the Intellectual Property Clause of the
U.S. Constitution authorizes Congress: “To promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.”625
By its plain language, the Intellectual Property Clause clearly
contemplates that “Inventors” include those who make

617. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct 1289, 1294–95 (2012).
618. Id. at 1294; see also id. at 1296 (“Prometheus' patents set forth laws of nature—namely,
relationships between concentrations of certain metabolites in the blood and the likelihood that a
dosage of a thiopurine drug will prove ineffective or cause harm.”).
619. Id. at 1297.
620. Id. at 1294 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co. v.
Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948)).
621. Id. at 1298.
622. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948).
623. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 588 (1978).
624. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294–95.
625. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added).
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“Discoveries,” and it expressly authorizes Congress to grant
“exclusive Right[s]” for such “Discoveries.”626
Indeed, equating inventorship with discovery was consistent
with the commonly understood meaning of these terms in 1787, at
the time of the Constitutional Convention. For example, the
Dictionary of the English Language, in versions published in both
1768 and 1792, provided the following definitions:
To DISCOVER. . . . 1. To show; to disclose; to bring to
light. 2. To make known. 3. To find out; to espy.
....
DISCOVERY. . . . 1. The act of finding any thing hidden.
2. The act of revealing or disclosing a secret.
....
To INVENT. . . . 1. To discover; to find out; to excogitate.
....
INVENTION. . . . 1. Fiction. 2. Discovery. 3. Excogitation;
act of producing something new.
....
INVENTOR. . . . 1. A finder out of something new.627
Moreover, as we discussed in Part II, supra,628 the Committee of
Eleven considered proposals from James Madison and Charles
Pinckney when drafting the Intellectual Property Clause. Pinckney
proposed to “grant patents for useful inventions,” while Madison
proposed protections for “useful knowledge and discoveries.”629 The
Committee of Eleven apparently merged the two proposals,
authorizing Congress to grant “Inventors the exclusive Right to
their . . . Discoveries.”630 The inclusion of the word “Discoveries” in
the Intellectual Property Clause was thus clearly no accident.
Consistent with the spirit and scope of congressional authority
granted by the Intellectual Property Clause, section 101 of the Patent
Act defines the categories of patent-eligible subject matter as

626. Id.
627. SAMUEL JOHNSON, DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (3d ed. 1768) (emphasis
added) (citations omitted). See also SAMUEL JOHNSON, DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (10th ed. 1792) (substantially the same definitions).
628. See supra notes 15–24 and accompanying text.
629. THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 14, at 321–22, 324–
25 (emphases added); see supra notes 15–24 and accompanying text.
630. Id. at 505 (emphasis added).
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follows: “Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to
the conditions and requirements of this title.”631
This language—”whoever invents or discovers”—is clear and
unambiguous. Moreover, consistent with the Intellectual Property
Clause, the Patent Act even equates inventorship with discovery in
an express definition, stating: “When used in this title unless the
context otherwise indicates—(a) The term “invention” means
invention or discovery.”632
Finally, it should be noted that the current version of the Patent
Act cited above is not an aberration, as the statute has expressly
made inventions and discoveries patent eligible from the very
beginning, dating all the way back to the Patent Act of 1790.633
This brings us back to the Supreme Court’s holdings. Despite
the clear statutory and constitutional support for the patent eligibility
of “discoveries” that fall within the § 101 categories, the Court has
held that “patents cannot issue for the discovery of phenomena of
nature” or “laws of nature,” as these are “free to all men and reserved
exclusively to none.”634 In the Court’s view, “however ingenious the
discovery of [a] natural principle may have been,” it falls “short of
invention within the meaning of the patent statutes.”635 The Court
631. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (emphasis added).
632. 35 U.S.C. § 100(a) (2012) (emphasis added). This definition was added “to avoid
repetition of the phrase ‘invention or discovery’ and its derivatives throughout the revised title.”
See S. Rep. No. 82-1979, at 5 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2409.
633. See, e.g., Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, § 101, 66 Stat. 792 (1952) (codified at 35 U.S.C.
§ 101) (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter . . . may obtain a patent therefor . . . .” (emphasis added)); Patent Act of
1930, ch. 312, § 4886, 46 Stat. 375 (1930) (“Any person who has invented or discovered any new
and useful art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter . . . may . . . obtain a patent
therefor.” (emphasis added)); Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 24, 16 Stat. 198–217 (1870) (“any
person who has invented or discovered any new and useful art, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter . . . may obtain a patent therefor.” (emphasis added)); Patent Act of 1836,
ch. 357, § 6, 5 Stat. 117 (1836) (“any person or persons having discovered or invented any new
and useful art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter” may seek a patent therefor
(emphasis added)); Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318 (1793) (authorizing the “Secretary
of State, to cause letters patent to be made out . . . giving a short description of the said invention
or discovery, and thereupon granting to such petitioner” (emphasis added)); Patent Act of 1790,
ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109 (1790) (anyone who has “invented or discovered any useful art,
manufacture, engine, machine, or device, or any improvement therein” may seek a patent therefor
(emphasis added)).
634. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948) (emphasis added).
635. Id. at 131 (emphasis added).
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requires patent claims to recite elements that embody an “inventive
concept,” disregarding the discovery of any natural principle.636
For all the reasons discussed above, such holdings are clearly
erroneous, as they are in direct conflict with the plain language of
both the Constitution and the Patent Act. This illustrates yet another
reason why the judicial exceptions to § 101 for “laws of nature,
physical phenomena, and abstract ideas” are fundamentally
flawed.637
But what then are the implications of discoveries being patent
eligible? If one “discovers” a chemical process naturally occurring in
a swamp, or a plant growing in the jungle, do these discoveries
respectively constitute a patent-eligible “process” and “composition
of matter” under § 101? The answer is undoubtedly no. And the
reason, once again, is firmly grounded in statute. To obtain a patent,
one must invent or discover something “new.”638
F. Patent-Eligible Subject Matter Must Be “New”
We turn now to the most overlooked word in § 101—”new.”
Section 101 states: “Whoever invents or discovers any new and
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or
any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent
therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”639
The word “new” in § 101 provides concrete statutory support for
a subset—though certainly not the entire scope—of the judicial
exceptions excluding “laws of nature” and “physical phenomena”
from patent eligibility.640 The Supreme Court has flirted with this
prospect, vaguely suggesting that the judicial exceptions “are
consistent with the notion that a patentable process must be ‘new and
useful.’”641 However, the Court has not expressly analyzed or
explained how the word “new” informs the § 101 inquiry.
The first Patent Act, enacted in 1790, did not include the word
“new” in the definition of patent-eligible subject matter. Rather, the
636. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S.Ct. 1289, 1294 (2012)
(citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594 (1978)).
637. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010) (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447
U.S. 303, 309 (1980)).
638. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (emphasis added).
639. Id. (emphasis added).
640. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3225 (quoting Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309).
641. Id.
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Act defined patent-eligible subject matter in section 1 as including
“any useful art, manufacture, engine, machine, or device, or any
improvement therein not before known or used.”642
In the Patent Act of 1793, drafted by Thomas Jefferson,643 the
definition of patent-eligible subject matter was modified to include
“any new and useful art, machine, manufacture or composition of
matter, or any new or useful improvement [therein], not known or
used before.”644
The foregoing changes were significant for several reasons.
First, in the 1790 Act, the definition of patent-eligible subject matter
and the novelty requirement were both included in the same sentence
of section 1, with novelty being reflected in the phrase “not before
known or used.”645 Similar language regarding novelty was carried
over into section 1 of the 1793 Act, in the phrase “not known or used
before.”646 Yet, even though section 1 already contained express
language pertaining to novelty, the 1793 revisions added the word
“new” to section 1 in two places.647 Moreover, the word “new” was
added as a qualifier immediately preceding the listed categories of
patent-eligible subject matter, whereas the words “not known or used
before” were retained later in the sentence.648
The foregoing amendment in the 1793 Act strongly suggests that
Congress (and Jefferson) intended the word “new” to have a different
meaning in the context of patent-eligible subject matter, distinct from
the concept of novelty that was already reflected in the phrase “not
known or used before.”649 Otherwise, adding the word “new”—
twice, in the same sentence as “not known or used before”—would
have been mere “surplusage.”650 We posit that the term “new” was
642. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109 (1790) (repealed 1793).
643. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318 (1793); see Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308–09
(referencing Thomas Jefferson as the author of the 1793 Act).
644. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318 (1793) (emphases added).
645. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109 (1790) (repealed 1793). It was not until the
Patent Act of 1952 that the categories of patent-eligible subject matter and the novelty
requirement were separated into section 101 and section 102, respectively. See Patent Act of
1952, ch. 950, §§ 101–02, 66 Stat. 792 (1952) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 101).
646. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318 (1793).
647. See supra notes 642–644 and accompanying text.
648. See Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318 (1793).
649. Id.; see also 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012) (providing the modern novelty requirement).
650. See Freeman v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2034, 2043 (2012) (noting that “the
canon against surplusage . . . favors that [statutory] interpretation which avoids surplusage”);
Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001) (explaining that the Court is “‘reluctan[t] to treat
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added to the definition of patent-eligible subject matter specifically
to clarify that something must be “new” to the world to be patent
eligible, even if it was “not known or used before.”
Our interpretation is supported by the fact that the word “new”
was added to the statute at the same time as the “composition of
matter” category of patent-eligible subject matter.651 At the time of
the 1793 Act, the dictionary definition of “MATTER” included:
“2. Materials; that of which anything is composed.”; and “9. Thing;
object; that which has some particular relation.”652 The dictionary
definition of “COMPOSITION” further included: “3. A mass formed
by mingling different ingredients.”653 Under these broad definitions,
any mass, object, or thing composed of two or more materials or
substances could arguably be viewed as a “composition of matter.”654
This would have been problematic, because an applicant might
discover a “composition of matter” in nature—for example, any
naturally occurring organism or thing composed of multiple
elements—which was “not known or used before.” However, such a
“composition of matter” would not be “new” to the world, as it
existed in nature prior to its discovery. This suggests that the word
“new” was added to the Patent Act specifically to clarify that
naturally existing compositions of matter, as well as naturally
occurring processes—i.e., “product[s] of nature”655 that are not
“new” to the world—do not constitute patent-eligible subject matter.
Indeed, when Congress re-codified the patent laws in 1952 and
split the patent eligibility and novelty requirements into § 101 and
§ 102 respectively, the word “new” was retained in § 101 as a

statutory terms as surplusage’ in any setting” and is “especially unwilling to do so when the term
occupies so pivotal a place in the statutory scheme” (quoting Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter
Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 698 (1995)).
651. Compare Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109 (1790) (repealed 1793), with Patent
Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318 (1793).
652. SAMUEL JOHNSON, DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (8th ed. 1792).
653. Id.
654. Later definitions of “composition of matter” have been similar. See, e.g., Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980) (noting that “‘composition of matter’ has been construed
consistent with its common usage to include ‘all compositions of two or more substances and . . .
all composite articles, whether they be the results of chemical union, or of mechanical mixture, or
whether they be gases, fluids, powders or solids’” (quoting Shell Dev. Co. v. Watson, 149 F.
Supp. 279, 280 (D.C. 1957))).
655. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2111 (2013).
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qualifier to the statutory categories.656 This is consistent with our
view that patent-eligible subject matter must be “new” to the world
under § 101, even if the claimed subject matter otherwise satisfies
the novelty requirement of § 102.657
How then does this relate to the judicial exceptions to § 101 for
“laws of nature” and “physical phenomena”?658 As an initial matter,
the word “new” appears to provide limited statutory support for a
subset of these exceptions. For example, compositions of matter that
exist in nature are “physical phenomena,” often referred to by the
Supreme Court as “product[s] of nature.”659 Similarly, naturally
occurring processes can be viewed as manifestations of the “laws of
nature.” Because neither are “new” to the world, they cannot
constitute patent-eligible subject matter under § 101.
However, the judicial exceptions for “laws of nature” and
“physical phenomena” are too vague and too broad to be completely
justified by the “new” requirement of § 101. Even subject matter that
is “new” to the world might still fail to pass muster under the judicial
exceptions. Consider, for example, the following hypothetical:
After spending billions of dollars on medical research,
Cancer Research Corp. discovers that all forms of cancer
that afflict humans are miraculously cured within 24 hours
when 250–500mg of lunar dust is introduced into the
bloodstream. Cancer Research Corp. seeks a patent
claiming the following: “A method of curing cancer,
comprising the steps of: (1) dissolving 250mg to 500mg of
lunar dust in a liquid solution; (2) injecting said liquid
solution containing said lunar dust into the bloodstream of a
cancer patient; and (3) curing the patient of cancer.”

656. See Patent Act of 1952, Pub L. No 82-593, §§ 101, 102, 66 Stat. 792 (1952) (codified at
35 U.S.C. §§ 100(b) & 101 (2012)).
657. Of course, this is not to say that the word “new” in § 101 never overlaps with the novelty
requirement of § 102. Indeed, the Committee Report to the 1952 Act recognized as much. See S.
Rep. No. 82-1979, at 5 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2399 (“Section 102, in
general, may be said to describe the statutory novelty required for patentability, and includes, in
effect, an amplification and definition of ‘new’ in section 101.”). We merely posit that the two
requirements are slightly different in scope. Namely, something that is novel under § 102 might
still not be “new” to the world under § 101—for example, when the claimed subject matter is a
“composition of matter” that exists in nature, or a “process” that occurs in nature, but was
previously unknown to those of skill in the art.
658. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010) (quoting Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309).
659. Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2111.
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Curing cancer by injecting dissolved lunar dust into a human’s
bloodstream would clearly be a “process” that is “new” to the world,
as there is no indication that such a process can be observed
occurring in nature. Thus, under our interpretation of the statute, the
claimed “process” would be patent eligible under § 101.
In contrast, the patent eligibility of the method of curing cancer
is less certain under the judicial exceptions to § 101, particularly
under the two-step “inventive concept” test applied in Mayo.
First, the Court would identify the “law of nature” underlying the
claim, which it might characterize as “the natural law that 250–
500mg of lunar dust in the bloodstream reacts within the human
body to cure cancer.”660 Second, the Court would analyze the claim’s
“other elements” to look for an “inventive concept” that “amounts to
significantly more than a patent upon the natural law itself.”661 The
Court might view the steps of dissolving a powder and injecting a
solution into the bloodstream as nothing but “well-understood,
routine, conventional activity previously engaged in by researchers
in the field.”662 Because “[a]nyone who wants to make use of the[]
law[]” that lunar dust cures cancer would necessarily have to take
these routine steps, the Court may find that the claim recites “nothing
significantly more than an instruction to doctors to apply the
applicable law[] when treating their patients.”663 It accordingly
appears that a straightforward application of Mayo might result in the
hypothetical method of curing cancer being held patent ineligible.664
Thus, even though the hypothetical method of curing cancer
would be a “process” that is “new” to the world—and would

660. In Mayo, when considering a claimed method of determining optimal drug dosage based
on metabolite levels in a patient’s blood, the Court characterized the “law of nature” underlying
the claim as “natural laws describing the relationships between the concentration in the blood of
certain [drug] metabolites and the likelihood that the drug dosage will be ineffective or induce
harmful side-effects.” Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289,
1294–96 (2012).
661. Id. at 1294 (emphasis added) (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594 (1978)).
662. Id. at 1294.
663. Id. at 1298.
664. To be sure, the Mayo Court did suggest that diagnostic methods may somehow be
distinguishable from treatment methods, stating: “Unlike, say, a typical patent on a new drug or a
new way of using an existing drug, the patent claims do not confine their reach to particular
applications of [natural] laws.” Id. at 1302. However, the Court offered no explanation or
reasoning to support any such distinction. Id. Thus, it is difficult to fathom how the hypothetical
method of treating cancer described herein can be anything but patent ineligible under Mayo,
unless the framework and reasoning applied in Mayo is subsequently modified by the Court.
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therefore be patent eligible under our interpretation of § 101—there
is a good chance it might be found patent ineligible under the
Supreme Court’s exception for “laws of nature” when applied using
the prevailing “inventive concept” test. The foregoing hypothetical
clearly exemplifies how the judicial exceptions—and in particular
the “inventive concept” framework—are illogical and inconsistent
with the plain language of the statute. As described in Part V.E,
supra, the Constitution and the Patent Act both clearly provide for
the patentability of “discoveries.” The statute could not be more clear
on this point—whoever “discovers any new and useful process” has
satisfied the requirements of § 101.665 Indeed, a new process of
curing cancer by injecting lunar dust into the bloodstream would
certainly be an earth-shattering discovery—precisely the kind of
innovation the patent system is presumably intended to incentivize.
As we have shown in this Part,666 the judicial exceptions to
§ 101 for “laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas”
are overbroad, misguided, and largely inconsistent with the statute.667
These exceptions clearly are “not required by the statutory text.”668
Nor are they justified by “preemption” concerns, as Congress has
enacted a detailed statutory scheme specifically designed to balance
preemption concerns against the goal of incentivizing innovation.669
Likewise, the “abstract ideas” exception is itself an abstraction in
view of the statutory scheme, as claims which satisfy all of the
conditions of patentability are by definition not abstract.670 The
“inventive concept” test improperly conflates § 101 with § 103, is
wholly unworkable in practice, and ignores the fact that
“discoveries” can be patent eligible.671 Finally, although the word
“new” in § 101 provides limited statutory support for a subset of the
“laws of nature” and “physical phenomena” exceptions, these
frameworks—in conjunction with the “inventive concept” test—are
dangerously overbroad. As Justice Frankfurter aptly noted,
“Everything that happens may be deemed ‘the work of nature,’ and
665. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (emphases added).
666. See supra Part V.
667. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010) (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447
U.S. 303, 309 (1980)).
668. Id.; see also supra Part V.A.
669. See supra Part V.B.
670. See supra Part V.C.
671. See supra Parts V.D–E.
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any patentable composite exemplifies in its properties ‘the laws of
nature.’”672 As such, the inventive-concept test “would, if carried to
its extreme, make all inventions unpatentable because all inventions
can be reduced to underlying principles of nature which, once
known, make their implementation obvious.”673
Accordingly, for all the foregoing reasons, we propose that the
judicial exceptions to § 101 for “laws of nature, physical phenomena,
and abstract ideas,” as well as the “inventive concept” test, should be
abandoned entirely. In their stead, we propose asking a simple and
straightforward question that is grounded firmly in the statutory text:
Is the claimed subject matter “new” to the world?
VI. THE CURE: HITTING THE “RESET” BUTTON
In Parts I–V, we have provided an in-depth analysis of § 101,
including its constitutional basis and legislative history, and we have
surveyed more than 160 years of Supreme Court patent-eligibility
jurisprudence, leading up to the Court’s recent decision in Myriad.674
We have concluded that the Court’s “judicial exceptions” to § 101
for “laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas” are
overbroad, misguided, inconsistent with the statute, and unworkable
in practice. Accordingly, in this part, we endeavor to provide a
“new” framework for the § 101 analysis that is clear, workable, and
can predictably determine the subject-matter eligibility of any patent
claim. Importantly, the framework we provide is grounded firmly in
the statutory text, and it is consistent with the Court’s most recent
patent-eligibility decision in Myriad.
Indeed, as we have described at length, we believe the Myriad
decision was a significant departure from the Court’s prior § 101
jurisprudence. In particular, Myriad eschewed both the “inventive
concept” test and any consideration of “preemption” concerns, two
core principles which dominated most of the Court’s prior patenteligibility decisions.675 We propose that Myriad’s departure from
precedent presents a unique opportunity for the Supreme Court to hit

672. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 134–35 (1948) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring).
673. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 189 n.12 (1981).
674. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2107 (2013).
675. See supra Part III.G.

224

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:117

“reset” on its § 101 jurisprudence in future cases, using Myriad as a
pivot point and foundation for a “new” interpretation of § 101.
A. Myriad to the Rescue: A “New” Framework for Patent Eligibility
We propose that the judicial exceptions to § 101 for “laws of
nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas”—as well as the
“inventive concept” test and any “preemption” concerns—should all
be eliminated from the patent-eligibility analysis. In their stead, we
propose consulting the statutory language of § 101 itself, including
(a) the listed categories of patent-eligible subject matter, and (b) the
requirement that patent-eligible subject matter must be “new.”676
Based on these express statutory requirements, we propose that a
claim should be found to recite patent-eligible subject matter if and
only if the following questions are both answered in the affirmative:
“(1) Does the claim, considered as a whole, literally recite a ‘process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter?’ (2) If so, is the
claimed process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter
one that is ‘new’ to the world?”
The proposed framework closely tracks the plain language of
§ 101, which expressly states that “any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter” constitutes patenteligible subject matter.677 Moreover, the proposed framework is
functionally equivalent to the two-step analysis the Supreme Court
effectively applied in Myriad, the Court’s most recent patenteligibility decision. We elaborate below as to the application of the
proposed framework to various actual and hypothetical fact patterns,
including the facts of Myriad and other cases.
Under the first step of the proposed framework, the court would
focus on the categories of patent-eligible subject matter expressly
listed in § 101—i.e., “process, machine, manufacture, or composition
of matter.”678 The focus should be on what is literally recited in the
patent claim, considering the claim as a whole. To the extent that
multiple claims are at issue, each claim must be considered
individually on its own merits. Ultimately, any claim that literally
recites a process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter—
under the plain and ordinary meaning of those terms—would satisfy
676. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
677. Id. (emphasis added).
678. Id.
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the first step of the proposed framework. The analysis would then
proceed to step two. On the other hand, if a patent claim fails to
literally recite subject matter within the § 101 categories, the claim
would immediately be found patent ineligible, ending the analysis.
We do not further belabor the first step of the proposed analysis,
as the Court has long considered the § 101 categories at the onset of
virtually every patent-eligibility analysis, with this base requirement
typically found to be satisfied. For example, before applying the
judicial exceptions in Benson, Flook, Chakrabarty, Diehr, Bilski,
Mayo, and Myriad, the Court initially found that the claims at issue
in each case recited subject matter that literally fell within the § 101
categories.679 As a practical matter, patent claims that recite subject
matter literally outside of the § 101 categories are unlikely to be filed
by patentees and even less likely to be issued by the United States
Patent and Trademark Office. As such, this initial step of the
proposed framework would generally serve as a “coarse eligibility
filter,”680 weeding out or deterring claims that do not even attempt to
recite patent-eligible subject matter under § 101.
If the first requirement is satisfied—i.e., if the claim literally
recites a “process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter”—then the second step of the framework focuses on the § 101
requirement that patent-eligible subject matter must be “new.” As we
have described at length, we believe the term “new” was added to the
definition of patent-eligible subject matter specifically to clarify that
something must be “new” to the world to be patent eligible under
§ 101, regardless of whether the claimed subject matter is novel
under § 102.681 For this analysis, we propose that claimed subject
matter is “new” to the world if and only if the claimed “process,

679. See Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2113, 2116–17 (finding that the claimed DNA sequences fell
into the “composition of matter” category); Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294 (finding that the claims at
issue “cover[ed] processes that help doctors who use thiopurine drugs . . . determine whether a
given dosage level is too low or too high”); Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3225 (“The present case involves
an invention that is claimed to be a ‘process’ under § 101.”); Diehr, 450 U.S. at 177 (“The
claimed invention is a process for molding raw, uncured synthetic rubber into cured precision
products.”); Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309 (finding that the claim at issue was directed to a
“manufacture or composition of matter”); Flook, 437 U.S. at 588 (“It is true, as respondent
argues, that his method is a ‘process’ in the ordinary sense of the word.”); Benson, 409 U.S. at 68
(noting that “the present case deals with a ‘process’ claim”).
680. Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 722 F.3d 1335, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
681. See supra Part V.F.
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machine, manufacture, or composition of matter” does not typically
occur or exist in nature absent human input or intervention.
For clarity, it is helpful to describe what step two of the
proposed framework is not. First, unlike the Court’s “inventive
concept” test, the question of whether the claimed subject matter is
“new” to the world does not involve any dissection of the patent
claim at issue. The framework does not call for a subjective
identification of any “abstract idea” or “law of nature” “underlying”
the patent claim.682 Rather, as for step one, the claim should again be
considered as a whole for step two of the analysis. In other words,
the level of generality at which to analyze the claimed subject matter
is dictated solely by the limitations actually recited in the claim—
nothing more, nothing less. This reflects the “‘bedrock principle’ of
patent law that ‘the claims of a patent define the invention.’”683
Second, the analysis of whether the claimed subject matter is
“new” to the world should not invoke any considerations regarding
claim overbreadth, abstractness, or preemption. Such concerns are
appropriately analyzed under the enablement and definiteness
requirements of § 112.684
Third, the § 101 requirement that patent-eligible subject matter
must be “new” should not be confused with the novelty or nonobviousness requirements. Because the patent-eligibility inquiry
under § 101 has no time element, subject matter that is patent eligible
today should never cease to be patent eligible, regardless of the level
of knowledge in the art.685 Thus, the § 101 inquiry should not be
concerned with who invented or discovered the claimed subject
matter first, or with the simplicity of the claimed subject matter given
the state of the art. Such concerns are appropriately addressed under
the § 102 novelty and § 103 obviousness inquiries, respectively. The
patent-eligibility inquiry under § 101 should be concerned solely
with the type of subject matter claimed. Thus, under our proposal, the
question of whether the claimed subject matter is “new” to the world
as required by § 101 would hinge solely on whether the recited
682. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1293–94 (emphasis added).
683. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting Innova/Pure
Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); see also
Altoona Publix Theatres v. Am. Tri-Ergon Corp., 294 U.S. 477, 487 (1935) (“Under the statute, it
is the claims of the patent which define the invention.”).
684. See supra Parts V.B–C.
685. See supra Part V.D.
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“process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter” typically
exists or occurs in nature absent human input or intervention,
regardless of when the subject matter was invented or discovered.
Fourth, the claimed subject matter will be considered “new” to
the world so long as it does not typically exist or occur in nature
absent human input or intervention. As the Myriad Court recognized,
a mere “possibility that an unusual and rare phenomenon might
randomly create” the claimed subject matter does not defeat its
patent eligibility.686 In our view, subject matter that does not
typically exist in nature can always be considered “new” under
§ 101—given the ordinary meaning of that term—even if the claimed
subject matter could in theory result from an improbable random
occurrence.
Finally, as a practical matter, the second step of our framework
will likely have significance for only two of the four categories of
statutory subject matter—the “process” and “composition of matter”
categories.687 There are countless “process[es]” and “composition[s]
of matter” that typically occur or exist in nature and thus cannot be
considered “new” to the world. In contrast, if a claim recites subject
matter that literally falls within the “machine” or “manufacture”
categories of § 101, then the claimed subject matter is likely “new”
to the world, as machines and manufactures by definition exist solely
due to human activity—i.e., they are things “made by man.”688
As an exemplary application of the proposed framework, we
first revisit the facts of Myriad, the Court’s most recent patenteligibility decision.689 Myriad discovered two human DNA
sequences—the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes—which can be used to
assess a patient’s risk of developing breast or ovarian cancer.690
Myriad sought patent claims directed to (a) isolated DNA sequences
relating to the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes, and (b) synthetically
created cDNA sequences derived from the BRCA1 and BRCA2
genes.691

686. Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2119 n.8.
687. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
688. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309 (quoting S. Rep. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1952);
H.R. Rep. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1952)).
689. Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2107; see also supra Part III.G.
690. Id. at 2110–13.
691. Id. at 2111–12.
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Under the first step of the proposed framework, we assess
whether each claim, considered as a whole, literally recites a
“process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter”—i.e.,
subject matter literally within one of the § 101 categories. We find it
clear that all of the claims at issue in Myriad literally recited
“composition[s] of matter”—i.e., compositions of nucleotides which
form the claimed DNA and cDNA sequences. We note that the
Myriad Court reached the same preliminary conclusion.692
With step one satisfied for all of Myriad’s challenged claims, we
next ask whether the particular “composition of matter” recited in
each claim is “new” to the world. For this analysis, a “composition of
matter” is “new” to the world if and only if it does not typically exist
in nature absent human input or intervention. Again, each patent
claim at issue must be considered as a whole and on its own merits.
If a claim reads on any composition of matter that is not “new” to the
world, then it recites subject matter that is patent ineligible under
§ 101.
Proceeding under step two, we first consider Myriad’s claims
directed to isolated DNA sequences. Exemplary Claim 1 recites “[a]n
isolated DNA coding for a BRCA1 polypeptide”—i.e., the entire
BRCA1 sequence.693 This claim clearly fails step two, as the BRCA1
nucleotide sequence typically exists in nature, as part of the human
genome, without human input or intervention. Likewise, dependent
Claim 5 recites “[a]n isolated DNA having at least 15 nucleotides of
the DNA of claim 1.”694 This claim similarly fails step two, as it
reads on any contiguous sequence of 15+ nucleotides that naturally
exists in the BRCA1 portion of the human genome. Accordingly,
because Claims 1 and 5 both read on compositions of matter that are
not “new” to the world, these claims each recite subject matter that is
patent ineligible under § 101.
Our framework’s treatment of the foregoing isolated DNA
claims is consistent with the Supreme Court’s holding in Myriad.
Specifically, the Myriad Court found that “[t]he location and order of
the nucleotides existed in nature before Myriad found them.”695
692. Id. at 2113, 2116–17 (finding that the claimed DNA and cDNA sequences each literally
recited a “composition of matter”).
693. Id. at 2113.
694. Id.
695. Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2116 (emphasis added)
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Myriad’s discovery of the naturally occurring BRCA1 sequence thus
did “not render the BRCA genes ‘new . . . composition[s] of matter’
that are patent eligible.”696 As such, the Court held that Myriad’s
claims to isolated DNA sequences were invalid under § 101.697
We next apply step two of the proposed framework to Myriad’s
cDNA claims. Exemplary Claim 2, for example, recites a cDNA
sequence derived from isolated BRCA1—i.e., a sequence containing
only the exon nucleotides from BRCA1, with all intervening intron
nucleotides removed.698 Unlike the sequences of Claims 1 and 5, the
cDNA sequence recited in claim 2 does not typically exist in nature
without human input or intervention, as the precise nucleotide
sequence claimed presumably cannot be found in the human genome.
As such, the cDNA recited in Claim 2 is a composition of matter that
is “new” to the world, rendering it patent eligible under § 101.
Our framework’s treatment of Claim 2 is likewise consistent
with the Supreme Court’s holding in Myriad. The Court reasoned
that “cDNA does not present the same obstacles to patentability as
naturally occurring, isolated DNA segments,” because “creation of a
cDNA sequence . . . results in an exons-only molecule that is not
naturally occurring.”699 The key fact, the Court held, was that “the
lab technician unquestionably creates something new when cDNA is
made,” rendering the claimed cDNA patent eligible under § 101.700
Claim 6 of Myriad’s patent is also directed to cDNA, but
applying step two of our framework yields a different result. Claim 6
recites “[a]n isolated DNA having at least 15 nucleotides of the DNA
of claim 2,” effectively claiming any 15+ nucleotide sequence found
in cDNA derived from the BRCA1 gene.701 As previously discussed,
cDNA is created by removing intron sequences from isolated DNA,
keeping only the exon sequences.702 But exon sequences are often
more than 15 nucleotides in length.703 Claim 6 would thus read on
any 15+ nucleotide sequence that naturally exists within a single
exon of the BRCA1 gene. Therefore, assuming the BRCA1 gene
696.
697.
698.
699.
700.
701.
702.
703.

Id. at 2117 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 101) (emphases added).
Id. at 2119.
Id. at 2113.
Id. at 2119 (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. at 2112.
See supra note 353.
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includes at least one 15+ nucleotide exon, Claim 6 reads on one or
more nucleotide sequences that are not “new” to the world, rendering
the claim invalid under § 101.
The foregoing conclusion regarding Claim 6 is again consistent
with the Supreme Court’s holding in Myriad. Specifically, the Court
held that cDNA was typically patent eligible, “except insofar as very
short series of DNA may have no intervening introns to remove
when creating cDNA.”704 “In that situation,” the Court held, “a short
strand of cDNA may be indistinguishable from natural DNA.”705 In
other words, to pass muster under § 101, a patent claim cannot read
on any nucleotide sequence that exists in the human genome.
Thus, under both the proposed framework and Myriad, the key
factors to patent eligibility are (1) whether the claim literally recites a
“process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter”; and
(2) whether the claimed subject matter is “new” to the world. Under
step one, Myriad’s claims recited nucleotide sequences, which are
“composition[s] of matter.” Under step two, Myriad’s claims that
solely read on nucleotide sequences that are “new” to the world are
patent eligible (e.g., cDNA with intervening introns removed),
whereas Myriad’s claims that read on one or more nucleotide
sequences that exist in the human genome are not patent eligible
(e.g., isolated BRCA1, or any contiguous portion thereof).
We note that, in reaching its holding, the Myriad Court reasoned
that the mere act of “isolating DNA from the human genome” does
not render the isolated nucleotide sequence patent eligible.706
We agree. In fact, such considerations are already subsumed within
step two of our proposed framework, which asks whether the
claimed process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter is
“new” to the world. A contiguous nucleotide sequence extracted
from the human genome cannot be considered a “new . . .
composition of matter” in any reasonable sense; it can at most be
viewed as a naturally existing “composition of matter” that has been
found and harvested. For example, a plant found in nature does not
become a “new . . . composition of matter” when clipped from its
stem, nor does a slab of stone become “new” when extracted from a
quarry.
704. Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2119 (emphasis added).
705. Id.
706. Id. at 2118 (emphasis added).
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But if “isolation” from nature does not confer patent eligibility,
how should the law treat something like a wooden baseball bat, given
that the bat is merely a piece of wood “isolated” from a tree? Myriad
raised this hypothetical before the Supreme Court, contending that
the clear patent eligibility of a wooden baseball bat necessitates the
patent eligibility of an isolated DNA sequence.707 The Court rejected
this argument and found isolated DNA patent ineligible, but it did
not address the baseball-bat hypothetical in its opinion.708 Our
proposed framework, however, offers a straightforward means for
distinction: Look to the actual limitations recited in the claim.
For example, a claim to a wooden baseball bat which merely
recites “a piece of wood sufficient for a person to swing” would fail
to satisfy § 101 under the proposed framework, as the claim would
literally read on a “composition of matter” that typically exists in
nature—e.g., a fallen tree branch. In contrast, a more specific claim
to a wooden baseball bat might read something like the following:
A wooden baseball bat turned from a single piece of wood,
comprising:
(a) a cylindrical barrel having a first diameter sufficient to
strike a baseball;
(b) a cylindrical handle having a second diameter less than
said first diameter and sufficient for a person to grip;
(c) a tapered portion connecting said barrel and said handle;
and
(d) a cylindrical knob connected to the base of said handle
and having a third diameter less than said first diameter and
greater than said second diameter.
The later claim’s structural and functional limitations clearly place
the recited subject matter into the “machine” or “manufacture”
categories of § 101, rather than the “composition of matter” category.
Moreover, the recited “machine” or “manufacture” is clearly “new”
to the world, as wooden baseball bats with the precise structural and
functional attributes claimed do not typically exist in nature absent
human input or intervention. Accordingly, the later claim would
recite patent-eligible subject matter under § 101.
707. See Brief for Respondents at 40–43, Myriad, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013) (No. 12-398);
Transcript of Oral Argument at 37, 41 & 48, Myriad, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013) (No. 12-398).
708. See Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2116–19.
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We have shown above how the proposed framework is entirely
consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Myriad. The
framework is similarly consistent with the Court’s decision in
Chakrabarty, wherein the Court considered a claim directed to a
genetically engineered bacterium capable of breaking down crude
oil.709 The Court found the claimed bacterium patent eligible under
§ 101, reasoning that the patentee had “produced a new bacterium
with markedly different characteristics from any found in nature.”710
Likewise, the genetically engineered bacterium would be found
patent eligible under our proposed framework, because (1) the
genetically-engineered bacterium falls into the “composition of
matter” category of § 101, and (2) the genetically-engineered
bacterium is “new” to the world, as it does not typically exist in
nature without human input or intervention.
However, the proposed framework would reach a different result
than the Supreme Court’s ruling in Funk Bros. In that case, the
patentee claimed an inoculant mixture for plants comprising multiple
strains of bacteria that would not inhibit each other’s effects.711
The Court found the claimed inoculant mixture patent ineligible,
reasoning that (a) the individual species of bacteria in the claimed
inoculant mixture were each products of nature, and (b) the patent
did not claim any inventive concept beyond the underlying “natural
principle” that certain strains of bacteria do not inhibit each other’s
effects.712 The § 101 analysis and outcome would differ under our
proposed framework.
Under the first step of the proposed framework, the claim from
Funk Bros. would be considered as a whole to determine whether it
recites subject matter that falls within the § 101 statutory categories.
Because the claimed inoculant mixture is a “composition of matter,”
this initial requirement is satisfied. Step two of our framework would
then ask whether the claimed inoculant mixture as a whole is “new”
to the world. This differs from the Court’s analysis in Funk Bros.,
which dissected the claim and focused on the fact that the individual
species of bacteria comprising the claimed inoculant mixture were

709.
710.
711.
712.

Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 305 (1980).
Id. at 310 (emphasis added).
Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 128–30 (1948).
Id. at 131.
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each products of nature.713 In contrast, under the proposed
framework, the claimed inoculant mixture as a whole is a
“composition of matter” that is “new” to the world, because there is
no indication that the claimed mixture of multiple species of bacteria
typically exists in nature without human input or intervention. As
such, the claimed inoculant mixture of Funk Bros. would be patent
eligible under the proposed framework.
While the foregoing applications of the proposed framework
concern “composition of matter” claims, the analysis is substantially
the same for claims directed to the other categories of statutory
subject matter. Consider, for example, the previously discussed
hypothetical method of curing cancer by injecting lunar dust into a
patient’s bloodstream.714 The hypothetical claim reads as follows: A
method of curing cancer, comprising the steps of: (1) dissolving
250mg to 500mg of lunar dust in a liquid solution; (2) injecting said
liquid solution containing said lunar dust into the bloodstream of a
cancer patient; and (3) curing the patient of cancer.
The foregoing claim satisfies step one of the proposed
framework, as it recites subject matter that literally falls into the
“process” category of § 101. The claim further satisfies step two, as
the claimed “process” of curing cancer is “new” to the world.
Specifically, there is no indication that the claimed process of curing
cancer with lunar dust typically occurs in nature without human input
or intervention. Accordingly, under the proposed framework, the
foregoing claim recites patent-eligible subject matter.
It should be noted that the patent eligibility of the foregoing
“process” of curing cancer is not affected by the mere fact that it
utilizes a “composition of matter”—lunar dust—that typically exists
in nature. Under the proposed framework, a “process” may be “new”
to the world, even if it involves the use of products of nature which
are not themselves patent eligible. Thus, a “process” of curing cancer
with lunar dust is patent eligible, even though the lunar dust itself
would not be patent eligible in a “composition of matter” claim.
Of course, there are a multitude of processes that typically occur
in nature without human input or intervention and thus cannot be
considered “new” to the world. For example, a chemical process that

713. Id.
714. See supra Part V.F.

234

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:117

typically occurs in swamplands, a biological process that typically
occurs in a natural organism, or a naturally occurring weather
process each would not be patent eligible under the proposed
framework. Moreover, a “process” which typically exits in nature
without human input or intervention does not automatically become
a “new” process when recreated in a lab. For example, a naturally
occurring biological process does not become a “new” process when
recreated in a petri dish. This is a corollary to the previously
discussed principle that mere “isolation” from nature does not render
a “composition of matter” patent eligible.
Needless to say, the foregoing exemplary applications of the
proposed framework do not endeavor to address every possible
nuance or fact pattern that might arise regarding patent eligibility.
The framework would be further refined through the development of
a new body of patent-eligibility jurisprudence building upon Myriad.
The important thing, in our view, is that the analysis should proceed
by asking the correct questions: (1) whether the claim literally recites
a “process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter”; and (2)
whether the claimed subject matter is “new” to the world.
Finally, it should always be remembered that a finding of patent
eligibility under § 101 does not itself render a claim patentable. The
other patentability requirements must additionally be satisfied, such
as the requirements of novelty,715 non-obviousness,716 enablement,717
written description,718 and definiteness.719 Indeed, even as the
Myriad Court found certain claims to cDNA patent eligible under
§ 101, it “express[ed] no opinion [as to] whether cDNA satisfies the
other statutory requirements of patentability.”720
B. Closing the Circle: A “New” Facet to the Obviousness Inquiry
Under the proposed framework, a “composition of matter” that
typically exists in nature is not “new” to the world and thus is not
patent eligible under § 101. Thus, the sap of a tree discovered in the
715. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012).
716. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012).
717. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012).
718. Id.
719. 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (2012).
720. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2119 n.9
(2013) (“We express no opinion whether cDNA satisfies the other statutory requirements of
patentability. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103, and 112 . . . .”).
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Amazon (let us call it an “Eden” tree) would not be patent eligible, as
the sap typically exists in nature without human input or intervention
and thus is not “new” to the world. However, if one were to discover
that sap from the Eden tree is an effective treatment for acne when
applied to human skin, this “new . . . process” of treating acne would
be patent eligible under the proposed framework. Unlike the sap
itself, the claimed “process” of treating acne does not typically exist
in nature absent human input or intervention, as the process requires
sap to be extracted from an Eden tree and applied to a person’s skin.
This raises an interesting question of fundamental importance:
Even though sap from the Eden tree would be patent ineligible as a
“composition of matter,” could a patentee effectively capture all uses
of this naturally occurring substance by simply claiming a “process”
of harvesting sap from an Eden tree? An exemplary claim might
read: “A method of harvesting Eden tree sap, comprising the steps of
(a) locating an Eden tree, (b) extracting sap from the trunk of said
Eden tree, and (c) storing the extracted sap in a sealed receptacle.”
Such a claim would recite a “process” that is “new” to the world, as
the claimed process of harvesting sap from the Eden tree does not
typically occur in nature absent human input or intervention. Thus,
under a straightforward application of the proposed framework, the
foregoing claim recites patent-eligible subject matter under § 101.
The scenario above illustrates a danger that patent eligibility
might be gamed through artful claim drafting. At a gut-check level,
many would likely agree that if sap from an Eden tree is
unpatentable, a claim directed to a generic method of harvesting the
sap should be unpatentable as well. Any contrary conclusion would
allow a patentee to effectively capture all uses of the Eden tree sap,
even though the sap itself is barred from patentability under § 101.
The key question is whether the Patent Act offers an objective and
logical means to prevent such apparently inconsistent results.
As a preliminary observation, we note that the answer to the
foregoing riddle cannot logically extend from the patent-eligibility
requirement of § 101, as a “method of harvesting Eden tree sap” is
clearly a “process” that is “new” to the world. The simplistic or
trivial nature of a claimed “process” is wholly irrelevant to the
patent-eligibility inquiry, as § 101 is solely concerned with the type
of subject matter claimed. Indeed, if a patentee were to invent a
particularized method of harvesting tree sap that is novel, non-

236

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:117

obvious, definite, and fully enabled by the patent’s specification,
then such a “process” applied to harvesting sap from an Eden tree
certainly would not be barred from patent eligibility under § 101.
Thus, because § 101 offers no statutory basis for distinguishing
between different “process[es]” that are “new” to the world, the
patent-eligibility inquiry cannot solve this quandary.
Nor could the patentability of the claimed “method of harvesting
Eden tree sap” be challenged under the novelty requirement of § 102.
A patent claim is anticipated under § 102 only if “each and every
[claimed] limitation is found either expressly or inherently in a single
prior art reference.”721 Because the patentee in our hypothetical was
the first person to ever harvest sap from an Eden tree—an express
claim limitation—the invention is clearly novel under § 102.
Likewise, under prevailing doctrine, the claimed “method of
harvesting Eden tree sap” could arguably satisfy the non-obviousness
requirement of § 103. Under § 103, a patent may not be obtained if
“the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious . . . to a
person having ordinary skill in the art.”722 Let us assume that the
claimed means of harvesting tree sap (from any type of tree) was
merely a routine and conventional process that had long been wellknown in the relevant field. Under that scenario, the claimed
“method of harvesting Eden tree sap” would still arguably be nonobvious under § 103, as the patentee was the first to discover the
existence of the Eden tree and its sap. Without knowledge of the
Eden tree’s existence, the patentee would argue, a person of ordinary
skill in the art could not have found it obvious to harvest Eden tree
sap. In other words, to establish the non-obviousness of the claimed
process under § 103, the patentee would distinguish the prior art
based solely upon his discovery of things that exist in nature—i.e.,
the Eden tree and its sap—which are not themselves patent eligible
under § 101.
The foregoing example illustrates the potential for seemingly
inconsistent results—(a) an Eden tree is patent ineligible under
§ 101, yet discovery of the Eden tree might be the sole basis for a
claim’s patentability under § 103; and (b) Eden tree sap is patent
ineligible as a “composition of matter” under § 101, yet a patent721. Whitserve, LLC v. Computer Packages, Inc., 694 F.3d 10, 21 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting
Celeritas Techs., Ltd. v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 150 F.3d 1354, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
722. 35 U.S.C. § 103.
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eligible “method of harvesting Eden tree sap” could effectively
capture all uses of the patent-ineligible composition of matter. The
fundamental underlying question, which has lurked just beneath the
surface of more than a century of patent-eligibility jurisprudence, can
be stated as follows: Where a claim as a whole recites patent-eligible
subject matter, to what extent can claim elements that would be
patent ineligible if claimed alone be used to distinguish the claim
from the prior art?
We believe that the Supreme Court’s failure to directly address
and answer the foregoing question has been a core source of the
confusion that has long plagued the patent-eligibility inquiry.
Apparently sensing the issue—but failing to directly articulate it—
the Court created the “inventive concept” test in an effort to avoid
inconsistencies such as those described above. Under that test, the
patent-ineligible law of nature, physical phenomena, or abstract idea
that the Court identifies as underlying the claim at issue “is treated
as though it were a familiar part of the prior art,” effectively
excising it from the claim.723 The claim is then found to be patent
eligible under § 101 only if the claim’s “other elements” collectively
recite an “inventive concept”—i.e., more than mere “routine,
conventional activity previously engaged in by researchers in the
field.”724
But as we have described at length, the “inventive concept” test
is deeply flawed.725 Unlike our proposed framework, the “inventive
concept” test focuses on the Court’s judicial exceptions to patent
eligibility for “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas,”726 which we have demonstrated are overbroad, inconsistent
with the statute, and unworkable in practice.727 Moreover, as the
Supreme Court has itself admitted, “ignoring all laws of nature when
evaluating a patent . . . would ‘make all inventions unpatentable
because all inventions can be reduced to underlying principles of
nature which, once known, make their implementation obvious.’”728

723. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 597 (1978); see also Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293–94 (2012).
724. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294.
725. See supra Part V.D.
726. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1293 (citation omitted).
727. See supra Part V.
728. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1304 (quoting Diehr, 450 U.S. at 189 n.12).
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As will be described further below, we do agree that at least
some patent-ineligible subject matter should be viewed as prior art.
However, such findings should be relevant only to an obviousness
analysis under § 103. There is no statutory basis for importing
obviousness considerations into the § 101 analysis,729 and doing so
invites subjective determinations outside of the detailed obviousness
framework that is defined by a rich body of § 103 jurisprudence.730
But if some patent-ineligible subject matter is to be treated as
prior art for the purposes of an obviousness analysis under § 103,
what is the statutory basis for doing so, and where should the line be
drawn? “[T]oo broad an interpretation of this exclusionary principle
could eviscerate patent law,”731 while too narrow an interpretation
would leave room for gamesmanship and inconsistent results such as
those described above. To answer this riddle, we turn once again to
Chief Judge Rader’s mantra: “When all else fails, consult the
statute!”732
Section 103 of the Patent Act reads in its entirety as follows:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained,
notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically
disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences
between the claimed invention and the prior art are such
that the claimed invention as a whole would have been
obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed
invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to
which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not
be negated by the manner in which the invention was
made.733
Section 103 does not expressly define what sources may be
considered “prior art” in the obviousness inquiry. The antecedent
phrase “notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically
disclosed as set forth in section 102” has been interpreted as
729. See supra notes 579–594 and accompanying text.
730. See, e.g., KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007); United States v.
Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (2001); Anderson’s-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57
(1969); Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1 (1966); Great Atlantic & Pacific
Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950); Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52
U.S. 248 (1850).
731. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1293.
732. CLS Bank, 717 F.3d at 1335 (Rader, C.J., Additional Reflections).
733. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (emphasis added).
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indicating that the “prior art” includes at least the categories of prior
art defined under § 102.734 Importantly, however, there is nothing in
§ 103 that necessarily limits the “prior art” solely to § 102 prior art.
To the contrary, the Federal Circuit has expressly recognized that
“section 102 is not the only source of section 103 prior art.”735 For
example, “prior art may be created by the admissions of the parties,”
such as an admission in the patent’s specification or prosecution
history that certain subject matter constitutes “prior art,” even if there
is no basis for that subject matter to qualify as prior art under
§ 102.736 As another example, “common sense” improvements and
“common knowledge” may be considered in the obviousness
analysis, even if not disclosed in any § 102 prior art reference.737 We
posit that, in addition to the foregoing sources of prior art that may
be considered in the obviousness inquiry, there is also a set of prior
734. See Riverwood Int’l Corp. v. R.A. Jones & Co., Inc., 324 F.3d 1346, 1354 (Fed. Cir.
2003) (“The term ‘prior art’ as used in section 103 refers at least to the statutory material named
in 35 U.S.C. § 102.”) (emphasis added); In re Wertheim, 646 F.2d 527, 532 (CCPA 1981) (“[W]e
have held that the term ‘prior art’ refers to at least the statutory prior art material named in
§ 102.”) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also S. Rep. No.
1979, 82nd Cong., 2d Sess. (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, at 2399 (“Section
103 . . . refers to the difference between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art,
meaning what was known before as described in section 102.”).
735. Riverwood, 324 F.3d at 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see also In re Fout, 675 F.2d 297, 300
(CCPA 1982) (“This court has recognized that section 102 is not the only source of section 103
prior art.”).
736. Riverwood, 324 F.3d at 1354; see PharmaStem Therapeutics, Inc. v. ViaCell, Inc., 491
F.3d 1342, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“Admissions in the specification regarding the prior art are
binding on the patentee for purposes of a later inquiry into obviousness.”); Constant v. Advanced
Micro-Devices, 848 F.2d 1560, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“A statement in a patent that something is
in the prior art is binding on the applicant and patentee for determinations of anticipation and
obviousness.”); Sjolund v. Musland, 847 F.2d 1573, 1577–79 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (where patent
specification admitted that certain subject matter was prior art, “the jury was not free to disregard
[that subject matter]” and “must have accepted [it] as prior art, as a matter of law”); see also In re
Fout, 675 F.2d at 300; In re Nomiya, 509 F.2d 566, 571 (CCPA 1975); In re Hellsund, 474 F.2d
1307, 1386 (CCPA 1973); In re LoPresti, 333 F.2d 932, 934 (CCPA 1964); John Burke, The
Prior Art By Admission Doctrine: Judicially Created Private Prior Art, 13 FED. CIR. B.J. 607
(2004) (gathering and discussing cases); Lance Leonard Barry, Anything You Say Can Be Used
Against You: Admissions of Prior Art, 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 347 (2000)
(gathering and discussing cases).
737. See, e.g., KSR, 127 U.S. at 420–21 (“Common sense teaches . . . that familiar items may
have obvious uses beyond their primary purposes, and in many cases a person of ordinary skill
will be able to fit the teachings of multiple patents together like pieces of a puzzle.”); Perfect Web
Techs., Inc. v. InfoUSA, Inc., 587 F.3d 1324, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (holding that “an analysis of
obviousness . . . may include recourse to logic, judgment, and common sense available to the
person of ordinary skill that do not necessarily require explication in any reference or expert
opinion”); In re Bozek, 416 F.2d 1385, 1390 (CCPA 1969) (holding that an examiner my find
obviousness based on “common knowledge and common sense of the person of ordinary skill in
the art without any specific hint or suggestion in a particular reference”).
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art defined by § 101. We propose the following rule: “Pursuant to
§ 101, any ‘process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter’ that is not ‘new’ to the world is ‘prior art’ for the purposes of
a § 103 obviousness analysis.”
The logic of the proposed § 101 prior-art rule is straightforward,
and it is firmly grounded in the statutory text. First, § 101 lists the
categories of subject matter that are potentially patent eligible—i.e.,
any “process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.”738
Second, under our framework, anything that falls into these statutory
categories is patent eligible, provided that it is “new” to the world.739
But if a “process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter”
is not “new” to the world, it is unpatentable under § 101. In such
case, the subject matter’s prior existence in nature is the sole reason
for its unpatentability under § 101. In other words, a “process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter” that is not “new” to
the world is unpatentable under § 101, not because it falls outside the
statutory categories, but rather because it is in effect anticipated by
nature. In this regard, § 101 and § 102 can be viewed as two sides of
the same coin—the former defining a set of prior art created by
nature, and the latter defining a set of prior art created by man.740
Indeed, the fundamental principle underlying the concept of
prior art is that “Congress may not authorize the issuance of patents
whose effects are to remove [subject matter] from the public domain,
or to restrict free access to materials already available.”741 If a
“process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter” is
unpatentable under § 101 because it is not “new” to the world, then
that subject matter is unquestionably within the public domain. For
example, if a “composition of matter” is unpatentable under § 101
because it exists in nature and thus is not “new” to the world, then
that composition of matter is necessarily a material to which all
members of the public are entitled free access.

738. 35 U.S.C. § 101.
739. Id.
740. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (“Whoever invents or discovers and new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter . . . may obtain a patent therefor . . . .”)
(emphasis added); 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (“A person shall be entitled to a patent unless—(1) the
claimed invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or
otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention; . . . .”)
(emphases added).
741. Graham, 383 U.S. at 6.
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Moreover, a patent may not “remove from the public that which
is in the public domain by virtue of its inclusion in, or obviousness
from, the prior art.”742 In other words, “obvious variants of prior art
references are themselves part of the public domain.”743 Accordingly,
because a “process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter”
that exists in nature is within the public domain, obvious variants and
uses thereof should be viewed as within the public domain as well.
Thus, if a natural “process” is unpatentable under § 101 because it is
not “new” to the world, then obvious variants and uses of the natural
process should be unpatentable as well. In such cases, the necessary
conclusion is that the natural subject matter must be viewed as “prior
art” for the purposes of an obviousness analysis under § 103.
Finally, the fact that a patentee may have been first to uncover
the existence of certain subject matter in nature is irrelevant to the
§ 103 inquiry, because “actual knowledge of the [subject matter] is
not required for [it] to be considered prior art.”744 “To determine
patentability, a hypothetical person [having ordinary skill in the art]
is presumed to know all the pertinent prior art, whether or not the
applicant [was] actually aware of its existence” prior to the alleged
invention.745 This “conclusive presumption of knowledge of such
prior art is, in effect, a statutorily required fiction.”746 We see no
reason this legal fiction should not apply equally to both prior art
defined under § 101 and prior art defined under § 102.
Accordingly, under the proposed § 101 prior-art rule, the
obviousness analysis under § 103 would presume that a hypothetical
person having ordinary skill in the art has full knowledge of the
existence of every “process, machine, manufacture, and composition
of matter” that is not “new” to the world—i.e., that typically exists or
occurs in nature without human input or intervention.
It is equally important to note what knowledge our proposed rule
would not automatically attribute to the hypothetical person having
ordinary skill in the art. While the person of ordinary skill would be
presumed to have knowledge of the existence of every naturally
742. In re Huai-Hung Kao, 639 F.3d 1057, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (quoting In re Wiseman,
596 F.2d 1019, 1023 (CCPA 1979)) (emphasis added).
743. In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (emphasis added).
744. In re Carlson, 983 F.2d 1032, 1038 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
745. Id.; see also In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“The person of
ordinary skill in the art is a hypothetical person who is presumed to know the relevant prior art.”).
746. In re Howarth, 654 F.2d 103, 106 (Fed. Cir. 1981).
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occurring “process, machine, manufacture, and composition of
matter,” the presumption of knowledge would not extend to any
attribute, quality, utility, or application of the natural subject matter.
To be sure, the full § 103 analysis may ultimately conclude that a
particular attribute, quality, utility, or application would have been
obvious to a person of ordinary skill who has knowledge of the
subject matter’s existence in nature. But that is an argument to be
made, not an automatic presumption to be applied.
Indeed, the foregoing is a key distinction between our proposed
§ 101 prior-art rule and the Supreme Court’s “inventive concept”
test. Beyond the existence of subject matter that falls within the
§ 101 statutory categories but is not “new” to the world, the Court’s
“inventive concept” test presumes that a person of ordinary skill in
the art has full knowledge of any underlying principle, attribute,
quality, or utility that can be characterized as a “law of nature.”747
As we have discussed and the Supreme Court has admitted, faithful
application of this rule would eviscerate patent law, “because all
inventions can be reduced to underlying principles of nature which,
once known, make their implementation obvious.”748 Moreover,
unlike our proposed § 101 prior-art rule, the “inventive concept” test
lacks any basis in the statutory text, and it conflicts with the plain
language of § 101 that makes “discover[ies]” patent eligible so long
as the claimed subject matter falls within the listed statutory
categories and is “new” to the world.749
We will now provide a series of exemplary applications of the
proposed patent-eligibility framework in conjunction with the
proposed § 101 prior-art rule. We return first to our hypothetical
regarding the Eden tree. Let us consider, for example, a
“composition of matter” claim directed solely to Eden tree sap.
Applying the proposed framework, such a claim would clearly recite
patent-ineligible subject matter under § 101, as Eden tree sap
typically exists in nature without human input or intervention and
thus is not “new” to the world. Such a “composition of matter” claim
would therefore be rendered unpatentable by § 101, making
consideration of the § 103 obviousness analysis unnecessary.

747. See Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1293–94; Flook, 43 U.S. at 597.
748. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1304 (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 189 n.12 (1981)).
749. See supra Parts V.D–E.
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The analysis changes if we instead consider a claim that recites:
“A method of harvesting Eden tree sap, comprising the steps of
(a) locating an Eden tree, (b) extracting sap from the trunk of said
Eden tree, and (c) storing the extracted sap in a sealed receptacle.”
The foregoing claim recites a “process” that is “new” to the world, as
the claimed process of harvesting Eden tree sap does not typically
occur in nature absent human input or intervention. As such, the
claim recites patent-eligible subject matter under § 101.
However, while the claimed “method of harvesting Eden tree
sap” is patent eligible under § 101, the claim must still satisfy the
remaining patentability requirements, including the non-obviousness
requirement of § 103. Under § 103, a patent may not be obtained if
“the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious . . . to a
person having ordinary skill in the art.”750 Our hypothetical presumes
that the recited means of harvesting tree sap was well-known in the
art at the time of the alleged invention. Further, under the proposed
§ 101 prior-art rule, because the Eden tree and its sap are both
“composition[s] of matter” that are not “new” to the world, they
constitute “prior art” for the purpose of the § 103 analysis. Under
these circumstances, we believe that a fact finder would likely
conclude that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have
found it obvious that the known means of harvesting tree sap could
be used to harvest sap from the Eden tree, the existence of which is
presumed to be well-known. Accordingly, the claimed “method of
harvesting Eden tree sap” would likely be found invalid as obvious
under § 103.
The analysis changes yet again if, after discovering that sap
from the Eden tree is an effective treatment for acne, the patentee
claims “[a] method of treating acne by applying Eden tree sap to a
person’s skin.” In that scenario, the claimed “process” of treating
acne would be “new” to the world, as it does not typically occur in
nature absent human input or intervention. Accordingly, such a claim
would be patent eligible under § 101.
Turning to the § 103 analysis, the Eden tree sap would again be
considered “prior art,” as it is a “composition of matter” that is not
“new” to the world. However, while the Eden tree sap’s existence
would be considered well-known, the prior art would not include the
750. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012).
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knowledge that Eden tree sap can be used to treat acne. The relevant
question, therefore, would be whether a person having ordinary skill
in the art would have found it obvious to use the known substance of
Eden tree sap to treat acne. Given that the prior art includes no
knowledge that Eden tree sap is effective at treating acne, we believe
a fact finder would likely find the claim non-obvious under § 103.
Accordingly, unlike the claims directed to Eden tree sap as a
“composition of matter” or to a generic “process” of harvesting Eden
tree sap, the claimed method of using Eden tree sap to treat acne
would be both patent eligible (§ 101) and non-obvious (§ 103).
As described above, if a “composition of matter” or “process”
constitutes prior art under § 101 because it is not “new” to the world,
then the hypothetical person having ordinary skill in the art is
presumed to have knowledge of the subject matter’s existence in
nature. It should be noted that knowledge of the subject matter’s
existence in nature necessarily includes knowledge of all locations in
nature where the subject matter can be found.
For example, let us consider a hypothetical scenario in which a
patentee was the first to discover that the DNA of an unborn fetus
can be found circulating in the maternal bloodstream during
pregnancy. Presume the patentee then claimed a “method of
detecting fetal DNA in maternal blood” generally comprising the
steps of (1) analyzing maternal blood using well-known laboratory
tests, and (2) detecting the fetal DNA in the maternal blood. Because
fetal DNA is a “composition of matter” that typically exists in nature
and thus is not “new” to the world, the fetal DNA itself constitutes
§ 101 prior art under our proposed rule. As such, a person having
ordinary skill in the art would be presumed to have knowledge of the
fetal DNA’s existence and location in nature—including,
specifically, the fact that fetal DNA naturally exists in the maternal
bloodstream. Under these circumstances, we believe a fact finder
would likely conclude that a person having ordinary skill in the art
would have found it obvious that known tests for analyzing blood
could be used to detect fetal DNA in maternal blood, given the
presumption that the presence of fetal DNA in maternal blood was
already well-known. Accordingly, the claimed “method of detecting
fetal DNA in maternal blood” would likely be found invalid as
obvious under § 103.
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While the foregoing examples both concerned “process” claims,
the proposed § 101 prior-art rule applies to any type of claim. For
example, let us again revisit the facts of Funk Bros., where the
patentee claimed an inoculant mixture for plants comprising multiple
strains of bacteria that did not inhibit each other’s effects.751 The
Supreme Court found the claimed inoculant mixture patent ineligible
under § 101, in part because the individual species of bacteria
comprising the mixture were each products of nature.752 In contrast,
as we described in Part VI.A, supra, our proposed framework would
find the Funk Bros. claim patent eligible under § 101, as the claimed
inoculant mixture as a whole is a “composition of matter” that is
“new” to the world—i.e., the mixture of bacteria does not typically
exist in nature absent human input or intervention.
But the Funk Bros. inoculant mixture must still satisfy the nonobviousness requirement of § 103. Under the proposed § 101 priorart rule, each of the individual species of bacteria comprising the
claimed inoculant mixture would be considered “prior art” for the
§ 103 analysis, as each bacteria strain is a “composition of matter”
that typically exists in nature and thus is not “new” to the world.
A person having ordinary skill in the art would thus be presumed to
have knowledge of the existence of each bacteria strain. But that does
not end the inquiry, as the claimed invention must be “considered as
a whole” under § 103.753 The relevant question is whether a person
of ordinary skill would have found it obvious to combine the known
bacteria strains to create the claimed inoculant mixture. The Funk
Bros. Court found that, prior to the invention, “it had been assumed
that the different [bacteria] species were mutually inhibitive.”754 The
inventor then “discovered that there are strains of each species of . . .
bacteria which do not exert a mutually inhibitive effect on each
other.”755 In our opinion, without this added knowledge discovered
by the inventor (i.e., the qualities of mutual non-inhibition), a person
having ordinary skill in the art would not have found it obvious to
combine the known species of bacteria to form the claimed mixture.
Accordingly, under our proposed patent-eligibility framework and
751.
752.
753.
754.
755.

Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 128–30.
Id. at 131.
35 U.S.C. § 103.
Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948).
Id.
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prior-art rule, the claimed inoculant mixture would have likely been
found both patent eligible (§ 101) and non-obvious (§ 103).
As a final example, we return once again to the facts of Myriad,
including Myriad’s claims directed to synthetically created cDNA.
As we discussed in Part VI.A, supra, our proposed framework would
find that claims which recite cDNA (with one or more intervening
introns removed) are patent eligible under § 101, as such claims
recite “composition[s] of matter” (i.e., nucleotide sequences) that are
“new” to the world (i.e., do not typically exist in the human genome).
The Myriad Court reached the same conclusion under substantially
similar reasoning.756 However, although the Myriad Court found that
such cDNA claims were patent eligible under § 101, it “express[ed]
no opinion [as to] whether cDNA satisfies the other statutory
requirements of patentability,” such as obviousness under § 103.757
The genome of a natural organism typically comprises one or
more discrete chromosomes, wherein each chromosome is encoded
with a sequence of millions of chemically joined nucleotide pairs.758
Each chromosome is a “composition of matter” that typically exists
in nature and thus is not “new” to the world. As such, under the
proposed § 101 prior-art rule, every chromosome that exists in
nature—including its entire nucleotide sequence—constitutes “prior
art” for the purposes of a § 103 analysis. This means that a person of
ordinary skill in the art would be presumed to have knowledge of the
existence and location—i.e., the sequence—of all nucleotides in
every chromosome of the natural organism’s genome. The
corresponding implications for the obviousness inquiry will likely
depend on the specific limitations recited in the claim at issue.
For example, consider a hypothetical “composition of matter”
claim directed to cDNA derived from the full nucleotide sequence of
a chromosome. In other words, presume that the claim recites cDNA
comprising all exons from the entire chromosome, with all of the
introns removed. Under the proposed § 101 prior-art rule, the full
nucleotide sequence of the chromosome used to create the cDNA
would be considered “prior art” for the § 103 analysis. Further, as the
Supreme Court noted in Myriad, the prior art also includes “well
756. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2119 (2013).
757. Id. at 2119 n.9 (“We express no opinion whether cDNA satisfies the other statutory
requirements of patentability. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103, and 112 . . . .”).
758. Id. at 2111, 2114.
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known laboratory methods” for deriving cDNA from natural
DNA.759 Under these circumstances, we believe a fact finder would
likely conclude that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have
found it obvious that the known laboratory methods could be used to
derive cDNA from the known nucleotide sequence of the
chromosome. Thus, the hypothetical claim directed to cDNA derived
from an entire natural chromosome would likely be invalid as
obvious under § 103.
The analysis changes, however, if we consider a “composition
of matter” claim that recites cDNA derived from a specific subset of
a chromosome’s nucleotide sequence. For example, Myriad
discovered that a subset of the nucleotides located within
chromosome 17 (the BRCA1 sequence) can be used to predict a
patient’s cancer risk.760 Claim 2 of Myriad’s patent thus recited
cDNA derived from the BRCA1 sequence.761 Under the proposed
§ 101 prior-art rule, the entire nucleotide sequence of chromosome
17 would be considered “prior art” for the § 103 analysis. What
would not be prior art, however, is the knowledge that the BRCA1
subset of chromosome 17 has a unique utility for predicting cancer
risk. But a patent claim which recites a “composition of matter” is
not limited to any specific utility. Thus, the relevant question for the
§ 103 analysis is whether a person of ordinary skill would have
found it obvious to use known laboratory methods to create cDNA
from the BRCA1 subset of chromosome 17’s known nucleotide
sequence, notwithstanding that the BRCA1 subset’s utility for
predicting cancer risk was previously unknown.
For such claims, the Federal Circuit has held that a “prima facie
case of obviousness” may be established if there is “structural
similarity” to the prior art and a “motivation to make the claimed
composition[]”—i.e., a motivation aside from the newfound
utility.762 The burden then shifts to the patentee to “rebut that prima
facie case,” for example, by showing “that the prior art is so deficient
that there is no motivation to make what might otherwise appear to
be obvious.”763 The discovery of “unexpectedly improved properties
759.
760.
761.
762.
763.

Id. at 2112.
Id. at 2110–11.
Id. at 2113.
In re Dillon, 919 F.2d 688, 692 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (en banc).
Id. at 693.
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or properties that the prior art does not have” is evidence of nonobviousness, but “does not by itself defeat a prima facie case.”764
Ultimately, analyzing Claim 2 of Myriad’s patent for obviousness
will be a fact-intensive inquiry that is beyond the scope of this
Article.765 But whatever the outcome, the important point is that the
§ 103 analysis of the claimed subject matter—cDNA derived from
the BRCA1 sequence—should proceed based upon the view that the
natural nucleotide sequence of chromosome 17 is “prior art.”
Finally, the analysis changes once again if—rather than a
“composition of matter”—we instead consider a claimed “process”
of using the BRCA1 sequence to test patients for an increased risk of
cancer. Such a claim would recite patent-eligible subject matter
under § 101, as the claimed “process” of using BRCA1 to assess a
patient’s cancer risk is clearly “new” to the world—i.e., the process
does not typically occur in nature without human input or
intervention.
Turning to the obviousness inquiry, the nucleotide sequence of
chromosome 17—which includes the BRCA1 sequence—would
again be considered “prior art” for the § 103 analysis, as it is a
“composition of matter” that is not “new” to the world. However,
while the sequence’s existence would be considered well-known, the
prior art would not include knowledge that the BRCA1 sequence can
be used to assess cancer risk. Moreover, unlike a “composition of
matter” claim, the claimed “process” is tied to a specific utility—i.e.,
assessing cancer risk. As such, the relevant question for the § 103
analysis is whether a person of ordinary skill in the art would have
found it obvious to use the BRCA1 subset of chromosome 17’s
known nucleotide sequence to test patients for increased cancer risk.
Given that the prior art includes no knowledge that the BRCA1
sequence can be used to assess cancer risk, we believe a fact finder
would likely find the claimed process non-obvious under § 103.
Accordingly, a claimed “process” of using the BRCA1 sequence to
test patients for increased cancer risk would be both patent eligible
(§ 101) and non-obvious (§ 103) under our proposed framework.
764. Id. at 692–93 (emphasis added).
765. Id. at 693 (“Each situation must be considered on its own facts . . . .”); see generally
Otsuka Pharm. Co., Ltd. v. Sandoz, Inc., 678 F.3d 1280 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (analyzing obviousness
of a pharmaceutical composition); Genetics Inst., LLC v. Novartis Vaccines & Diagnostics, Inc.,
655 F.3d 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (analyzing obviousness of a human blood-clotting protein).
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Indeed, this result should be unsurprising—the Myriad Court
expressly noted that “this case does not involve [claims] on new
applications of knowledge about the BRCA1” sequence, and “[m]any
of [the] unchallenged claims are limited to such applications.”766
VII. CONCLUSION
As we have endeavored to demonstrate in this Article, prior to
Myriad, the Supreme Court’s patent-eligibility jurisprudence was
deeply flawed. The Court’s judicially created exceptions to patenteligible subject matter lack any support in the statutory text, are
based on misinterpretations of the Court’s own precedents, and rely
upon subjective determinations that have proved thoroughly
confounding for lower courts to apply. Further, the judicial
exceptions have been prompted by concerns that Congress has
already addressed in other explicit provisions of the patent laws,
including but not limited to the requirements of non-obviousness,767
full-scope enablement,768 written description,769 and claim
definiteness.770 We submit that these other provisions should be
allowed to do their work as Congress intended, while the patenteligibility inquiry should be limited to a role firmly grounded in the
plain language of § 101. We have accordingly proposed a new
framework for the patent-eligibility inquiry that takes its cues from
Myriad and abandons the dominant frameworks of the Supreme
Court’s pre-Myriad case law.
Under our proposed framework, and consistent with the text of
§ 101, a claim recites patent-eligible subject matter if and only if
(1) the claim as a whole literally recites a “process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter,” and (2) the claimed subject
matter as a whole is “new” to the world.771 For this analysis, the
claimed subject matter is “new” to the world if and only if it does not
typically exist or occur in nature absent human input or intervention.
766. Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2120 (emphasis altered); see also id. at 2113 n.2 (“At issue are
claims 1, 2, 5, 6, and 7 of U.S. Patent 5,747,282 . . . .”); U.S. Patent No. 5,747,282 claim 20 (filed
June 7, 1995) (unchallenged claim 20 reciting “[a] method for screening potential cancer
therapeutics . . . .”).
767. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012).
768. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012).
769. Id.
770. 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (2012).
771. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
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Finally, to close the circle and preserve that which is rightfully in the
public domain, any “process, machine, manufacture, or composition
of matter” that is not “new” to the world constitutes § 101 “prior art,”
which may be cited in a typical § 103 obviousness analysis.
The framework we have proposed maintains the long-standing
prohibition against patenting products of nature—consistent with the
statutory text—while providing a bright-line rule that will bring
much-needed predictability and consistency to the § 101 inquiry. The
framework reserves for other, better-suited provisions of the patent
laws the more granular balancing of interests required to determine
whether a particular claimed invention warrants patent protection.
Finally, we emphasize that the proposed framework set forth in this
Article would require changes to prevailing law—including the
express overruling of a number of Supreme Court precedents—
which of course only the Supreme Court or Congress have the power
to do.

